

HUTCHESON: (Francis) *the Elder*

A N
INQUIRY
INTO THE
ORIGINAL of our IDEAS
OF
BEAUTY and VIRTUE;
In Two TREATISES.

- I. Concerning BEAUTY, ORDER,
HARMONY, DESIGN.
II. Concerning MORAL GOOD and
EVIL.

The Second Edition, Corrected and Enlarg'd.

Itaque eorum ipsorum quæ aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit. Quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis, factisque conservandum putat. Quibus ex rebus conflatur & efficitur id quod quærimus honestum: Quod etiam si nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit: quodque etiam si à nullo laudetur, naturâ est laudabile. Formam quidem ipsam & tanquam faciem honesti vides, quæ si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores excitaret sapientiæ. *Cic. de Off. lib. 1. c. 4.*

L O N D O N :

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INQUIRY

INTO THE

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In Two Parts
I. Concerning BEAUTY
HARMONY, DESIGN.
II. Concerning MORAL GOOD and
VIRTUE.

The second Edition, Corrected and Enlarged.

These essays contain the substance of the lectures delivered at the Royal Institution, London, during the winter of 1820-21, and are intended to present to the public a more complete and accurate view of the principles of beauty and virtue, than has hitherto been accessible. The author has endeavored to combine the results of his own observations with the opinions of the most celebrated philosophers and artists of the age, and to present them in a clear and concise manner, so as to be accessible to the general reader.

LONDON:

Printed by J. DODD, at the British Museum.
J. LAMBERT, at the British Museum.
R. CLAY, at the British Museum.



TO
His EXCELLENCY,
J O H N,
Lord CARTERET,
Lord Lieutenant of IRELAND.

May it please your Excellency,

WHEN I publish'd
these Papers, I had
so little Confidence
of their Success, that I was
unwilling to own them ; and

A 2

what

what I was unwilling myself to own, I durst not presume to inscribe to any great Name.

YOUR Excellency's favourable Reception of them, soon put me out of all Fears about their Success with the wiser and better Part of the World; and since this has given me Assurance to own them, I humbly presume to inscribe them in this second Edition to your Excellency, that I may have at once an Opportunity of expressing the sincerest Gratitude for the Notice you were pleas'd to take of me, and have the Pleasure also of letting the
World

DEDICATION.

V

World know that this small
Work has your Excellency's
Approbation.

THE Praise bestow'd by
Persons of real Merit and
Discernment, is allow'd by all
to give a noble and rational
Pleasure. Your Excellency
first made me feel this in
the most lively manner ; and
it will be a Pleasure as last-
ing as it is great : 'twill ever
be matter of the highest
Joy and Satisfaction to me,
that I am Author of a Book
my LORD CARTERET ap-
proves.

I KNOW, my Lord, that
much of your Commendation

is to be attributed to your own Humanity: You can entirely approve the Works of those alone, who can think and speak on these Subjects as justly as your self; and that is what few, if any, even of those who spend their Lives in such Contemplations, are able to do. In the Conversation, with which your Excellency has been pleas'd to honour me, I could not, I own, without the utmost surprize, observe so intimate an Acquaintance with the most valuable Writings of contemplative Men, Antient, and Modern; so just a Taste of what is excellent in the ingenious Arts,
in

DEDICATION.

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in so young a Man, amidst the Hurry of an active Life. Forgive me, my Lord, that I mention this part of your Character: 'tis so uncommon that it deserves the highest Admiration; and 'tis the only one which an obscure Philosopher, who has receiv'd the greatest Obligations from your Excellency, can with any Propriety take notice of.

THOSE other great Endowments which have enabled you, even in Youth, to discharge the most difficult Employments, with the highest Honour to your self, and Advantage to your Country, I dare not presume to describe.

scribe. He who attempts to do Justice to so great and good a Character, ought himself to be one of uncommon Merit and Distinction: and yet the ablest Panegyrist would find it difficult to add any thing to your Excellency's Fame. The Voices of NATIONS proclaim your Worth. I am,

May it please your Excellency,

Your most obliged,

Most obedient, and

Most devoted humble Servant,

Dublin,
June 19.
1725.

Francis Hutcheson.

THE
P R E F A C E.

THERE is no part of Philosophy of more importance, than a just Knowledge of Human Nature, and its various Powers and Dispositions. Our late Inquiries have been very much employ'd about our Understanding, and the several Methods of obtaining Truth. We generally acknowledge, that the Importance of any Truth is nothing else than its Moment, or Efficacy to make Men happy, or to give them the greatest and most lasting Pleasure; and Wisdom denotes only a Capacity of pursuing this End by the best Means. It must surely then be of the greatest importance,
to

to have distinct Conceptions of this End it self, as well as of the Means necessary to obtain it ; that we may find out which are the greatest and most lasting Pleasures, and not employ our Reason, after all our laborious Improvements of it, in trifling Pursuits. It is to be fear'd indeed, that most of our Studys, without this Inquiry, will be of very little use to us ; for they seem to have scarce any other tendency than to lead us into speculative Knowledge it self. Nor are we distinctly told how it is that Knowledge, or Truth is pleasant to us.

THIS Consideration put the Author of the following Papers upon inquiring into the various Pleasures which Human Nature is capable of receiving. We shall generally find in our modern philosophick Writings, nothing further on this Head, than some bare Division of them into Sensible, and Rational, and some trite Com-

Common-place Arguments to prove the latter more valuable than the former. Our sensible Pleasures are slightly pass'd over, and explain'd only by some Instances in Tastes, Smells, Sounds, or such like, which Men of any tolerable Reflection generally look upon as very trifling Satisfaction. Our rational Pleasures have had much the same kind of treatment. We are seldom taught any other Notion of rational Pleasure than that which we have upon reflecting on our Possession, or Claim to those Objects, which may be Occasions of Pleasure. Such Objects we call advantageous; but Advantage, or Interest, cannot be distinctly conceiv'd, till we know what those Pleasures are which advantageous Objects are apt to excite; and what Senses or Powers of Perception we have with respect to such Objects. We may perhaps find such an Inquiry of more importance in Morals, to prove what we call the Reality of Virtue, or that

that it is the surest Happiness of the Agent, than one would at first imagine.

IN reflecting upon our external Senses, we plainly see, that our Perceptions of Pleasure, or Pain, do not depend directly on our Will. Objects do not please us, according as we incline they should. The presence of some Objects necessarily pleases us, and the presence of others as necessarily displeases us. Nor can we by our Will, any otherwise procure Pleasure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the former kind of Objects, and avoiding the latter. By the very Frame of our Nature the one is made the occasion of Delight, and the other of Dissatisfaction.

THE same Observation will hold in all our other Pleasures and Pains. For there are many other sorts of Objects, which please, or displease us as necessarily, as material Objects do

do when they operate upon our Organs of Sense. There is scarcely any Object which our Minds are employ'd about, which is not thus constituted the necessary occasion of some Pleasure or Pain. Thus we find our selves pleas'd with a regular Form, a piece of Architecture or Painting, a Composition of Notes, a Theorem, an Action, an Affection, a Character. And we are conscious that this Pleasure necessarily arises from the Contemplation of the Idea, which is then present to our Minds, with all its Circumstances, altho some of these Ideas have nothing of what we call sensible Perception in them; and in those which have, the Pleasure arises from some Uniformity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation; and not from the simple Ideas of Colour, or Sound, or mode of Extension separately consider'd.

THESE Determinations to be pleas'd with any Forms, or Ideas which

which occur to our Observation, the Author chuses to call SENSES; distinguishing them from the Powers which commonly go by that Name, by calling our Power of perceiving the Beauty of Regularity, Order, Harmony, an INTERNAL SENSE; and that Determination to be pleas'd with the Contemplation of those Affections, Actions, or Characters of rational Agents, which we call virtuous, he marks by the name of a MORAL SENSE.

*HIS principal Design is to shew,
 " That Human Nature was not left
 " quite indifferent in the affair of
 " Virtue, to form to it self Obser-
 " vations concerning the Advantage,
 " or Disadvantage of Actions, and
 " accordingly to regulate its Con-
 " duct." The weakness of our Reason, and the avocations arising from the Infirmary and Necessitys of our Nature, are so great, that very few Men could ever have form'd those
 long*

The PREFACE.

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long Deductions of Reason, which shew some Actions to be in the whole advantageous to the Agent, and their Contrarys pernicious. The AUTHOR of Nature has much better furnish'd us for a virtuous Conduct, than our Moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful Instructions, as we have for the preservation of our Bodys. He has made Virtue a lovely Form, to excite our pursuit of it; and has given us strong Affections to be the Springs of each virtuous Action.

THIS moral Sense of Beauty in Actions and Affections, may appear strange at first View. Some of our Moralists themselves are offended at it in my LORD SHAFTESBURY; so much are they accusom'd to deduce every Approbation, or Aversion, from rational Views of Interest, (except it be merely in the simple Ideas of the external Senses) and have such a Horror at innate Ideas,
which

which they imagine this borders upon. But this moral Sense has no relation to innate Ideas, as will appear in the second Treatise. Our Gentlemen of good Taste can tell us of a great many Senses, Tastes, and Relishes for Beauty, Harmony, Imitation in Painting and Poetry; and may not we find too in Mankind a Relish for a Beauty in Characters, in Manners? I doubt we have made Philosophy, as well as Religion, by our foolish management of it, so austere and ungainly a Form, that a Gentleman cannot easily bring himself to like it; and those who are Strangers to it, can scarcely bear to hear our Description of it. So much it is changed from what was once the delight of the finest Gentlemen among the Ancients, and their Recreation after the Hurry of publick Affairs!

IN the first Treatise, the Author perhaps in some Instances has gone too far, in supposing a greater Agree-
ment

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*ment of Mankind in their Sense of Beauty, than Experience will confirm; but all he is solicitous about is to shew, "That there is some
 " Sense of Beauty natural to Men;
 " that we find as great an Agree-
 " ment of Men in their Relishes of
 " Forms, as in their external Senses
 " which all agree to be natural;
 " and that Pleasure or Pain, De-
 " light or Aversion, are naturally
 " join'd to their Perceptions." If
 the Reader be convinc'd of such De-
 terminations of the Mind to be pleas'd
 with Forms, Proportions, Resem-
 blances, Theorems, it will be no
 difficult matter to apprehend another
 superior Sense, natural also to Men,
 determining them to be pleas'd with
 Actions, Characters, Affections. This
 is the moral Sense, which makes the
 Subject of the second Treatise.*

*THE proper Occasions of Per-
 ception by the external Senses, occur
 to us as soon as we come into the
 a World;*

World; whence perhaps we easily look upon these Senses to be natural: but the Objects of the superior Senses of Beauty and Virtue generally do not. It is probably some little time before Children reflect, or at least let us know that they reflect upon Proportion and Similitude; upon Affections, Characters, Tempers; or come to know the external Actions which are Evidences of them. Hence we imagine that their Sense of Beauty, and their moral Sentiments of Actions, must be entirely owing to Instruction, and Education; whereas it is as easy to conceive, how a Character, a Temper, as soon as they are observ'd, may be constituted by NATURE the necessary occasion of Pleasure, or an Object of Approbation, as a Taste or a Sound; tho it be sometime before these Objects present themselves to our Observation.

THE

THE first Impression of these Papers was so well receiv'd, that the Author hopes it will be no offence to any who are concern'd in the Memory of the late Lord Viscount MOLESWORTH, if he lets his Readers know that he was the Noble Person mention'd in the Preface to the first Edition, and that their being published was owing to his Approbation of them. It was from him he had that shrewd Objection, which the Reader may find in the first Treatise *; besides many other Remarks in the frequent Conversations with which he honour'd the Author; by which that Treatise was very much improved beyond what it was in the Draught presented to him. The Author retains the most grateful Sense of his singular Civility, and of the Pleasure and Improvement he received in his Conver-

* Sect. v. Art. 2. the last Paragraph.

sation; and is still fond of expressing his grateful Remembrance of him: but,

Id cinerem, & Manes credas curare sepultos.

TO be concern'd in this Book can be no honour to a Person so justly celebrated for the most generous Sentiments of Virtue and Religion, deliver'd with the most manly Eloquence: yet it would, not be just toward the World, should the Author conceal his Obligations to the Reverend Mr. EDWARD SYNG; not only for revising these Papers, when they stood in great need of an accurate Review,; but for suggesting several just Amendments in the general Scheme of Morality. The Author was much confirm'd in his Opinion of the Justness of these Thoughts, upon finding, that this Gentleman had fallen into the same way of thinking before him; and will ever look upon his Friendship

as one of the greatest Advantages and Pleasures of his Life.

TO recommend the Lord SHAFTESBURY'S Writings to the World, is a very needless Attempt. They will be esteemed while any Reflection remains among Men. It is indeed to be wished, that he had abstained from mixing with such Noble Performances, some Prejudices he had receiv'd against Christianity; a Religion which gives us the truest Idea of Virtue, and recommends the Love of GOD, and of MANKIND, as the Sum of all true Religion. How would it have moved the Indignation of that ingenious Nobleman, to have found a dissolute set of Men, who relish nothing in Life but the lowest and most sordid Pleasures, searching into his Writings for those Insinuations against Christianity, that they might be the less restrained from their Debaucherys; when at the same time their low Minds are

incapable of relishing those noble Sentiments of Virtue and Honour, which he has placed in so lovely a Light!

WHATEVER Faults the Ingenious may find with this Performance, the Author hopes no body will find any thing in it contrary to Religion or good Manners: and he shall be well pleased if he gives the learned World an occasion of examining more thoroughly these Subjects, which are, he presumes, of very considerable Importance. The chief Ground of his Assurance that his Opinions in the main are just, is this, That as he took the first Hints of them from some of the greatest Writers of Antiquity, so the more he has convers'd with them, he finds his Illustrations the more conformable to their Sentiments.

IN the former Edition of this Book there were some Mistakes in one or two of the Instances borrowed
from

from other Sciences, to a perfect Knowledge of which the Author does not pretend; nor would he now undertake that this Edition is every way faultless. He hopes that those who are studious of the true measures of Life, may find his Ideas of Virtue and Happiness tolerably just; and that the profound Connoisseurs will pardon a few Faults, in the Illustrations borrow'd from their Arts, upon which his Arguments do not depend.

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ERRATA.

Page 2. l. 6. from the bot. dele, after *Ideas*. P. 5. l. 10. dele, after *Bodys*. P. 6. l. 1. dele in. P. 42. l. 3. for *which* r. *whom*. P. 43. l. 4. r. *even* of, and dele *would*. P. 44. l. 12, 13. for *Artificer* r. *Artificers*, and for *him* r. *them*. P. 48. l. 8. dele *possible*. — l. 9. in the Note, for *This* r. *The*. P. 75. l. 13. r. *Swine*. P. 140. l. 2. dele *possibly*. P. 148. l. 13. dele, after *Action*. P. 149. in the Reference, r. *Par. 5*. P. 160. l. 7. from bot. for *and* r. *or*. P. 162. in the Reference, for *Par. 2*. r. *Par. 3*. P. 171. l. 12. dele, after *violent*. P. 189. l. 1. r. $\mu = H \times L$. P. 210. in the Reference, r. *Par. 2*. P. 213. l. 20. r. *Persons*. P. 226. l. 4. from bot. r. *to procure us*.

TREATISE I.

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TREATISE I.

VIZ.

AN

INQUIRY

CONCERNING

BEAUTY, ORDER, &c.

AN
INQUIRY
CONCERNING
BEAUTY, ORDER, &c.

SECT. I.

*Concerning some Powers of Perception,
distinct from what is generally un-
derstood by Sensation.*

TO make the following Observa-
tions understood, it may be ne-
cessary to premise some *Defi-
nitions*, and *Observations*, ei-
ther universally acknowledg'd, or sufficient-
ly prov'd by many Writers both ancient and
modern, concerning our Perceptions called
Sensations, and the *Actions* of the Mind
consequent upon them.

Art. I. THOSE Ideas which are rais'd in *Sensation.*
the Mind upon the presence of external Ob-
jects,

2



II. WHEN two Perceptions are entirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of *Sensation*, we call the Powers of receiving those different Perceptions, *different Senses*. Thus *Seeing* and *Hearing* denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho Colours have vast Differences among themselves, as also have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the most opposite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence we call all Colours Perceptions of the same Sense. All the several Senses seem to have their distinct Organs, except *Feeling*, which is in some degree diffus'd over the whole Body.

III. THE Mind has a Power of *compound-*
ing Ideas, which were receiv'd separately ;
of *comparing* their Objects by means of the
Ideas, and of observing their *Relations* and
Proportions ; of *enlarging* and *diminishing*
its Ideas at pleasure, or in any certain *Ratio*,
or Degree ; and of considering *separately*
2 each

each of the simple Ideas, which might per- Sect. I.
haps have been impress'd jointly in the Sen-
sation. This last Operation we commonly
call *Abstraction*.

IV. THE Ideas of *Substances* are com- *Substances.*
pounded of the various simple Ideas jointly
impress'd, when they presented themselves
to our Senses. We define Substances only
by enumerating these sensible Ideas: And
such Definitions may raise an Idea clear e-
nough of the Substance in the Mind of one
who never immediately perceiv'd the Sub-
stance; provided he has separately receiv'd
by his Senses all the simple Ideas which are
in the Composition of the complex one of
the Substance defin'd: But if there be any
simple Ideas which he has not receiv'd, or
if he wants any of the *Senses* necessary for
the Perception of them, no Definition can
raise any simple Idea which has not been
before perceived by the *Senses*.

V. HENCE it follows, " That when *In-* *Education.*
struction, Education, or Prejudice of any *Instructi-*
kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward *on.*
an Object, this Desire or Aversion must
be founded upon an Opinion of some
Perfection, or of some Deficiency in those
Qualitys, for Perception of which we
have the proper Senses." Thus if *Beauty*
be desir'd by one who has not the Sense of
Sight, the Desire must be rais'd by some
B 2 appre-

Sect. 1. apprehended Regularity of *Figure, Sweetness of Voice, Smoothness, or Softness*, or some other Quality perceivable by the other Senses, without relation to the Ideas of *Colour*.

Pleasure.
Pain.

VI. MANY of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant, and many painful, immediately, and that without any knowledge of the Cause of this Pleasure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of it; or without seeing to what further Advantage or Detriment the Use of such Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge of these things vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception, however it might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible; or might raise a distinct Joy, from a prospect of further Advantage in the Object, or Aversion, from an apprehension of Evil.

Different
Ideas.

VII. The *simple Ideas* rais'd in different Persons by the same Object, are probably some way different, when they disagree in their Approbation or Dislike; and in the same Person, when his *Fancy* at one time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from reflecting on those Objects, to which we have now an Aversion, tho they were formerly agreeable: And we shall generally find that there is some accidental *Conjunction* of a disagreeable Idea, which

which always recurs with the Object; as Sect. 1. in those Wines to which Men acquire an Aversion, after they have taken them, in an Emetick Preparation: In this case we are conscious that the *Idea* is alter'd from what it was when that Wine was agreeable, by the Conjunction of the Ideas of Loathing and Sickness of Stomach. The like Change of *Idea* may be insensibly made by the Change of our Bodys; as we advance in Years, or when we are accustomed to any Object, which may occasion an Indifference toward Meats we were fond of in our Childhood; and may make some Objects cease to raise the disagreeable Ideas, which they excited upon our first use of them. Many of our simple Perceptions are disagreeable only thro the too great *Intenseness* of the Quality: thus moderate Light is agreeable, very strong Light may be painful; moderate Bitter may be pleasant, a higher Degree may be offensive. A Change in our Organs will necessarily occasion a Change in the *Intenseness* of the Perception at least; nay sometimes will occasion a quite contrary Perception: Thus a warm Hand shall feel that Water cold, which a cold Hand shall feel warm.

WE shall not find it perhaps so easy to account for the Diversity of Fancy about more *complex Ideas* of Objects, in which we regard many Ideas of different Senses at

Sect I. once ; as in some Perceptions of those call'd
 ~~~~~ *primary Qualitys*, and some *secondary*, as  
 explain'd by Mr. LOCKE : for instance,  
 in the different Fancys about *Architecture*,  
*Gardening*, *Dress*. Of the two former  
 we shall offer something in Sect. VI. As  
 to *Dress*, we may generally account for  
 the Diversity of Fancys from a like Con-  
 junction of Ideas : Thus, if either from any  
 thing in Nature, or from the Opinion of  
 our Country or Acquaintance, the fancying  
 of *glaring Colours* be look'd upon as an  
 evidence of Levity, or of any other evil  
 Quality of Mind ; or if any *Colour* or *Fa-*  
*shion* be commonly us'd by Rusticks, or  
 by Men of any disagreeable Profession, Em-  
 ployment, or Temper ; these additional  
 Ideas may recur constantly with that of the  
*Colour* or *Fashion*, and cause a constant Dis-  
 like to them in those who join the additio-  
 nal Ideas, altho the Colour or Form be no  
 way disagreeable of themselves, and actu-  
 ally do please others who join no such  
 Ideas to them. But there does not seem to  
 be any Ground to believe such a Diversity  
 in human Minds, as that the same simple  
 Idea or Perception should give pleasure to  
 one and pain to another, or to the same  
 Person at different times ; not to say that  
 it seems a Contradiction, that the same  
 simple Idea should do so.

VIII. THE only Pleasure of Sense, which our Philosophers seem to consider, is that which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But there are vastly greater Pleasures in those complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain the Names of *Beautiful, Regular, Harmonious*. Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as possible; and more pleas'd with a Prospect of the Sun arising among settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry Hemisphere, a fine Landskip, a regular Building, than with a clear blue Sky, a smooth Sea, or a large open Plain, not diversify'd by Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: And yet even these latter Appearances are not quite *simple*. So in Musick, the Pleasure of *fine Composition* is incomparably greater than that of any one Note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever.

IX. LET it be observ'd, that in the following Papers, the Word *Beauty* is taken for the *Idea rais'd in us*, and a *Sense* of Beauty for our *Power of receiving this Idea*. *Harmony* also denotes our *pleasant Ideas arising from Composition of Sounds*, and a *good Ear* (as it is generally taken) a *Power of perceiving this Pleasure*. In the following Sections, an Attempt is made



Sect. I. to discover " what is the *immediate Oc-*  
 " *casion* of these pleasant Ideas, or what  
 " real Quality in the Objects ordinarily ex-  
 " cites them."

*Internal  
 Sense.*

X. IT is of no consequence whether we call these Ideas of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, Perceptions of the *External Senses* of Seeing and Hearing, or not. I should rather chuse to call our Power of perceiving these Ideas, an INTERNAL SENSE, were it only for the Convenience of distinguishing them from other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing, which men may have without Perception of *Beauty* and *Harmony*. It is plain from Experience, that many Men have in the common meaning, the Senses of Seeing and Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the *simple Ideas* separately, and have their Pleasures; they distinguish them from each other, such as one Colour from another, either quite different, or the stronger or fainter of the same Colour, when they are plac'd beside each other, altho they may often confound their *Names*, when they occur a-part from each other; as some do the Names of *Green* and *Blue*: they can tell in separate Notes, the *higher*, *lower*, *sharper* or *flatter*, when separately sound- ed; in Figures they discern the *Length*, *Breadth*, *Wideness* of each Line, Surface, Angle; and may be as capable of hearing and seeing at great distances as any men

3

what-



whatsoever : And yet perhaps they shall find Sect. 1.  
no Pleasure in Musical Compositions, in  
Painting, Architecture, natural Landskip ;  
or but a very weak one in comparison of  
what others enjoy from the same Objects.  
This greater Capacity of receiving such  
pleasant Ideas we commonly call a *fine Ge-  
nius* or *Taste* : In Musick we seem univer-  
sally to acknowledge something like a distinct  
Sense from the External one of Hearing,  
and call it a *good Ear* ; and the like distinc-  
tion we should probably acknowledge in  
other Objects, had we also got distinct  
Names to denote these *Powers* of Percep-  
tion by.

XI. THERE will appear another Reason *Different*  
perhaps afterwards, for calling this Power *from Ex-*  
of perceiving the Ideas of *Beauty*, an *Internal*  
*Sense*, from this, that in some other  
Affairs, where our *External Senses* are not  
much concern'd; we discern a sort of Beau-  
ty, very like, in many respects, to that ob-  
serv'd in sensible Objects, and accompany'd  
with like Pleasure : Such is that *Beauty* per-  
ceiv'd in *Theorems*, or universal Truths,  
in *general Causes*, and in some *extensive*  
*Principles* of Action.

XII. Let every one here consider, how  
different we must suppose the *Perception*  
to be, with which a Poet is transported  
upon the Prospect of any of those Objects  
of

10      *An INQUIRY concerning*

Sect. I. of *natural Beauty*, which ravish us even in his Description ; from that cold lifeless *Conception* which we imagine in a *dull Critick*, or one of the *Virtuosi*, without what we call a *fine Taste*. This latter Class of Men may have greater Perfection in that Knowledge, which is deriv'd from external Sensation ; they can tell all the *specifick Differences* of Trees, Herbs, Minerals, Metals ; they know the *Form* of every Leaf, Stalk, Root, Flower, and Seed of all the Species, about which the Poet is often very ignorant : And yet the Poet shall have a vastly more delightful Perception of the Whole ; and not only the Poet but any man of a fine Taste. Our External Senses may by measuring teach us all the Proportions of Architecture to the Tenth of an Inch, and the Situation of every Muscle in the human Body ; and a good Memory may retain these : and yet there is still something further necessary, not only to make a man a compleat Master in *Architecture*, *Painting* or *Statuary*, but even a tolerable Judge in these Works ; or capable of receiving the highest Pleasure in contemplating them. Since then there are such different Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the *External Senses* are the same ; since the most accurate Knowledg of what the External Senses discover, often does not give the Pleasure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a *good Taste* will enjoy

joy at once without much *Knowledge* ; we Sect. I.  
may justly use another Name for these higher, and more delightful Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony, and call the *Power* of receiving such Impressions, an *Internal Sense*. The Difference of the Perceptions seems sufficient to vindicate the Use of a different Name, especially when we are told in what meaning the Word is applied.

XIII. THIS superior Power of Perception is justly called a *Sense*, because of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure does not arise from any *Knowledge* of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object ; but strikes us at first with the Idea of Beauty : nor does the most accurate *Knowledge* increase this Pleasure of Beauty, however it may super-add a distinct rational Pleasure from prospects of *Advantage*, or from the Increase of *Knowledge* \*.

*Its Pleasures necessary and immediate.*

XIV. AND further, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are *necessarily* pleasant to us, as well as immediately so ; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any *Prospect* of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object : For as in the external Sensations, no View of *Interest* will

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\* See above, Art. 6.



Sect. 1. make an Object grateful, nor View of *Detriment*, distinct from immediate *Pain* in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose the whole World as a *Reward*, or *threaten* the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deform'd Object, or disapprove a beautiful one; Dissimulation may be procur'd by Rewards or Threatnings, or we may in external Conduct abstain from any *pursuit* of the Beautiful, and pursue the Deform'd; but our *Sentiments* of the Forms, and our *Perceptions*, would continue invariably the same.

*This Sense  
antecedent  
to and dis-  
tinct from  
prospects of  
Interest.*

XV. HENCE it plainly appears, " that  
" some Objects are *immediately* the Occa-  
" sions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that  
" we have Senses fitted for perceiving it;  
" and that it is distinct from that *Joy* which  
" arises from Self-love upon prospect of Ad-  
" vantage." Nay, do not we often see  
Convenience and Use neglected to obtain  
Beauty, without any other prospect of *Ad-  
vantage* in the Beautiful Form, than the  
suggesting the pleasant Ideas of Beauty?  
Now this shews us, that however we may  
*pursue* beautiful Objects from Self-love,  
with a view to obtain the Pleasures of Beau-  
ty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and  
many other Affairs; yet there must be a  
*Sense* of Beauty, antecedent to Prospects  
even of this Advantage, without which  
Sense, these Objects would not be thus  
*Advan-*



*Advantageous*, nor excite in us this Pleasure which constitutes them advantageous. Our *Sense* of Beauty from Objects, by which they are constituted good to us, is very distinct from our *Desire* of them when they are thus constituted: Our *Desire* of Beauty may be counter-ballanc'd by Rewards or Threatnings, but never our *Sense* of it; even as Fear of Death, or Love of Life, may make us chuse and desire a bitter Potion, or neglect those Meats which the *Sense* of Taste would recommend as pleasant; and yet no prospect of Advantage, or Fear of Evil, can make that Potion agreeable to the *Sense*, or Meat disagreeable to it, which was not so antecedently to this Prospect. Just in the same manner as to the *Sense* of Beauty and Harmony; that the *Pursuit* of such Objects is frequently neglected, from prospects of Advantage, Aversion to Labour, or any other Motive of Self-love, does not prove that we have no *Sense* of Beauty; but only that our *Desire* of it may be counter-ballanc'd by a stronger *Desire*: So Gold out-weighing Silver, is never adduc'd as a proof that the latter is void of Gravity.

XVI. HAD we no such *Sense* of Beauty and Harmony; Houses, Gardens, Dress, Equipage, might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, warm, easy; but never as *beautiful*: And in Faces I see nothing

Sect. 1. thing which could please us, but Liveliness of Colour, and Smoothness of Surface: And yet nothing is more certain, than that all these Objects are recommended under quite different *Views* on many Occasions: And no Custom, Education, or Example could ever give us *Perceptions* distinct from those of the Senses which we had the use of before, or recommend Objects under another *Conception* than grateful to \* them. But of the Influence of Custom, Education, Example, upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below †.

Beauty,  
Original  
or Compar-  
ative.

XVII. BEAUTY is either *Original* or *Comparative*; or, if any like the Terms better, *Absolute*, or *Relative*: Only let it be observ'd, that by *Absolute* or *Original* Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos'd to be in the Object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the *Perception* of some Mind; so *Cold*, *Hot*, *Sweet*, *Bitter*, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps there is no resemblance in the Objects, which excite these Ideas in us, however we generally imagine that there is something in the Object just like our Perception. The Ideas of Beauty and

\* See Art. 5.

† Sect. 7.

Harmony being excited upon our *Percep-* Sect. 1.  
*tion* of some *primary Quality*, and having   
 relation to *Figure* and *Time*, may indeed  
 have a nearer resemblance to Objects, than  
 these Sensations, which seem not so much  
 any *Pictures* of Objects, as *Modifications*  
 of the perceiving Mind; and yet were there  
 no Mind with a *Sense* of Beauty to contem-  
 plate Objects, I see not how they could be  
 call'd *beautiful*. We therefore by \* *Absol-*  
*ute* Beauty understand only that Beauty,  
 which we perceive in Objects without *com-*  
*parison* to any thing external; of which the  
 Object is suppos'd an Imitation, or Picture;  
 such as that Beauty perceiv'd from the  
*Works of Nature, artificial Forms, Fi-*  
*gures, Theorems.* *Comparative* or *Rela-*  
*ative* Beauty is that which we perceive in  
 Objects, commonly considered as *Imita-*  
*tions* or *Resemblances* of something else.  
 These two Kinds of Beauty employ the  
 three following Sections.

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\* This division of Beauty is taken from the different Foun-  
 dations of Pleasure to our Sense of it, rather than from the  
 Objects themselves: for most of the following Instances of re-  
 lative Beauty have also absolute Beauty; and many of the In-  
 stances of absolute Beauty, have also relative Beauty in some  
 respect or other. But we may distinctly consider these two  
 Fountains of Pleasure, Uniformity in the Object it self, and  
 Resemblance to some Original.

## S E C T.



## S E C T. II.

## Of Original or Absolute Beauty.

Sense of  
Men.

I. SINCE it is certain that we have *Ideas* of Beauty and Harmony, let us examine what *Quality* in Objects excites these *Ideas*, or is the occasion of them: And let it be here observ'd, that our Inquiry is only about the *Qualities* which are beautiful to *Men*; or about the Foundation of their Sense of Beauty: for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to the *Sense* of some Mind; and when we afterwards shew how generally the Objects which occur to us, are *beautiful*, we mean that such Objects are agreeable to the Sense of *Men*: for as there are not a few Objects, which seem no way beautiful to Men, so we see a variety of other *Animals* who seem delighted with them; they may have *Senses* otherwise constituted than those of Men, and may have the *Ideas* of Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form. We see Animals fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and shapeless, or loathsome, may be to them a *Paradise*.

II. THAT we may more distinctly discover the general *Foundation* or Occasion of the



the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be Sect. 2. necessary to consider it first in its *simpler* Kinds, such as occurs to us in regular Figures; and we may perhaps find that the same Foundation extends to all the more complex Species of it.

III. THE Figures which excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*. There are many Conceptions of Objects which are agreeable upon other accounts, such as *Grandeur*, *Novelty*, *Sanctity*, and some others, which shall be mention'd hereafter\*. But what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be in a compound *Ratio* of *Uniformity* and *Variety*: so that where the *Uniformity* of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the *Variety*; and where the *Variety* is equal, the Beauty is as the *Uniformity*. This will be plain from Examples.

FIRST, the *Variety* increases the Beauty in equal *Uniformity*. The Beauty of an *equilateral Triangle* is less than that of the *Square*; which is less than that of a *Pentagon*; and this again is surpass'd by the *Hexagon*. When indeed the Number of Sides is much increas'd, the Proportion of them to the *Radius*, or *Diameter* of the

\* See Sect. vi. Art. 11, 12, 13.

Sect. 2. Figure, or of the *Circle* to which regular *Polygons* have an obvious Relation, is so much lost to our Observation, that the Beauty does not always increase with the Number of Sides; and the want of Parallelism in the Sides of *Heptagons*, and other Figures of odd Numbers, may also diminish their Beauty. So in *Solids*, the *Eicosiedron* surpasses the *Dodecaedron*, and this the *Octaedron*, which is still more beautiful than the *Cube*; and this again surpasses the regular *Pyramid*: The obvious Ground of this, is greater *Variety* with equal *Uniformity*.

Uniformity.

THE greater *Uniformity* increases the *Beauty* amidst equal *Variety*, in these Instances: An Equilateral *Triangle*, or even an *Isofceles*, surpasses the *Scalenum*: A *Square* surpasses the *Rhombus* or *Lozenge*, and this again the *Rhomboides*, which is still more beautiful than the *Trapezium*, or any Figure with irregular curve Sides. So the regular *Solids* vastly surpass all other *Solids* of equal number of plain Surfaces: And the same is observable not only in the Five perfectly regular *Solids*, but in all those which have any considerable *Uniformity*, as *Cylinders*, *Prisms*, *Pyramids*, *Obelisks*; which please every Eye more than any rude Figures, where there is no *Unity* or Resemblance among the Parts.

INSTANCES of the compound *Ratio* Compound Ratio.  
 we have in comparing *Circles* or *Spheres*,  
 with *Ellipses* or *Spheroids* not very eccen-  
 tric; and in comparing the compound So-  
 lids, the *Exoctaedron*, and *Eicosidodecae-*  
*dron*, with the perfectly regular ones of  
 which they are compounded: and we shall  
 find, that the Want of that most perfect  
*Uniformity* observable in the latter, is com-  
 pensated by the greater *Variety* in the o-  
 thers, so that the *Beauty* is nearly equal.

IV. THESE Observations would proba-  
 bly hold true for the most part, and might  
 be confirm'd by the Judgment of Children  
 in the *simpler* Figures, where the *Variety*  
 is not too great for their Comprehension.  
 And however uncertain some of the particu-  
 lar afore said Instances may seem, yet this  
 is perpetually to be observ'd, that Chil-  
 dren are fond of all *regular* Figures in their  
 little Diversions, altho they be no more  
 convenient, or useful for them, than the  
 Figures of our common Pebbles: We see  
 how early they discover a *Taste* or Sense of  
*Beauty*, in desiring to see Buildings, regular  
 Gardens, or even Representations of them  
 in Pictures of any kind.

V. IT is the same Foundation which we Beauty of Nature.  
 have for our Sense of *Beauty* in the Works  
 of NATURE. In every Part of the World  
 C 2 which



Sect. 2. which we call *Beautiful*, there is a vast *Uniformity* amidst an almost infinite *Variety*. Many Parts of the Universe seem not at all design'd for the use of Man ; nay, it is but a very small Spot with which we have any acquaintance. The *Figures* and *Motions* of the great Bodys are not obvious to our Senses, but found out by Reasoning and Reflection, upon many long Observations : and yet as far as we can by *Sense* discover, or by *Reasoning* enlarge our Knowledge, and extend our Imagination, we generally find their Structure, Order, and Motion, agreeable to our Sense of *Beauty*. Every particular Object in *Nature* does not indeed appear *beautiful* to us ; but there is a vast Profusion of *Beauty* over most of the Objects which occur either to our Senses, or Reasonings upon Observation : For not to mention the apparent Situation of the heavenly Bodys in the Circumference of a great Sphere, which is wholly occasion'd by the Imperfection of our Sight in discerning distances ; the Forms of all the great Bodys in the Universe are nearly *Spherical* ; the *Orbits* of their Revolutions generally *Elliptick*, and without great Eccentricity, in those which continually occur to our Observation : now these are Figures of great *Uniformity*, and therefore pleasing to us.

FURTHER,




FURTHER, to pass by the less obvious *Uniformity* in the Proportion of their *Quantitys* of Matter, *Distances*, *Times* of revolving, to each other; what can exhibit a greater Instance of *Uniformity amidst Variety*, than the constant Tenour of Revolutions in nearly equal Times, in each *Planet*, around its Axis, and the central Fire or SUN, thro all the Ages of which we have any Records, and in nearly the same Orbit? by which, after certain Periods, all the same Appearances are again renew'd; the alternate Successions of *Light* and *Shade*, or *Day* and *Night*, constantly pursuing each other around each *Planet*, with an agreeable and regular Diversity in the Times they possess the several Hemispheres, in the *Summer*, *Harvest*, *Winter*, and *Spring*; and the various *Phases*, *Aspects*, and *Situations*, of the *Planets* to each other, their *Conjunctions* and *Oppositions*, in which they suddenly darken each other with their Conick Shades in Eclipses, are repeated to us at their fixed Periods with invariable Constancy: These are the *Beauty's* which charm the *Astronomer*, and make his tedious Calculations pleasant.

*Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem\*.*

\* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 12.

Sect. 2.



Earth.

VI. AGAIN, as to the dry Part of the Surface of our Globe, a great Part of which is cover'd with a very pleasant inoffensive Colour, how *beautifully* is it diversify'd with various Degrees of *Light* and *Shade*, according to the different Situations of the Parts of its Surface, in *Mountains*, *Valleys*, *Hills*, and open *Plains*, which are variously inclin'd toward the great LUMINARY!

plants.

VII. IF we descend to the minuter Works of NATURE, what vast *Uniformity* among all the Species of *Plants* and *Vegetables* in the manner of their Growth and Propagation! what exact Resemblance among all the Plants of the same Species, whose Numbers surpass our Imagination! And this *Uniformity* is not only observable in the Form in gross; nay, in this it is not so very exact in all Instances, but in the Structure of their minutest Parts, which no Eye unassisted with Glasses can discern. In the almost infinite Multitude of *Leaves*, *Fruit*, *Seed*, *Flowers* of any one Species, we often see an exact *Uniformity* in the Structure and Situation of the smallest Fibres. This is the *Beauty* which charms an ingenious *Botanist*. Nay, what vast *Uniformity* and Regularity of Figure is found in each particular *Plant*, *Leaf*, or *Flower*! In all Trees and most of the smaller Plants, the Stalks or Trunks are either *Cylinders* nearly, or regular *Prisms*;

*Prisms*; the Branches similar to their several Trunks, arising at nearly regular Distances, when no Accidents retard their natural Growth: In one *Species* the Branches arise in Pairs on the opposite Sides; the perpendicular Plain of Direction of the immediately superior Pair, intersecting the Plain of Direction of the inferior, nearly at right Angles: In another *Species*, the Branches spring singly, and alternately, all around in nearly equal Distances: And the Branches in other *Species* sprout all in Knots around the Trunk, one for each Year. And in every *Species*, all the Branches in the first Shoots preserve the same Angles with their Trunk; and they again sprout out into smaller Branches exactly after the Manner of their Trunks. Nor ought we to pass over that great *Unity* of Colours which we often see in all the Flowers of the same Plant or Tree, and often of a whole *Species*; and their exact Agreement in many shaded Transitions into opposite Colours, in which all the Flowers of the same Plant generally agree, nay often all the Flowers of a *Species*.

VIII. AGAIN, as to the *Beauty* of *Animals*, either in their inward Structure, which we come to the Knowledge of by Experiment and long Observation, or their outward Form, we shall find vast *Uniformity* among all the *Species* which are known to



Sect. 2. us, in the Structure of those Parts, upon which Life depends more immediately. And how amazing is the *Unity* of Mechanism, when we shall find an almost infinite diversity of Motions, all their Actions in *walking, running, flying, swimming*; all their serious Efforts for *Self-preservation*, all their freakish *Contortions* when they are gay and sportful, in all their various Limbs, perform'd by one simple Contrivance of a contracting *Muscle*, apply'd with inconceivable Diversities to answer all these Ends! Various Engines might have obtain'd the same Ends; but then there had been less *Uniformity*, and the *Beauty* of our Animal Systems, and of particular Animals, had been much less, when this surprizing *Unity* of Mechanism had been remov'd from them.

IX. AMONG Animals of the same Species, the *Unity* is very obvious, and this Resemblance is the very Ground of our ranking them in such *Classes* or *Species*, notwithstanding the great Diversities in Bulk, Colour, Shape, which are observ'd even in those call'd of the same Species. And then in each Individual, what vast *Beauty* arises from the exact Resemblance of all the external double Members to each other, which seems the universal Intention of NATURE, when no Accident prevents it! We see the Want of this Resemblance never fails to pass for an

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


Imperfection, and Want of *Beauty*, tho no Sect. 2.  
other Inconvenience ensues; as when the  
Eyes are not exactly like; or one Arm or  
Leg is a little shorter or smaller than its  
fellow.

As to that most powerful *Beauty* in  
*Countenances, Airs, Gestures, Motion*, we  
shall shew in the second Treatise\*, that it  
arises from some imagin'd *Indication* of mo-  
rally good Dispositions of Mind.

X. THERE is a further *Beauty* in Ani-<sup>Proportion.</sup>  
mals, arising from a certain *Proportion* of  
the various Parts to each other, which still  
pleases the Sense of Spectators, tho they  
cannot calculate it with the Accuracy of a  
*Statuary*. The *Statuary* knows what Pro-  
portion of each Part of the *Face* to the  
whole *Face* is most agreeable, and can tell  
us the same of the Proportion of the *Face* to  
the *Body*, or any Parts of it; and between  
the *Diameters* and *Lengths* of each Limb:  
When this Proportion of the Head to the  
Body is remarkably alter'd, we shall have a  
*Giant* or a *Dwarf*. And hence it is, that  
either the one or the other may be repre-  
sented to us even in *Miniature*, without Re-  
lation to any external Object, by observing  
how the Body surpasses the Proportion it  
should have to the Head in *Giants*, and falls

\* Sect. vi. Art. 3.

Sect. 2. below it in *Dwarfs*. There is a further  
 *Beauty* arising from that Figure, which is a natural Indication of *Strength*; but this may be pass'd over, because probably it may be alledg'd, that our Approbation of this Shape flows from an opinion of *Advantage*, and not from the Form it self.

THE *Beauty* arising from Mechanism, apparently adapted to the Necessitys and Advantages of any Animal; which pleases us, even tho there be no Advantage to our selves ensuing from it; will be consider'd under the Head of *Relative Beauty*, or *Design* \*.

*Fowls.*

XI. THE peculiar *Beauty* of *Fowls* can scarce be omitted, which arises from the vast *Variety* of Feathers, a curious Sort of Machines adapted to many admirable Uses, which retain a vast Resemblance in their Structure among all the Species, and a perfect *Uniformity* in those of the same Species in the corresponding Parts, and in the two Sides of each Individual; besides all the *Beauty* of lively Colours and gradual Shades, not only in the external Appearance of the Fowl, resulting from an artful Combination of shaded Feathers, but often visible even in one Feather separately.

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\* See Sect. iv. Art. 7.

XII. IF our Reasonings about the *Nature of Fluids* be just, the vast Stores of *Water* will give us an Instance of *Uniformity* in *Nature* above Imagination, when we reflect upon the almost infinite Multitude of small, polish'd, smooth Spheres, which must be suppos'd form'd in all the parts of this Globe. The same *Uniformity* there is probably among the Parts of other *Fluids* as well as *Water* : and the like must be observ'd in several other natural Bodys, as *Salts*, *Sulphurs*, and such like ; whose uniform Propertys do probably depend upon an *Uniformity* in the Figures of their Parts.

XIII. UNDER *Original Beauty* we may include *Harmony*, or *Beauty of Sound*, if that Expression can be allow'd, because *Harmony* is not usually conceiv'd as an Imitation of any thing else. *Harmony* often raises Pleasure in those who know not what is the Occasion of it : And yet the Foundation of this Pleasure is known to be a sort of *Uniformity*. When the several Vibrations of one Note regularly coincide with the Vibrations of another, they make an agreeable Composition ; and such Notes are call'd *Concords*. Thus the Vibrations of any one Note coincide in *Time* with two Vibrations of its *Octave* ; and two Vibrations of any Note coincide with three of its *Fifth* ; and so on in the rest of the *Concords*.



Sect. 2. *cords.* Now no *Composition* can be harmonious, in which the Notes are not, for the most part, dispos'd according to these natural Proportions. Besides which, a due Regard must be had to the *Key*, which governs the whole, and to the *Time* and *Humour*, in which the Composition is begun; a frequent and inartificial *Change* of any of which will produce the greatest, and most unnatural *Discord*. This will appear, by observing the *Dissonance* which would arise from tacking Parts of different Tunes together as one, altho both were separately agreeable. A like *Uniformity* is also observable among the *Bases*, *Tenors*, *Trebles* of the same Tune.

THERE is indeed observable, in the best Compositions, a mysterious Effect of *Discords*: They often give as great Pleasure as continu'd Harmony; whether by refreshing the Ear with *Variety*, or by awakening the Attention, and enlivening the Relish for the succeeding Harmony of Concords, as Shades enliven and beautify Pictures, or by some other means not yet known: Certain it is however that they have their place, and some good Effect in our best Compositions. Some other Powers of *Musick* may be consider'd hereafter\*.


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\* See Sect. vi. Art. 12.



XIV. BUT in all these Instances of *Beauty* let it be observ'd, That the Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this general Foundation; and that all here alledg'd is this, " That the pleasant Sensation arises only from Objects, in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*: " We may have the Sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man's *Taste* may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho he be ignorant of the *Forms* of the small Bodys, or their *Motions*, which excite these Perceptions in him.

## S E C T.



## S E C T. III.

## Of the Beauty of Theorems.

Theorems.

I. **T**HE Beauty of *Theorems*, or universal Truths demonstrated, deserves a distinct Consideration, being of a Nature pretty different from the former kinds of *Beauty*; and yet there is none in which we shall see such an amazing *Variety* with *Uniformity*: and hence arises a very great Pleasure distinct from Prospects of any further Advantage.

II. FOR in one *Theorem* we may find included, with the most exact Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often an Infinity of Infinites: so that altho the Necessity of forming abstract Ideas, and universal *Theorems*, arises perhaps from the Limitation of our Minds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of singular Ideas or Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largeness of the human Capacity above our Imagination. Thus for instance, the 47<sup>th</sup> Proposition of the first *Book* of EUCLID'S *Elements* contains an infinite Multitude of Truths, concerning the infinite possible *Sizes* of right-angled *Triangles*, as you make the *Area* greater  
or

or less; and in each of these *Sizes* you may find an infinite Multitude of dissimilar *Triangles*, as you vary the Proportion of the *Base* to the *Perpendicular*; all which Infinities of Infinites agree in the general *Theorem*. In *Algebraick*, and *Fluxional Calculations*, we shall still find a greater Variety of particular *Truths* included in general *Theorems*; not only in general *Equations* applicable to all Kinds of *Quantity*, but in more particular Investigations of *Areas* and *Tangents*: In which one Manner of Operation shall discover *Theorems* applicable to infinite *Orders* or *Species* of *Curves*, to the infinite *Sizes* of each *Species*, and to the infinite *Points* of the infinite *Individuals* of each *Size*.

III. THAT we may the better discern this Agreement, or *Unity* of an Infinity of Objects, in the general *Theorem*, to be the Foundation of the *Beauty* or *Pleasure* attending their Discovery, let us compare our Satisfaction in such Discoverys, with the uneasy state of Mind in which we are, when we can only measure *Lines*, or *Surfaces*, by a *Scale*, or are making Experiments which we can reduce to no general *Canon*, but only heaping up a Multitude of particular incoherent Observations. Now each of these Trials discovers a new Truth, but with no *Pleasure* or *Beauty*, notwithstanding

Foundati-  
on of their  
Beauty.



Sect. 3. ing the *Variety*, till we can discover some  
 sort of *Unity*, or reduce them to some ge-  
 neral Canon.

Little  
 Beauty in  
 Axioms.

IV. AGAIN, let us take a Metaphysi-  
 cal Axiom, such as this, *Every Whole is*  
*greater than its Part*; and we shall find  
 no *Beauty* in the Contemplation. For  
 tho this Proposition contains many Infi-  
 nitys of particular Truths; yet the *Unity*  
 is inconsiderable, since they all agree only  
 in a vague, undetermin'd Conception of  
*Whole* and *Part*, and in an indefinite  
 Excess of the former above the latter, which  
 is sometimes great and sometimes small.  
 So, should we hear that the *Cylinder* is  
 greater than the inscrib'd *Sphere*, and this  
 again greater than the *Cone* of the same Al-  
 titude and Diameter with the Base, we shall  
 find no pleasure in this Knowledge of a ge-  
 neral Relation of greater and less, without  
 any precise Difference or Proportion. But  
 when we see the universal exact Agreement  
 of all possible Sizes of such Systems of So-  
 lids, that they preserve to each other the  
 constant *Ratio* of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is  
 the *Theorem*, and how are we ravish'd with  
 its first Discovery!

Easy Theo-  
 rems.

WE may likewise observe, that *easy* or  
*obvious* Propositions, even where the *U-*  
*nity* is sufficiently distinct, and determinate,  
 do not please us so much as those, which  
 being



being less *obvious*, give us some *Surprize* Sect. 3.  
in the Discovery : Thus we find little Pleasure in discovering that a *Line bisecting the vertical Angle of an Isosceles Triangle, bisects the Base, or the Reverse*; or, that *Equilateral Triangles are Equiangular*. These Truths we almost know *Intuitively*, without Demonstration : They are like common *Goods*, or those which Men have long possessed, which do not give such sensible Joys as much smaller new *Additions* may give us. But let none hence imagine, that the sole Pleasure of Theorems is from *Surprize*; for the same *Novelty* of a single Experiment does not please us much : nor ought we to conclude from the greater Pleasure accompanying a *new, or unexpected Advantage*, that *Surprize, or Novelty* is the only Pleasure of Life, or the only ground of Delight in *Truth*.

V. THERE is another *Beauty* in Propositions, which cannot be omitted; which is, When one *Theorem* contains a vast Multitude of Corollarys easily deducible from it. Thus that *Theorem* which gives us the Equation of a *Curve*, whence perhaps most of its Propertys may be deduc'd, does some way please and satisfy our Mind above any other Proposition : Such a *Theorem* also is the 35th of the 1st Book of EUCLID, from which the whole Art of measuring right-lin'd Areas is deduc'd, by

Sect. 3. Resolution into *Triangles*, which are the halves of so many *Parallelograms*; and these are each respectively equal to so many *Rectangles* of the *Base* into the perpendicular *Altitude*: The 47th of the 1st *Book* is another of like *Beauty*, and so are many others.

IN the search of *Nature* there is the like *Beauty* in the Knowledge of some great *Principles*, or universal *Forces*, from which innumerable Effects do flow. Such is *Gravitation*, in Sir ISAAC NEWTON's Scheme; such also is the Knowledge of the Original of *Rights*, perfect and imperfect, and external; alienable and unalienable, with their manner of *Translations*; from whence the greatest Part of moral Dutys may be deduc'd in the various Relations of human Life.

IT is easy to see how Men are charm'd with the *Beauty* of such Knowledge, besides its Usefulness; and how this sets them upon deducing the Propertys of each Figure from one *Genesis*, and demonstrating the mechanick Forces from one *Theorem* of the Composition of Motion; even after they have sufficient Knowledge and Certainty in all these Truths from distinct independent Demonstrations. And this Pleasure we enjoy even when we have no Prospect of obtaining any other *Advantage* from such  
 2 Man-

Manner of Deduction, than the immediate Pleasure of contemplating the *Beauty*: nor could Love of *Fame* excite us to such regular Methods of Deduction, were we not conscious that Mankind are pleas'd with them immediately, by this *internal Sense* of their *Beauty*. Sect. 3.

IT is no less easy to see into what absurd Attempts Men have been led by this Sense of *Beauty*, and a silly Affectation of obtaining it in the other Sciences as well as the *Mathematicks*. 'Twas this probably which set DESCARTES on that hopeful Project of deducing all human Knowledge from one Proposition, *viz. Cogito, ergo sum*; while others with as little Sense contended, that *Impossibile est idem simul esse & non esse*, had much fairer Pretensions to the Style and Title of *Principium humanæ Cognitionis absolute primum*. Mr. LEIBNITZ had an equal Affection for his favourite Principle of a *sufficient Reason* for every thing in *Nature*, and brags to Dr. CLARKE of the Wonders he had wrought in the intellectual World by its Assistance; but his learned Antagonist seems to think he had not sufficient Reason for his Boasting\*. If we look into particular Sciences, we may see in the Systems learned Men have given us of them,

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\* See the Letters which pass'd between Dr. CLARKE and Mr. LEIBNITZ, Pag. 23.



Sect. 3. the Inconveniences of this Love of *Uniformity*. How aukardly is PUFFENDORF forc'd to deduce the several Dutys of Men to God, *themselves*, and their *Neighbours*, from his single fundamental Principle of *Sociableness to the whole Race of Mankind*? This Observation might easily be extended farther, were it necessary; and is a strong Proof that Men have a Sense of *Beauty in Uniformity* in the Sciences, even from the Contortions of common Sense they are led into by pursuing it.

VI. THIS Delight which accompanys Sciences, or univerſal *Theorems*, may really be call'd a kind of *Sensation*; ſince it neceſſarily accompanys the Diſcovery of any Propoſition, and is diſtinct from bare Knowledge it ſelf, being moſt violent at firſt, whereas the Knowledge is uniformly the ſame. And however Knowledge enlarges the *Mind*, and makes us more capable of comprehensive Views and Projects in ſome kinds of Buſineſs, whence *Advantage* may alſo ariſe to us; yet we may leave it in the Breſt of every Student to determine, whether he has not often felt this Pleaſure without any ſuch proſpect of Advantage from the Diſcovery of his *Theorem*. All which can thence be infer'd is only this, that as in our external Senſes, ſo in our *internal* ones, the pleaſant Senſations generally ariſe from thoſe Objects which calm Reason  
would



would have recommended, had we understood their Use, and which might have engag'd our pursuits from *Self-interest*. Sect. 3.

VII. IF any alledge, “ that this Pleasure “ in Theorems arises only at first, upon the “ *Novelty* of the Discovery; which occasions *Surprize*:” It must be own'd indeed that \* *Novelty* is generally very agreeable, and heightens the Pleasure in the Contemplation of *Beauty*; but then the *Novelty* of a particular *Truth*, found out by measuring, as above mention'd, gives no considerable Pleasure, nor *Surprize*. That then which is *pleasant* and *surprizing*, is the first Observation of this *Unity* amidst such a great *Variety*. There is indeed another kind of *Surprize*, which adds to the Beauty of some Propositions less *universal*, and may make them equally pleasant with more *universal* ones; as when we discover a general Truth which seem'd before, upon some confus'd Opinion, to be a Falshood: as that *Assymptotes always approaching should never meet the Curve*. This is like that Joy, which may be very strong and violent, upon the unexpected Arrival of a small *Advantage*, from that Occasion from which we apprehended great Evil; but still this *Unity* of many Particulars in the general Theo-

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\* See Sect. vi. Art. 13. and the Spectator there referr'd to.

Sect. 3. rem, is necessary to make it pleasant, in  
 any case.

Works of  
 Art.

VIII. As to the Works of ART, were we to run thro the various artificial Contrivances or Structures, we should constantly find the Foundation of the *Beauty* which appears in them, to be some kind of *Uniformity*, or *Unity* of Proportion among the Parts, and of each Part to the Whole. As there is a vast Diversity of Proportions possible, and different Kinds of *Uniformity*, so there is room enough for that Diversity of Fancys observable in *Architecture*, *Gardening*, and such like Arts in different *Nations*; they all may have *Uniformity*, tho the Parts in one may differ from those in another. The *Chinese* or *Persian* Buildings are not like the *Grecian* and *Roman*, and yet the former has its *Uniformity* of the various Parts to each other, and to the Whole, as well as the latter. In that kind of *Architecture* which the EUROPEANS call *Regular*, the *Uniformity* of Parts is very obvious, the several Parts are *regular Figures*, and either *equal* or *similar* at least in the same Range; the Pedestals are *Parallelopipedons* or square *Prisms*; the Pillars, *Cylinders* nearly; the Arches *Circular*, and all those in the same Row *equal*; there is the same Proportion every where observ'd in the same Range between the *Diameters* of Pillars and their *Heights*, their *Capitals*, the *Dia-*  
*eters*

*meters of Arches, the Heights of the Pedestals, the Projections of the Cornice, and all the Ornaments in each of our five Orders. And tho other Countrys do not follow the Grecian or Roman Proportions; yet there is even among them a Proportion retain'd, a Uniformity, and Resemblance of corresponding Figures; and every Deviation in one part from that Proportion which is observ'd in the rest of the Building, is displeasing to every Eye, and destroys or diminishes at least the Beauty of the Whole.*

IX. THE same might be observ'd thro all other Works of *Art*, even to the meanest *Utenfil*; the *Beauty* of every one of which we shall always find to have the same Foundation of *Uniformity amidst Variety*, without which they appear mean, irregular and deform'd.



## S E C T. IV,

## Of Relative or Comparative Beauty,

Comparative Beauty:

I. IF the preceding Thoughts concerning the Foundation of *absolute Beauty* be just, we may easily understand wherein *relative Beauty* consists. All *Beauty* is relative to the Sense of some Mind perceiving it ; but what we call *relative* is that which is apprehended in any *Object*, commonly consider'd as an *Imitation* of some Original ; And this *Beauty* is founded on a *Conformity*, or a kind of *Unity* between the Original and the Copy. The Original may be either some *Object* in *Nature*, or some *establish'd Idea* ; for if there be any known *Idea* as a Standard, and Rules to fix this Image or *Idea* by, we may make a *beautiful Imitation*. Thus a *Statuary*, *Painter*, or *Poet*, may please us with an *HERCULES*, if his Piece retains that *Grandeur*, and those marks of *Strength*, and *Courage*, which we imagine in that Hero.

AND farther, to obtain *comparative Beauty* alone, it is not necessary that there be any *Beauty* in the Original ; the *Imitation* of *absolute Beauty* may indeed in the whole make a more lovely Piece, and yet an

an exact Imitation shall still be *beautiful*, Sect. 4. tho the Original were intirely void of it: ~~~~~ Thus the *Deformitys* of old Age in a Picture, the *rudest Rocks* or *Mountains* in a *Landskip*, if well represented, shall have abundant *Beauty*, tho perhaps not so great as if the Original were *absolutely beautiful*, and as well represented.

II. THE same Observation holds true in Description in Poetry, the Descriptions of the Poets either of *natural* Objects or Persons; and this *relative Beauty* is what they should principally endeavour to obtain, as the peculiar *Beauty* of their Works. By the *Moralæ Fabulæ*, or the *idea* of ARISTOTLE, we are not to understand *virtuous Manners* in a moral Sense, but a *just Representation* of Manners or Characters as they are in *Nature*; and that the *Actions* and *Sentiments* be suited to the Characters of the *Persons* to whom they are ascrib'd in *Epick* and *Dramatick* Poetry. Perhaps very good Reasons may be suggested from the Nature of our *Passions*, to prove that a Poet should not draw his *Characters* perfectly *Virtuous*; these Characters indeed abstractly consider'd might give more Pleasure, and have more *Beauty* than the *imperfect* ones which occur in Life with a mixture of Good and Evil: But it may suffice at present to suggest against this Choice, that we have more lively Ideas of *imperfect Men* with all their Passions, than

Sect. 4. than of *morally perfect Heroes*, such as really never occur to our Observation; and of which consequently we cannot judge exactly as to their Agreement with the Copy. And further, thro' Consciousness of our own State, we are more nearly touch'd and affected by the *imperfect Characters*; since in them we see represented, in the Persons of others, the *Contrasts* of Inclinations, and the *Struggles* between the Passions of *Self-Love* and those of *Honour* and *Virtue*, which we often feel in our own Breasts. This is the Perfection of *Beauty* for which HOMER is justly admir'd, as well as for the *Variety* of his *Characters*.

Probabili-  
ty, Simily,  
Metaphor.

III. MANY other Beautys of Poetry may be reduc'd under this Class of *relative Beauty*: The *Probability* is absolutely necessary to make us imagine *Resemblance*; it is by *Resemblance* that the *Similitudes*, *Metaphors* and *Allegorys* are made *beautiful*, whether either the Subject or the Thing compar'd to it have *Beauty* or not; the *Beauty* indeed is greater, when both have some *original Beauty* or *Dignity* as well as *Resemblance*: and this is the foundation of the Rule of studying *Decency* in *Metaphors* and *Similys* as well as *Likeness*. The *Measures* and *Cadence* are instances of *Harmony*, and come under the head of *absolute Beauty*.

IV. WE

IV. WE may here observe a strange Proneness in our Minds to make *perpetual Comparisons* of all things which occur to our Observation, even those which would seem very remote. There are certain *Resemblances* in the Motions of all Animals upon like Passions, which easily found a *Comparison*; but this does not serve to entertain our Fancy: *Inanimate Objects* have often such Positions as resemble those of the *human Body* in various Circumstances; these Airs or Gestures of the *Body* are Indications of certain Dispositions in the *Mind*, so that our very *Passions* and *Affections* as well as other Circumstances obtain a Resemblance to *natural inanimate Objects*. Thus a *Tempest* at Sea is often an Emblem of *Wrath*; a *Plant* or *Tree* drooping under the Rain, of a Person in *Sorrow*; a *Poppy* bending its Stalk, or a *Flower* withering when cut by the Plow, resembles the Death of a *blooming Hero*; an *aged Oak* in the Mountains shall represent an *old Empire*, a *Flame* seizing a Wood shall represent a *War*. In short, every thing in *Nature*, by our strange inclination to *Resemblance*, shall be brought to represent other things, even the most remote, especially the Passions and Circumstances of human Nature in which we are more nearly concern'd; and to confirm this, and furnish Instances of it, one need



Sect. 4. need only look into HOMER or VIRGIL.  
 A fruitful Fancy would find in a Grove,  
 or a Wood, an Emblem for every Character  
 in a Commonwealth, and every turn of  
 Temper, or Station in Life.

*Intention.*

V. CONCERNING that kind of *comparative Beauty* which has a necessary relation to some establish'd Idea, we may observe, that some Works of *Art* acquire a *distinct Beauty* by their Correspondence to some universally suppos'd *Intention* in the Artificer, or the Persons who employ'd him: And to obtain this *Beauty*, sometimes they do not form their Works so as to attain the highest Perfection of *original Beauty* separately consider'd; because a Composition of this *relative Beauty*, along with some degree of the *original Kind*, may give more Pleasure, than a more *perfect original Beauty* separately. Thus we see, that strict *Regularity* in laying out of Gardens in *Parterres*, *Vista's*, *parallel Walks*, is often neglected, to obtain an Imitation of *Nature* even in some of its *Wildnesses*. And we are more pleas'd with this *Imitation*, especially when the Scene is large and spacious, than with the more confin'd Exactness of *regular Works*. So likewise in the *Monuments* erected in honour of deceased *Heroes*, altho a *Cylinder*, or *Prism*, or *regular Solid*, may have more *original Beauty* than a very acute *Pyramid* or *Obelisk*,  
 yet

yet the latter pleases more, by answering Sect. 4. better the suppos'd Intentions of *Stability*, and being *conspicuous*. For the same reason *Cubes*, or square *Prisms*, are generally chosen for the *Pedestals* of *Statues*, and not any of the more *beautiful Solids*, which do not seem so secure from rolling. This may be the reason too, why *Columns* or *Pillars* look best when made a little taper from the middle, or a third from the bottom, that they may not seem top-heavy and in danger of falling.

VI. THE like reason may influence Artists, in many other Instances, to depart from the Rules of *original Beauty*, as above laid down. And yet this is no Argument against our Sense of *Beauty* being founded, as was above explain'd, on *Uniformity amidst Variety*, but only an Evidence that our Sense of *Beauty* of the *Original* Kind may be vary'd and overballanc'd by another kind of *Beauty*.


VII. THIS *Beauty* arising from Correspondence to *Intention*, would open to curious Observers a new Scene of *Beauty* in the Works of NATURE, by considering how the *Mechanism* of the various Parts known to us, seems adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in Subordination to the Good of some *System* or *Whole*. We generally suppose the Good of the

Sect. 4. the greatest *Whole*, or of all *Beings*, to have been the *Intention* of the *AUTHOR* of *Nature*; and cannot avoid being pleas'd when we see any part of this *Design* executed in the *Systems* we are acquainted with. The *Observations* already made on this *Subject* are in every one's hand, in the *Treatises* of our late Improvers of *mechanical Philosophy*. We shall only observe here, that every one has a certain *Pleasure* in seeing any *Design* well executed by curious *Mechanism*, even when his own *Advantage* is no way concern'd; and also in discovering the *Design* to which any complex *Machine* is adapted, when he has perhaps had a general *Knowledge* of the *Machine* before, without seeing its *Correspondence* or *Aptness* to execute any *Design*.

THE Arguments by which we prove *Reason* and *Design* in any *Cause* from the *Beauty* of the *Effects*, are so frequently us'd in some of the highest *Subjects*, that it may be necessary to enquire a little more particularly into them, to see how far they will hold, and with what degree of *Evidence*.

## S E C T.





## S E C T. V.

*Concerning our Reasonings about Design and Wisdom in the Cause, from the Beauty or Regularity of Effects.*

I. **T**HERE seems to be no necessary Sense, Arbitrary in its Author. Connection of our pleasing Ideas of *Beauty* with the *Uniformity* or *Regularity* of the Objects, from the *Nature* of things, antecedent to some *Constitution* of the AUTHOR of our Nature, which has made such Forms pleasant to us. Other *Minds* may be so fram'd as to receive no Pleasure from *Uniformity*; and we actually find that the same regular Forms seem not equally to please all the Animals known to us, as shall probably appear afterwards. Therefore let us make what is the most unfavourable Supposition to the present Argument, *viz.* That the Constitution of our Sense so as to approve *Uniformity*, is merely arbitrary in the AUTHOR of our Nature; and that there are an infinity of *Tastes* or *Relishes* of *Beauty* possible; so that it would be impossible to throw together fifty or a hundred Pebbles, which should not make an agreeable Habitation for some Animal or other, and appear *beautiful* to it. And then it is plain,




Sect. 5. plain, that from the Perception of *Beauty* in any one Effect, we should have no reason to conclude *Design* in the Cause: for a Sense might be so constituted as to be pleas'd with such *Irregularity* as may be the effect of an *undirected Force*. \* But then, as there are an Infinity of *Forms* possible into which any System may be reduc'd, an Infinity of *Places* in which Animals may be situated, and an Infinity of *Relishes* or *Senses* in these Animals is suppos'd possible; that in the immense Spaces any one Animal should by Chance be plac'd in a System agreeable to its Taste, must be improbable as *infinite* to one at least: And much more unreasonable is it to expect from Chance, that a multitude of Animals agreeing in their Sense of *Beauty* should obtain *agreeable Places*.

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\* By undirected Force, or undesigning Force, is to be understood, That Force with which an Agent may put Matter into Motion, without having any Design or Intention to produce any particular Form. This Conatus ad motum, without an actual Line of Direction, seems such a gross absurdity in the Cartesian Scheme, that it is below the Dignity of common Sense to vouchsafe to confute it. But Men have so many confus'd Notions of some Nature, or Chance impressing Motions without any Design or Intention of producing any particular Effect, that it may be useful to shew, that even this very absurd Postulatum, tho it were granted them, is insufficient to answer the appearances in the Regularity of the World; and this is what is attempted in the first fourteen Articles of this Section. These Arguments would really be useless, if all Men were persuaded of what to a Man of just Thought will appear pretty obvious, that there can be no Thought-less Agent; and that Chance and Nature are mere empty Names, as they are us'd on this Occasion, relative only to our Ignorance.

II. THERE is also the same Probability, that in any one System of Matter an *Undirected Force* will produce a *regular Form*, as any one given *irregular* one, of the same degree of Complication: But still the *irregular Forms* into which any System may be rang'd, surpass in multitude the *Regular*, as *Infinite* does *Unity*; for what holds in *one* small System will hold in a *Thousand*, a *Million*, a *Universe*, with more Advantage, viz. that the *irregular Forms* possible infinitely surpass the *Regular*. For Instance, the *Area* of an *Inch Square* is capable of an *Infinity* of *regular Forms*, the *Equilateral Triangle*, the *Square*, the *Pentagon*, *Hexagon*, *Heptagon*, &c. but for each one regular Form, there are an *Infinity* of *Irregular*, as an *Infinity* of *Scalena* for the one *equilateral Triangle*, an *Infinity* of *Trapezia* for the one *Square*, of *irregular Pentagons* for the one *Regular*, and so on: and therefore supposing any one System agitated by *undesigning Force*, it is infinitely more probable that it will resolve itself into an *irregular Form*, than a *regular*. Thus, that a System of *six* Parts upon Agitation shall not obtain the Form of a regular *Hexagon*, is at least *infinite* to *Unity*; and the more complex we make the System, the greater is the hazard, from a very obvious Reason.

Sect. 5.



WE see this confirm'd by our constant Experience, that *Regularity* never arises from any *undesign'd Force* of ours ; and from this we conclude, that wherever there is any *Regularity* in the disposition of a System capable of many other Dispositions, there must have been *Design* in the Cause ; and the Force of this Evidence increases, according to the Multiplicity of Parts employ'd.

BUT this Conclusion is too rash, unless some further Proof be introduc'd ; and what leads us into it is this. Men, who have a Sense of *Beauty* in *Regularity*, are led generally in all their Arrangements of Bodys to study some kind of *Regularity*, and seldom ever design *Irregularity* ; hence we judge the same of other Beings too, *viz.* that they study *Regularity*, and presume upon *Intention* in the Cause wherever we see it, making *Irregularity* always a Presumption of Want of *Design* : Whereas if other Agents have different Senses of *Beauty*, or if they have no Sense of it at all, *Irregularity* may as well be design'd as *Regularity*. And then let it be observ'd, that in this Case there is just the same reason to conclude *Design* in the Cause from any one irregular Effect, as from a regular one ; for since there are an Infinity of other *Forms* possible as well as this irregular



gular one produc'd, and since to such a Sect. 5.  
Being \* void of a Sense of *Beauty*, all Forms are as to its own Relish indifferent, and all agitated Matter meeting must make some Form or other, and all Forms, upon Supposition that the Force is apply'd by an Agent void of a Sense of *Beauty*, would equally prove *Design*; it is plain that no one Form proves it more than another, or can prove it at all; except from a general metaphysical Consideration, too subtle to be certain, that there is no proper Agent without *Design* and *Intention*, and that every *Effect* flows from the *Intention* of some *Cause*.

III. THIS however follows from the above Similar  
mention'd Considerations, that supposing a Forms by  
Mass of Matter surpassing a cubick Inch, as Chance,  
impossible.

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\* There is a great Difference between such a Being as is here mention'd, and a Being which has no Intention for any reason whatsoever to produce one Form more than another. This latter sort of Being, as to the present Argument, would be the same with Chance, but not the former. For tho a Being has no sense of Beauty, he may notwithstanding be capable of Design, and of Intention to produce regular Forms; and the observation of greater Regularity in any number of Effects, than could be expected from undirected Force, is a presumption of Design and Intention in the Cause, even where the Cause is suppos'd to have no sense of Beauty in such Forms, since perhaps he may have other Reasons moving him to chuse such Forms. Thus supposing the DEITY no way necessarily pleas'd with Regularity, Uniformity, or Similarity in Bodys, yet there may be Reasons moving him to produce such Objects, such as the pleasing his Creatures, having given them a sense of Beauty founded on these Qualitys. See the two last Paragraphs of the last Section.



Sect. 5. *infinite* of the *first* Power does *Unity*, and that this whole Mass were some way determin'd from its own Nature without any *Design* in a *Cause* (which perhaps is scarce possible) to resolve itself into the solid Content of a *cubick* Inch, and into a *prismatick* Form whose *Base* should always be  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a *square* Inch; suppose these Conditions determin'd, and all others left to *undirected Force*; all which we could expect from *undirected Force* in this Case would be one equilateral *Prism*, or two perhaps; because there are an Infinity of irregular *Prisms* possible of the same *Base*, and *solid Content*: and when we met with many such *Prisms*, we must probably conclude them produc'd by *Design*, since they are more than could have been expected by the Laws of *Hazard*.

IV. BUT if this *infinite* Mass was no way determin'd to a *prismatick* Form, we could only expect from its *casual Concourse* one *Prism* of any Kind, since there is an Infinity of other Solids into which the Mass might be resolv'd; and if we found any great number of *Prisms*, we should have reason to presume *Design*: so that in a Mass of Matter as *infinite* of the *first* Power, we could not from any *Concourse* or *Agitation* expect with any good ground a Body of any given Dimensions or Size, and of any given Form;

Form; since of any Dimension there are infinite Forms possible, and of any Form there are an Infinity of Dimensions; and if we found several Bodys of the same Dimension and Form, we should have so much Presumption for *Design*.

V. THERE is one trifling Objection which may perhaps arise from the *crystallizing* of certain Bodys, when the Fluid is evaporated in which they were swimming; for in this we frequently see *regular Forms* arising, tho there is nothing suppos'd in this Affair but an *undirected Force* of *Attraction*. But to remove this Objection, we need only consider, that we have good Reason to believe, that the smallest Particles of *crystalliz'd* Bodys have fix'd *regular Forms* given them in the Constitution of *Nature*; and then it is easy to conceive how their *Attractions* may produce *regular Forms*: but unless we suppose some preceding *Regularity* in the Figures of *attracting* Bodys, they can never form any regular Body at all. And hence we see how improbable it is, that the whole Mass of *Matter*, not only in this Globe, but in all the fixed Stars known to us by our Eyes or Glasses, were they a thousand times larger than our Astronomers suppose, could in any *Concourse* have produc'd any Number of *similar* Bodys *Regular* or *Irregular*.

Sect. 5.

Combinations by  
Chance,  
impossible.

VI. AND let it be here observ'd, that there are many Compositions of Bodys which the smallest Degree of *Design* could easily effect, which yet we would in vain expect from all the Powers of *Chance* or *undesign'd Force*, after an *Infinity* of *Rencounters*; even supposing a *Dissolution* of every Form except the *regular one*, that the Parts might be prepar'd for a new Agitation. Thus, supposing we could expect *one* equilateral *Prism* of any *given* Dimensions should be form'd from *undirected Force*, in an *Infinity* of Matter some way determin'd to resolve itself into Bodys of a *given* solid Content, (which is all we could expect, since it is *infinite to one* after the *solid Content* is obtain'd, that the Body shall not be *Prismatical*; and allowing it *Prismatical*, it is *infinite to one* that it shall not be *Equilateral* :) And again, supposing another *Infinity* of Matter determin'd to resolve itself into *Tubes*, of *Orifices* exactly equal to the *Bases* of the former *Prisms*, it is again at least as the *second Power* of *Infinite to Unity*, that not one of these *Tubes* shall be both *Prismatick* and *Equiangular*; and then if the *Tube* were thus form'd, so as to be exactly capable of receiving one of the *Prisms* and no more, it is *infinite to one* that they shall never meet in *infinite Space*; and should they



they meet, it is *infinite* to one that the Sect. 5.  
*Axes* of the *Prism* and *Tube* shall never  
 happen in the same strait *Line*; and sup-  
 posing they did, it is again as *infinite* to  
 three, that *Angle* shall not meet *Angle*, so  
 as to enter. We see then how infinitely  
 improbable it is, "that all the Powers of  
 " *Chance* in *infinite Matter*, agitated thro  
 " *infinite Ages*, could ever effect this small  
 " Composition of a *Prism* entering a *Pris-*  
 " *matick Bore*; and, that all our hazard  
 " for it would at most be but as *three* is  
 " to the *third Power* of *Infinite*." And  
 yet the smallest *Design* could easily effect  
 it.

VII. MAY we not then justly count it  
 altogether absurd, and next to an absolute  
 strict *Impossibility*, "That all the Powers  
 " of *undirected Force* should ever effect  
 " such a complex Machine as the most  
 " imperfect *Plant*, or the meanest *Ani-*  
 " *mal*, even in *one Instance*?" for the  
*Improbability* just increases, as the Com-  
 plication of Mechanism in these *natural*  
 Bodys surpasses that *simple* Combination  
 above mention'd.

VIII. Let it be here observ'd, "That  
 " the preceding Reasoning from the *Fre-*  
 " *quency* of *regular Bodys* of one Form in  
 " the *Universe*, and from the *Combina-*  
 " *tions* of various Bodys, is intirely inde-  
 E 4 " pendent



Sect. 5. "pendent on any Perception of *Beauty*;  
 "and would equally prove *Design* in the  
 "Cause, altho there were no *Being* which  
 "perceiv'd *Beauty* in any Form what-  
 "soever:" for it is in short this, "That  
 "the recurring of any Effect oftner  
 "than the Laws of Hazard determine,  
 "gives Presumption of *Design*; and,  
 "That Combinations which no undesign'd  
 "Force could give us reason to expect,  
 "must necessarily prove the same; and  
 "that with superior probability, as the  
 "multitude of Cases in which the con-  
 "trary might happen, surpass all the  
 "Cases in which this could happen:"  
 which appears to be in the simplest Cases  
 at least as *Infinite* does *Unity*. And the  
 frequency of similar irregular Forms, or  
 exact Combinations of them, is an equal  
 Argument of *Design* in the Cause, since  
 the Similarity, or exact Combinations of ir-  
 regular Forms, are as little to be expected  
 from all the Powers of undirected Force,  
 as any sort whatsoever.

IX. To bring this nearer to something  
 like a *Theorem*, altho the *Idea* of *Infinite*  
 be troublesom enough to manage in Reaso-  
 ning. The Powers of *Chance*, with *infinite*  
*Matter* in *infinite* Ages, may answer Ha-  
 zards as the fifth Power of *Infinite* and  
 no more: thus the Quantity of Matter  
 may be conceiv'd as the third Power of  
 In.

*Infinite* and no more, the *various Degrees* Sect. 5. of Force may make *another* Power of *Infinite*, and the *Number* of Rencounters may make the *fifth*. But this last only holds on Supposition, that after every Rencounter there is no *Cohesion*, but all is dissolv'd again for a new Concourse, except in *similar Forms* or *exact Combinations*; which Supposition is entirely groundless, since we see *dissimilar Bodys* cohering as strongly as any, and *rude Masses* more than any Combinations. Now to produce any *given* Body, in a *given* Place or Situation, and of *given* Dimensions, or Shape, the Hazards of the contrary are, *one* Power of *Infinite* at least to obtain the *Place* or Situation; when the *Situation* is obtain'd, the *solid Content* requires *another* Power of *Infinite* to obtain it; the *Situation* and *Solidity* obtain'd require, for accomplishing the *simplest given* Shape, at least the other *three* Powers of *Infinite*. For instance, let the Shape be a four-sided *Prism* or *Parallelopiped*; that the *Surfaces* should be *Planes* requires *one* Power; that they should be *Parallel* in this Case, or *inclin'd* in any *given Angle* in any other Case, requires *another* Power of *Infinite*; and that they should be in any *given Ratio* to each other, requires at least the *third* Power: for in each of these Heads there is still an *Infinity* at least of other Cases possible beside the *one given*. So that all the

Sect. 5. the Powers of *Chance* could only produce perhaps *one* Body of every simpler Shape or Size *at most*, and this is all we could expect: we might expect one *Pyramid*, or *Cube*, or *Prism* perhaps; but when we increase the Conditions requir'd, the Prospect must grow more improbable, as in more *complex Figures*, and in all *Combinations* of Bodys, and in *similar Species*, which we never could reasonably hope from *Chance*; and therefore where we see them, we must certainly ascribe them to *Design*.

Combina-  
tions of ir-  
regular  
Forms, e-  
qually im-  
possible.

X. THE Combinations of *regular Forms*, or of *irregular ones* exactly adapted to each other, require such *vast Powers* of *Infinite* to effect them, and the Hazards of the *contrary* Forms are so *infinitely* numerous, that all *Probability* or *Possibility* of their being accomplish'd by *Chance* seems quite to vanish. Let us apply the Cases in *Art. vi.* of this *Section* about the *Prism* and *Tube*, to our simplest Machines, such as a *pair of Wheels* of our ordinary Carriages; each *Circular*, *Spokes* equal in *length*, *thickness*, *shape*; the *Wheels* set *Parallel*, the *Axle-tree* fix'd in the *Nave* of both, and secur'd from coming out at either End: Now the Cases in which the contrary might have happen'd from *undirectea Concourses*, were there no more requir'd than what is just now mention'd, must amount in Multitude to a Power of *Infinite*  
equal



*equal* to every Circumstance requir'd. What Sect. 5.  
shall we say then of a *Plant*, a *Tree*, an *Animal*, a *Man*, with *such multitudes* of  
adapted Vessels, *such Articulations*, *In-*  
*sertions* of *Muscles*, *Diffusion* of *Veins*,  
*Arterys*, *Nerves*? The *Improbability* that  
such *Machines* should be the Effect of *Chance*,  
must be near the *infinitesimal* Power of  
*Infinite* to *Unity*.


XI. FURTHER, were all the former  
Reasoning from *Similarity* of Forms and  
Combinations groundless, and could *Chance*  
give us ground to expect such Forms, with  
exact Combination, yet we could only pro-  
mise ourselves *one* of these Forms among an  
*Infinity* of others. When we see then such  
a *multitude* of Individuals of a Species,  
*similar* to each other in a vast number of  
Parts; and when we see in each *Individual*,  
the corresponding Members so exactly like  
each other, what possible room is there left  
for questioning *Design* in the *Universe*?  
None but the barest *Possibility* against an in-  
conceivably great *Probability*, surpassing e-  
very thing which is not *strict Demonstration*.

XII. THIS Argument, as has been al-  
ready observ'd\*, is quite abstracted from  
any Sense of *Beauty* in any particular Form;  
for the *exact Similarity* of a hundred or a

---

\* See above, Art. viii.



Sect. 5.  thousand *Trapezia*, proves *Design* as well as the *Similarity* of *Squares*, since both are equally above all the Powers of *undirected Force* or *Chance*, as the *hundredth* or *thousandth* Power of *Infinite* surpasses *Unity*; and what is above the Powers of *Chance*, must give us proportionable *Presumption* for *Design*.

THUS, allowing that a *Leg*, or *Arm*, or *Eye*, might have been the Effect of *Chance*, (which was shewn to be *most absurd*, and next to absolutely *impossible*) that it would not have a corresponding *Leg*, *Arm*, *Eye*, exactly *similar*, must be a hazard of a Power of *Infinite* proportion'd to the Complication of Parts; for in Proportion to this is the multitude of Cases increas'd, in which it would not have a corresponding Member *similar*: so that allowing twenty or thirty Parts in such a Structure, it would be as the *twentieth* or *thirtieth* Power of *Infinite* to *Unity*, that the corresponding Part should not be *similar*. What shall we say then of the *similar Forms* of a whole *Species*?

Gross Simi-  
larity by  
chance, im-  
possible.

XIII. IF it be objected, " That *natural* Bodys are not *exactly similar*; but  
" only *grossly so* to our Senses; as that a  
" *Vein*, an *Artery*, a *Bone* is not perhaps  
" exactly similar to its Correspondent in  
" the same Animal, tho it appears so to  
" our


" our Senses, which judge only of the Sect. 5.  
 " Bulk, and do not discern the small con-  
 " stituent Parts ; and that in the several In-  
 " dividuals of a Species the *Dissimilarity*  
 " is always sensible, often in the internal  
 " Structure, and often, nay always in the  
 " external Appearance." To remove this  
 Objection it will be sufficient to shew,  
 " That the multitude of Cases wherein *sen-*  
 " *sible Dissimilitude* cou'd have happen'd,  
 " are still infinitely more than all the Cases  
 " in which *sensible Similitude* might ;" so  
 that the same Reasoning holds from *sensible*  
*Similarity*, as from the *mathematically*  
*exact* : And again, " That the Cases of  
 " *gross Dissimilarity* do in the same man-  
 " ner surpass the Cases of *gross Similarity*  
 " possible, as *infinite* does *one*."

XIV. To prove both these Assertions,  
 let us consider a simple Instance. Suppose  
 a *Trapezium* of a foot Square in *Area*  
 should appear grossly *similar* to another,  
 while no one *side* differs, by  $\frac{1}{10}$  of an Inch ;  
 or no *Angle* in one surpasses the corre-  
 sponding one in the other above ten Mi-  
 nutes : now this tenth of an Inch is *infi-*  
*nitely* divisible, as are also the ten Minutes,  
 so that the Cases of *insensible Dissimilarity*  
 under *apparent Similarity* are really *Infi-*  
*nite*. But then it is also plain that there  
 are an *Infinity* of different sensibly dissimi-  
 lar *Trapezia*, even of the same *Area*, ac-  
 cording

Sect. 5. cording as we vary a *Side* by one Tenth, two Tenths, three Tenths, and so on, and vary the *Angles* and another *Side* so as to keep the *Area* equal. Now in each of these infinite Degrees of *sensible Dissimilitude* the several Tenths are *infinitely* divisible as well as in the first Case; so that the multitude of *sensible Dissimilarities* are to the multitude of *insensible Dissimilarities* under apparent Resemblance, still as the *second* Power of *Infinite* to the *first*, or as *Infinite* to *Unity*. And then how vastly greater must the Multitude be, of all possible *sensible Dissimilarities* in such complex Bodys as *Legs, Arms, Eyes, Arterys, Veins, Skeletons*?

XV. As to the *Dissimilarities* of Animals of the same Species, it is in the same manner plain, that the possible Cases of *gross Dissimilarity* are Infinite; and then every Case of *gross Dissimilarity* contains also all the Cases of *insensible Dissimilarity*. Thus, if we would count all Animals of a Species *grossly similar*, while there was no Limb which in Length or Diameter did exceed the ordinary Shape by above a third of the Head; it is plain that there are an Infinity of *gross Dissimilarities* possible, and then in each of these Cases of *gross Dissimilarity*, there are an Infinity of Cases of *nicer Dissimilarity*, since  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the Head may be infinitely divided. To take a low  
 2 but



but easy Instance ; two *Cockle-Shells* which Sect. 5.  
 fitted each other naturally, may have an   
 Infinity of *insensible Differences*, but still  
 there are an Infinity of possible *sensible*  
*Differences* ; and then in any one of the  
*sensibly different* Forms, there may be the  
 same Infinity of *insensible Differences* be-  
 side the *sensible one* : So that still the ha-  
 zard for even *gross Similarity* from *Chance*  
 is *Infinite* to one, and this always increases  
 by a Power of Infinite for every distinct  
 Member of the Animal, in which even *gross*  
*Similarity* is retain'd ; since the Addition  
 of every Member or Part to a complex Ma-  
 chine, makes a new Infinity of Cases, in  
 which *sensible Dissimilarity* may happen ;  
 and this Infinity combin'd with the infinite  
 Cases of the former Parts, raises the Ha-  
 zard by a Power of Infinite.

Now this may sufficiently shew us the  
 Absurdity of the *Cartesian* or *Epicurean*  
*Hypothesis*, even granting their *Postulatum*  
 of *undirected Force* impress'd on *infinite*  
*Matter* ; and seems almost a Demonstration  
 of *Design* in the *Universe*.

XVI. ONE Objection more remains to  
 be remov'd, *viz.* " That some imagine,  
 " this Argument may hold better *à Priori*  
 " than *à Posteriori* ; that is, we have  
 " better Reason to believe, when we see a  
 " Cause about to act, without Knowledge,  
 " that

Sect. 5.

“ that he will not attain any given, or de-  
 “ fir'd *End* ; than we have on the other  
 “ hand to believe, when we see the *End*  
 “ actually attain'd, that he acted with  
 “ Knowledge : Thus, say they, when a  
 “ particular Person is about to draw a  
 “ Ticket in a *Lottery*, where there is but  
 “ one *Prize* to a thousand *Blanks*, it is  
 “ highly probable that he shall draw a  
 “ *Blank* ; but suppose we have seen him  
 “ actually draw for himself the *Prize*, we  
 “ have no ground to conclude that he had  
 “ *Knowledge* or *Art* to accomplish this  
 “ *End*.” But the Answer is obvious : In  
 such Contrivances we generally have, from  
 the very Circumstances of the Lottery, ve-  
 ry strong moral Arguments, which almost de-  
 monstrate that *Art* can have no place ; so  
 that a Probability of a *thousand* to *one*, does  
 not surmount those Arguments : But let the  
 Probability be increas'd, and it will soon  
 surmount all Arguments to the contrary.  
 For instance, If we saw a Man ten times  
 successively draw Prizes, in a Lottery where  
 there were but ten Prizes to ten thousand  
 Blanks, I fancy few would question whe-  
 ther he us'd *Art* or not : much less would  
 we imagine it were *Chance*, if we saw a  
 Man draw for his own Gain successively a  
 hundred, or a thousand Prizes, from among  
 a proportionably greater number of Blanks.  
 Now in the Works of *Nature* the Case is  
 entirely different : we have not the least  
 Ar-

Argument against *Art* or *Design*. An in- Sect. 5.  
*telligent Cause* is surely at least as probable  
 a Notion as *Chance*, *general Force*, *Conatus ad Motum*, or the *Clinamen Principiorum*, to account for any Effect whatsoever:  
 And then all the *Regularity*, *Combinations*, *Similaritys* of Species, are so many Demonstrations, that there was *Design* and *Intelligence* in the CAUSE of this Universe: Whereas in fair Lotterys, all *Art* in drawing is made, if not actually impossible, at least highly improbable.

XVII. LET it be here observ'd also, *Irregularity does not prove want of Design.*  
 " That a *rational Agent* may be capable  
 " of impressing Force without intending  
 " to produce any particular Form, and  
 " of designedly producing *irregular* or  
 " *dissimilar Forms*, as well as *regular*  
 " and *similar*:" And hence it follows,  
 " That altho all the *Regularity*, *Combination* and *Similarity* in the *Universe*,  
 " are Presumptions of *Design*, yet *Irregularity* is no Presumption of the contrary; unless we suppose that the *Agent*  
 " is determin'd from a Sense of *Beauty*  
 " always to act *regularly*, and delight in  
 " *Similarity*; and that he can have no  
 " other inconsistent Motive of Action:"  
 Which last is plainly absurd. We do not want in the *Universe* many Effects which seem to have been left to the general *Laws of Motion* upon some great *Impulse*, and  
 F have



- Sect. 5. have many Instances where *Similarity* has been plainly design'd in some respects, and probably neglected in others; or even *Dissimilarity* design'd. Thus we see the *general exact Resemblance* between the two *Eyes* of most persons; and yet perhaps no other third *Eye* in the World is *exactly* like them. We see a *gross Conformity* of shape in all Persons in innumerable Parts, and yet no two *Individuals* of any Species are undistinguishable; which perhaps is intended for valuable Purposes to the whole Species.

Wisdom,  
Prudence.

XVIII. HITHERTO the Proof amounts only to *Design* or *Intention* barely, in opposition to *blind Force* or *Chance*; and we see the Proof of this is independent on the *arbitrary Constitution* of our *internal Sense of Beauty*. *Beauty* is often suppos'd an Argument of more than *Design*, to wit, *Wisdom* and *Prudence* in the Cause. Let us enquire also into this.

WISDOM denotes the pursuing of the best Ends by the best Means; and therefore before we can from any Effect prove the Cause to be wise, we must know what is best to the Cause or Agent. Among men who have pleasure in contemplating *Uniformity*, the *Beauty* of Effects is an Argument of Wisdom, because this is Good to them;

them; but the same Argument would not Sect. 5.  
 hold as to a *Being void* of this *Sense* of *Beauty*. And therefore the *Beauty* apparent to us in *Nature*, will not of itself prove *Wisdom* in the *Cause*, unless this *Cause*, or AUTHOR of *Nature* be suppos'd BENEVOLENT; and then indeed the Happiness of Mankind is desirable or *Good* to the SUPREME CAUSE; and that Form which pleases us, is an Argument of his *Wisdom*. And the Strength of this Argument is increased always in proportion to the Degree of *Beauty* produc'd in *Nature*, and expos'd to the View of any *rational Agent*; since upon supposition of a *benevolent DEITY*, all the apparent *Beauty* produc'd is an Evidence of the Execution of a *Benevolent Design*, to give him the Pleasures of *Beauty*.

BUT what more immediately proves *Wisdom* is this; when we see any Machine with a vast Complication of Parts actually obtaining an *End*, we justly conclude,  
 “ That since this could not have been the  
 “ Effect of *Chance*, it must have been *intended* for that *End*, which is obtain'd  
 “ by it;” and then the *Ends* or *Intentions*, being in part known, the Complication of Organs, and their nice Disposition adapted to this *End*, is an Evidence  
 “ of a *comprehensive large Understanding*  
 “ in the *Cause*, according to the Multi-  
 F 2 plicity

Sect. 5. “ plicity of Parts, and the Appositeneſs  
 “ of their Structure, even when we do  
 “ not know the *Intention* of the *Whole*.”

General  
 Causes.

XIX. THERE is another kind of *Beauty* also which is still pleasing to our *Sense*, and from which we conclude *Wisdom* in the Cause as well as *Design*, and that is, *when we see many useful or beautiful Effects flowing from one general Cause*. There is a very good Reason for this Conclusion among Men. *Interest* must lead *Beings* of limited Powers, who are incapable of a great diversity of Operations, and distracted by them, to chuse this *frugal Oeconomy* of their Forces, and to look upon such Management as an Evidence of *Wisdom* in other *Beings* like themselves. Nor is this speculative Reason all which influences them, for even beside this Consideration of *Interest*, they are determin'd by a *Sense of Beauty* where that Reason does not hold; as when we are judging of the Productions of other *Agents* about whose Oeconomy we are not solicitous. Thus, who does not approve of it as a Perfection in *Clock-work*, that three or four Motions of the *Hour*, *Minute*, and *second Hands*, and *monthly Plate*, should arise from one *Spring* or *Weight*, rather than from three, or four *Springs*, or *Weights*, in a very Compound Machine, which should perform the same Effects, and answer all the



the same Purposes with equal exactness? Sect. 5.  
Now the Foundation of this *Beauty* plainly appears to be *Uniformity* or *Unity* of Cause amidst *Diversity* of Effects.

XX. WE shall \* hereafter offer some *General* Reasons, why the AUTHOR of *Nature* *Laws.* may chuse to operate in this manner by *General Laws* and *Universal extensive Causes*, altho the Reason just now mention'd does not hold with an *Almighty Being*. This is certain, That we have some of the most delightful Instances of *Universal Causes* in the *Works* of *Nature*, and that the most studious men in these Subjects are so delighted with the Observation of them, that they always look upon them as Evidences of *Wisdom* in the Administration of *Nature*, from a SENSE OF BEAUTY.

XXI. THE wonderfully simple *Mechanism* which performs all Animal Motions, was mention'd † already; nor is *that* of the inanimate Parts of *Nature* less admirable. How innumerable are the Effects of that one Principle of *Heat*, deriv'd to us from the *Sun*, which is not only delightful to our Sight and Feeling, and the Means of discerning Objects, but is the Cause of *Rains, Springs, Rivers, Winds,*


\* See the last Section.

† See above, Sect. ii, Art. 8.

Sect. 5. and the universal Cause of *Vegetation* !

~ The *uniform Principle of Gravity* preserves at once the *Planets* in their *Orbits*, gives *Cohesion* to the Parts of each *Globe*, and *Stability* to *Mountains*, *Hills*, and *artificial Structures* ; it raises the *Sea* in *Tides*, and sinks them again, and restrains them in their *Channels* ; it drains the *Earth* of its superfluous *Moisture*, by *Rivers* ; it raises the *Vapours* by its Influence on the *Air*, and brings them down again in *Rains* ; it gives an *uniform Pressure* to our *Atmosphere*, necessary to our *Bodys* in general, and more especially to *Inspiration* in *Breathing* ; and furnishes us with an *universal Movement*, capable of being apply'd in innumerable *Engines*. How incomparably more *beautiful* is this *Structure*, than if we suppos'd so many *distinct Volitions* in the *DEITY*, producing every particular *Effect*, and preventing some of the accidental *Evils* which casually flow from the *general Law* ! We may rashly imagine that this latter manner of *Operation* might have been more useful to us ; and it would have been no distraction to *Omnipotence* : But then the great *Beauty* had been lost, and there had been no more *Pleasure* in the *Contemplation* of this *Scene*, which is now so delightful. One would rather chuse to run the hazard of its *casual Evils*, than part with that *harmonious Form* which has been an

unexhausted Source of Delight to the successive Spectators in all Ages. Sect. 5.



XXII. HENCE we see, "That how-  
 " ever *Miracles* may prove the Superin-  
 " tendency of a *voluntary Agent*, and  
 " that the *Universe* is not guided by *Ne-*  
 " *cessity* or *Fate*, yet *that Mind* must  
 " be *weak* and *inadvertent*, which needs  
 " them to confirm the Belief of a *Wise*  
 " and *Good DEITY*; since the deviation  
 " from *general Laws*, unless upon very  
 " extraordinary Occasions, must be a pre-  
 " sumption of *Inconstancy* and *Weak-*  
 " *ness*, rather than of *steddy Wisdom* and  
 " *Power*, and must weaken the best Ar-  
 " guments we can have for the *Sagacity*  
 " and *Power* of the *universal MIND*."

*Miracles.*



## S E C T. VI.

Of the Universality of the Sense of  
Beauty among Men.

Internal  
Sense not  
an imme-  
diate  
Source of  
Pain.

I. **W**E before \* insinuated, “ That  
“ all *Beauty* has a relation to  
“ some *perceiving Power* ;” and conse-  
quently since we know not how great a  
*Variety* of Senses there may be among A-  
nimals, there is no Form in *Nature* con-  
cerning which we can pronounce, “ That  
“ it has no *Beauty* ;” for it may still  
please some *perceiving Power*. But our  
*Inquiry* is confin’d to Men ; and before we  
examine the *Universality* of this *Sense of*  
*Beauty*, or their agreement in approving  
*Uniformity*, it may be proper to consider,  
“ whether, as the other *Senses* which give  
“ us Pleasure do also give us Pain, so this  
“ *Sense of Beauty* does make some Objects  
“ disagreeable to us, and the occasion of  
“ Pain.”

THAT many Objects give no pleasure to  
our *Sense* is obvious, many are certainly  
void of *Beauty* : But then there is no  
Form which seems necessarily disagreeable  
of itself, when we dread no other Evil

\* See above Sect. i. Art. 17. Sect. iv. Art. 1.

from it, and compare it with nothing better Sect. 6.  
of the Kind. Many Objects are naturally displeasing, and distasteful to our *external Senses*, as well as others pleasing and agreeable; as *Smells, Tastes*, and some separate *Sounds*: but as to our *Sense of Beauty*, no Composition of Objects which give not unpleasant simple Ideas, seems positively unpleasant or painful of it self, had we never observ'd any thing better of the Kind. *Deformity* is only *the absence of Beauty*, or *deficiency in the Beauty expected in any Species*: Thus *bad Musick* pleases *Rusticks* who never heard any better, and the *finest Ear* is not offended with *tuning* of Instruments if it be not too tedious, where no *Harmony* is expected; and yet much smaller *Dissonancy* shall offend amidst the Performance, where *Harmony* is expected. A *rude Heap* of Stones is no way offensive to one who shall be displeas'd with *Irregularity* in *Architecture*, where *Beauty* was expected. And had there been a Species of that Form which we call now *ugly* or *deform'd*, and had we never seen or expected greater *Beauty*, we should have receiv'd no disgust from it, altho the Pleasure would not have been so great in this Form as in those we now admire. Our *Sense of Beauty* seems design'd to give us positive Pleasure, but not positive Pain or Disgust, any further than what arises from disappointment.

## II. THERE

## Sect. 6.

~  
 Approba-  
 tion and  
 Dislike  
 from As-  
 sociations  
 of Ideas.

II. THERE are indeed many Faces which at first View are apt to raise Dislike; but this is generally not from any positive Deformity which of it self is positively displeasing, but either from want of *expected Beauty*, or much more from their carrying some natural indications of *morally bad Dispositions*, which we all acquire a Faculty of discerning in *Countenances, Airs, and Gestures*. That this is not occasion'd by any Form positively disgusting, will appear from this, That if upon long acquaintance we are sure of finding *sweetness of Temper, Humanity and Cheerfulness*, altho the bodily Form continues, it shall give us no Disgust or Displeasure; whereas if any thing was naturally disagreeable, or the occasion of Pain, or positive Distaste, it would always continue so, even altho the Aversion we might have toward it were counterballanc'd by other Considerations. There are Horrors rais'd by some Objects, which are only the Effect of *Fear* for our selves, or *Compassion* toward others, when either *Reason*, or some foolish *Association of Ideas*, makes us apprehend Danger, and not the Effect of any thing in the Form it self: for we find that most of those Objects which excite Horror at first, when Experience or Reason has remov'd the Fear, may become the occasions of Pleasure; as *ravenous Beasts,*



*Beasts, a tempestuous Sea, a craggy Precipice, a dark shady Valley.* Sect. 6.

III. WE shall see \* hereafter, " That *Associations*  
 " *Associations of Ideas* make Objects  
 " pleasant, and delightful, which are not  
 " naturally apt to give any such Plea-  
 " sures; and the same way, the *casual*  
 " *Conjunctions of Ideas* may give a Dis-  
 " gust, where there is nothing disagree-  
 " able in the Form it self." And this  
 is the occasion of many fantastick Aver-  
 sions to Figures of some Animals, and to  
 some other Forms: Thus *Swines, Ser-*  
*pents* of all Kinds, and some *Insects* real-  
 ly beautiful enough, are beheld with A-  
 version by many People, who have got  
*some accidental Ideas associated* to them.  
 And for *Distastes* of this Kind, no other  
 Account can be given.

IV. BUT as to the *universal Agreement* *Universali-*  
 of Mankind in their *Sense of Beauty* from *ty of this*  
*Uniformity amidst Variety*, we must con- *Sense.*  
 sult Experience: and as we allow all Men  
 Reason, since all Men are capable of under-  
 standing simple Arguments, tho few are  
 capable of complex Demonstrations; so in  
 this Case it must be sufficient to prove *this*  
*Sense of Beauty universal*, " if all Men  
 " are better pleas'd with *Uniformity* in the

\* See below Art. 11, 12. of this Section.

" simpler

Sect. 6. “ simpler Instances than *the contrary*, even  
 “ when there is no Advantage observ’d  
 “ attending it ; and likewise if all Men,  
 “ according as their Capacity enlarges, so  
 “ as to receive and compare more complex  
 “ Ideas, have a greater Delight in *Unifor-*  
 “ *mity*, and are pleas’d with its more  
 “ complex Kinds, both *Original* and *Re-*  
 “ *lative*.”

Now let us consider if ever any Person was void of *this Sense* in the simpler Instances. Few Trials have been made in the simplest Instances of *Harmony*, because as soon as we find an *Ear* incapable of relishing complex Compositions, such as our *Tunes* are, no further Pains are employ’d about such. But in *Figures*, did ever any Man make choice of a *Trapezium*, or any irregular *Curve*, for the *Ichnography* or Plan of his House, without Necessity, or some great Motive of Convenience ? or to make the opposite Walls *not parallel*, or *unequal* in Height ? Were ever *Trapeziums*, irregular *Polygons* or *Curves* chosen for the Forms of *Doors* or *Windows*, tho these Figures might have answer’d the Uses as well, and would have often sav’d a great part of the Time, Labour and Expence to Workmen, which is now employ’d in suiting the Stones and Timber to the *regular* Forms ? Among all the fantastick Modes of *Dress*,  
 none

none was ever quite void of *Uniformity*, Sect. 6. if it were only in *the resemblance* of the two Sides of the same *Robe*, and in *some general Aptitude* to the human Form. The *Pictish Painting* had always *relative Beauty* by resemblance to other Objects, and often those Objects were *originally beautiful*: however justly we might apply HORACE'S Censure of impertinent Descriptions in *Poetry*.

*Sed non erat his locus — \**

But never were any so extravagant as to affect such Figures as are made by *the casual spilling* of liquid Colours. Who was ever pleas'd with an *inequality* of Heights in *Windows* of the same Range, or *dissimilar Shapes* of them? with *unequal Legs* or *Arms*, *Eyes* or *Cheeks* in a *Mistress*? It must however be acknowledg'd, "That  
" *Interest* may often counterballance our  
" *Sense of Beauty* in this Affair as well  
" as in others, and superior good Quali-  
" tys may make us overlook such Imper-  
" fections."

V. NAY further, it may perhaps appear,  
" That *Regularity* and *Uniformity* are so  
" copiously diffus'd thro the *Universe*,  
" and we are so readily determin'd to

*Real Beau-  
ty alone  
pleases.*

\* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 19.



Sect. 6. "pursue *this* as the Foundation of *Beauty* in *Works of Art*, that there is scarcely any thing ever fancy'd as *Beautiful*, where there is not really something of this *Uniformity and Regularity*." We are indeed often mistaken in imagining that there is the greatest possible *Beauty*, where it is but very imperfect; but still it is some degree of *Beauty* which pleases, altho there may be higher Degrees which we do not observe; and our *Sense* acts with full Regularity when we are pleas'd, altho we are kept by a false Prejudice from pursuing Objects which would please us more.

A GOTH, for instance, is mistaken, when from Education he imagines the *Architecture* of his Country to be the most perfect: and a *Conjunction* of some hostile *Ideas*, may make him have an Aversion to *Roman Buildings*, and study to demolish them, as some of our *Reformers* did the *Popish Buildings*, not being able to separate the Ideas of the superstitious Worship, from the Forms of the Buildings where it was practis'd: and yet it is still *real Beauty* which pleases the GOTH, founded upon *Uniformity amidst Variety*. For the *Gothick Pillars* are *uniform* to each other, not only in their *Sections*, which are *Lozenge-form'd*; but also in their *Heights and Ornaments*: Their *Arches* are not one *uniform Curve*, but yet they

they are *Segments* of *similar Curves*, and Sect. 6. generally equal in the same Ranges. The very *Indian Buildings* have some kind of *Uniformity*, and many of the EASTERN NATIONS, tho they differ much from us, yet have great *Regularity* in their Manner, as well as the ROMANS in theirs. Our *Indian Screens*, which wonderfully supply the *regular* Imaginations of our *Ladys* with Ideas of Deformity, in which *Nature* is very churlish and sparing, do want indeed all the *Beauty* arising from Proportion of Parts, and Conformity to *Nature*; and yet they cannot divest themselves of all *Beauty* and *Uniformity* in the separate Parts: And this diversifying the human Body into various Contortions, may give some wild Pleasure from *Variety*, since some *Uniformity* to the human Shape is still retain'd.

VI. THERE is one sort of *Beauty* which might perhaps have been better mention'd before, but will not be impertinent here, because the Taste or Relish of it is *universal* in all Nations, and with the Young as well as the Old, and that is the *Beauty* of *History*. Every one knows how dull a Study it is to read over a Collection of *Gazettes*, which shall perhaps relate all the same Events with the *Historian*: The superior Pleasure then of *History* must arise, like that of *Poetry*, from the

*History*  
*pleases in*  
*like man-*  
*ner.*

Man-

Sect. 6. *Manners*; as when we see a *Character* well drawn, wherein we find the secret Causes of a great Diversity of seemingly inconsistent Actions; or an *Interest* of *State* laid open, or an *artful View* nicely unfolded, the Execution of which influences very different and opposite Actions, as the Circumstances may alter. Now this reduces the whole to an *Unity* of Design at least: And this may be observ'd in the very Fables which entertain Children, otherwise we cannot make them relish them.

VII. WHAT has been said will probably be assented to, if we always remember in our Inquiries into the *Universality* of the *Sense of Beauty*, “ That there may be  
 “ *real Beauty*, where there is not the  
 “ *greatest*; and that there are an Infinity  
 “ of different Forms which may all have  
 “ some *Unity*, and yet differ from each  
 “ other.” So that Men may have different Fancies of *Beauty*, and yet *Uniformity* be the *universal Foundation* of our Approbation of any Form whatsoever as *Beautiful*. And we shall find that it is so in the *Architecture*, *Gardening*, *Dress*, *Equipage*, and *Furniture* of Houses, even among the most uncultivated Nations; where *Uniformity* still pleases, without any other Advantage than the Pleasure of the Contemplation of it.



## Sect. 6.

VIII. IT will deserve our Consideration on this Subject, how, in like Cases, we form very different Judgments concerning the *internal* and *external Senses*. Nothing is more ordinary among those, who after Mr. LOCKE have shaken off the groundless Opinions about *innate Ideas*, than to alledge, "That all our Relish for *Beauty*, "and *Order*, is either from prospect of *Advantage*, *Custom*, or *Education*," for no other Reason but the *Variety* of *Fancys* in the World: and from this they conclude, "That our *Fancys* do not arise from any "natural Power of *Perception*, or *Sense*." And yet all allow our *external Senses* to be *Natural*, and that the Pleasures or Pains of their Sensations, however they may be increas'd, or diminish'd, by *Custom*, or *Education*, and counterballanc'd by *Interest*, yet are really antecedent to *Custom*, *Habit*, *Education*, or Prospect of *Interest*. Now it is certain, "That "there is at least as great a variety of "Fancys about their Objects, as the Objects of *Beauty*:" Nay it is much more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to bring the *Fancys* or Relishes of the *external Senses* to any general Foundation at all, or to find any Rule for the *agreeable* or *disagreeable*: and yet we all allow "that "these are *natural Powers of Perception*."

Diversity  
of Judg-  
ments con-  
cerning our  
Senses.

## Sect. 6.

The Reason of it.

IX. THE Reason of this different Judgment can be no other than this, That we have got distinct Names for the *external Senses*, and none, or very few, for the *Internal*; and by this are led, as in many other Cases, to look upon the former as some way more *fix'd*, and *real* and *natural*, than the latter. The *Sense of Harmony* has got its Name, *viz.* a *good Ear*; and we are generally brought to acknowledge this a *natural Power of Perception*, or a *Sense* some way distinct from *Hearing*: now it is certain, "That there is as necessary a Perception of *Beauty* upon the presence of *regular Objects*, as of *Harmony* upon hearing certain *Sounds*."

An internal Sense does not presuppose innate Ideas.

X. BUT let it be observ'd here once for all, "That an *internal Sense* no more presupposes an *innate Idea*, or Principle of Knowledge, than the *external*." Both are *natural Powers of Perception*, or *Determinations of the Mind* to receive necessarily certain Ideas from the presence of Objects. The *internal Sense* is, a *passive Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty from all Objects in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety*. Nor does there seem any thing more difficult in this matter, than that the Mind should be always determin'd to receive the Idea of *Sweet*, when Particles of such a Form enter the Pores of the

the Tongue ; or to have the Idea of *Sound* Sect. 6. upon any quick Undulation of the Air. ~~~~~ The one seems to have as little Connection with its Idea, as the other : And the *same Power* could with equal ease constitute the former the occasion of Ideas as the latter.

XI. THE *Association* of Ideas \* above *Associations cause of disagreement.* hinted at, is one great Cause of the apparent Diversity of Fancys in the *Sense of Beauty*, as well as in the *external Senses* ; and often makes Men have an aversion to Objects of *Beauty*, and a liking to others void of it, but under different Conceptions than those of *Beauty* or *Deformity*. And here it may not be improper to give some Instances of some of these *Associations*. The *Beauty* of *Trees*, their *cool Shades*, and their *Aptness* to conceal from Observation, have made *Groves* and *Woods* the usual Retreat to those who love *Solitude*, especially to the *Religious*, the *Pensive*, the *Melancholy*, and the *Amorous*. And do not we find that we have so join'd the Ideas of these Dispositions of Mind with those external Objects, that they always recur to us along with them ? The *Cunning* of the *Heathen Priests* might make such obscure Places the Scene of the fictitious Appearances of their *Deities* ; and hence we join Ideas of something *Divine*

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\* See above Art. 3. of this Section.



Sect. 6. to them. We know the like Effect in the  
 Ideas of our *Churches*, from the perpetual  
 use of them only in *religious Exercises*.  
 The faint Light in *Gothick Buildings* has  
 had the same Association of a very foreign  
 Idea, which our *Poet* shews in his *Epi-*  
*thet*,

————— *A Dim religious Light.* \*

IN like manner it is known, That often  
 all the Circumstances of *Actions*, or *Places*,  
 or *Dresses* of Persons, or *Voice*, or *Song*,  
 which have occur'd at any time together,  
 when we were strongly affected by any  
 Passion, will be so connected that any one  
 of these will make all the rest recur. And  
 this is often the occasion both of great  
 Pleasure and Pain, Delight and Aversion  
 to many Objects, which of themselves  
 might have been perfectly indifferent to  
 us: but these *Approbations*, or *Dislikes*,  
 are remote from the Ideas of *Beauty*,  
 being plainly different Ideas.

*Musick,*  
*how it*  
*pleases*  
*differently.*

XII. THERE is also another Charm in  
*Musick* to various Persons, which is distinct  
 from the *Harmony*, and is occasion'd by  
 its raising agreeable Passions. The *human*  
*Voice* is obviously vary'd by all the strong-  
 er Passions; now when our *Ear* discerns

\* Milt. ll *Penseroso*.

any resemblance between the *Air* of a *Sect. 6.*  
*Tune*, whether sung or play'd upon an Instrument, either in its *Time*, or *Modulation*, or any other Circumstance, to the sound of the *human Voice* in any *Passion*, we shall be touch'd by it in a very sensible manner, and have *Melancholy*, *Joy*, *Gravity*, *Thoughtfulness* excited in by us a sort of *Sympathy* or *Contagion*. The same Connexion is observable between the very *Air* of a *Tune*, and the *Words* expressing any *Passion* which we have heard it fitted to, so that they shall both recur to us together, tho but one of them affects our *Senses*.

Now in such a diversity of pleasing or displeasing Ideas which may be join'd with Forms of *Bodys*, or *Tunes*, when Men are of such different Dispositions, and prone to such a variety of Passions, it is no wonder "that they should often  
 " disagree in their Fancys of Objects, e-  
 " ven altho their *Sense of Beauty* and  
 " *Harmony* were perfectly uniform;" because many other Ideas may either please or displease, according to Persons Tempers, and past Circumstances. We know how agreeable a very *wild Country* may be to any Person who has spent the chearful Days of his Youth in it, and how disagreeable very *beautiful Places* may be, if they were the Scenes of his


Sect. 6. Misery. And this may help us in many Cases to account for the Diversitys of Fancy, without denying the *Uniformity* of our *internal Sense of Beauty*.

XIII. GRANDEUR and *Novelty* are two Ideas different from *Beauty*, which often recommend Objects to us. The Reason of this is foreign to the present Subject. See *Spectator* N<sup>o</sup> 412.

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S E C T.





## S E C T. VII.

*Of the Power of Custom, Education, and Example, as to our internal Senses.*


I. **C**USTOM, *Education*, and *Example* are so often alledg'd in this Affair, as the occasion of our Relish for *beautiful Objects*, and for our Approbation of, or Delight in a certain *Conduct in Life*, in a *moral Sense*, that it is necessary to examine these three particularly, to make it appear "that there is a *natural Power* " of *Perception*, or *Sense of Beauty* in " *Objects*, antecedent to all *Custom, Education*, or *Example*."

II. CUSTOM, as distinct from the other two, operates in this manner. As to *Actions*, it only gives a disposition to the Mind or Body more easily to perform those *Actions* which have been frequently repeated, but never leads us to apprehend them under any other View than what we were capable of apprehending them under at first; nor gives us any new Power of Perception about them. We are naturally capable of Sentiments of *Fear*, and *Dread* of any powerful *Presence*; and

*Custom gives no new Sense;*

Sect. 7. so *Custom* may connect the Ideas of religious *Horror* to certain Buildings: but *Custom* could never have made a *Being* naturally incapable of *Fear*, receive such Ideas. So had we no other Power of perceiving, or forming Ideas of Actions, but as they were *advantageous* or *disadvantageous*, *Custom* could only have made us more ready at perceiving the *Advantage* or *Disadvantage* of Actions. But this is not to our present Purpose.

As to our Approbation of, or Delight in external Objects. When the *Blood* or *Spirits* of which *Anatomists* talk are rouz'd, quicken'd, or fermented as they call it, in any agreeable manner by Medicine or Nutriment; or any *Glands* frequently stimulated to Secretion; it is certain that to preserve the Body easy, we shall delight in Objects of Taste which of themselves are not immediately pleasant to it, if they promote that agreeable State which the Body had been *accustom'd* to. Further, *Custom* will so alter the State of the Body, that what at first rais'd uneasy Sensations will cease to do so, or perhaps raise another agreeable Idea of the same Sense; but *Custom* can never give us any Idea of a Sense different from those we had antecedent to it: It will never make the *Blind* approve Objects as *coloured*, or those who have no *Taste* approve Meats as *delicious*, however they might

might approve them as *Strengthening* or Sect. 7. *Exhilarating*. Were our *Glands* and the  Parts about them void of Feeling, did we perceive no Pleasure from certain brisker Motions in the *Blood*, *Custom* could never make stimulating or intoxicating Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not so to the Taste : So by like Reasoning, had we no *natural Sense* of *Beauty* from *Uniformity*, *Custom* could never have made us imagine any *Beauty* in Objects ; if we had had no *Ear*, *Custom* could never have given us the Pleasures of *Harmony*. When we have these *natural Senses* antecedently, *Custom* may make us capable of extending our Views further, and of receiving more complex Ideas of *Beauty* in Bodys, or *Harmony* in Sounds, by increasing our Attention and quickness of Perception. But however *Custom* may increase our Power of receiving or comparing complex Ideas, yet it seems rather to weaken than strengthen the Ideas of *Beauty*, or the Impressions of Pleasure from regular Objects ; else how is it possible that any Person could go into the open Air on a sunny Day, or clear Evening, without the most extravagant Raptures, such as MILTON \* represents our *Ancestor* in upon his first Creation ? For such any Person would certainly fall into, upon the first Representation of such a Scene.

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\* See *Paradise Lost*, Book 8.



CUSTOM in like manner may make it easier for any Person to discern the Use of a complex Machine, and approve it as *advantageous*; but he would never have imagin'd it *Beautiful*, had he no *natural Sense of Beauty*. *Custom* may make us quicker in apprehending the Truth of complex *Theorems*, but we all find the Pleasure or *Beauty of Theorems* as strong at first as ever. *Custom* makes us more capable of retaining and comparing complex Ideas, so as to discern more complicated *Uniformity*, which escapes the Observation of *Novices* in any Art; but all this presupposes a *natural Sense of Beauty in Uniformity*: for had there been nothing in Forms, which was constituted the necessary occasion of Pleasure to our Senses, no Repetition of indifferent Ideas as to Pleasure or Pain, *Beauty* or *Deformity*, could ever have made them grow pleasing or displeasing.

Nor Education.

III. THE Effect of EDUCATION is this, that thereby we receive many speculative Opinions, which are sometimes true and sometimes false; and are often led to believe that Objects may be naturally apt to give Pleasure or Pain to our external Senses, which in reality have no such Qualitys. And further, by *Education* there are some strong Associations of Ideas without any Reason, by mere Accident sometimes, as well as by

by Design, which it is very hard for us Sect. 7.  
ever after to break asunder. Thus Aver-  
sions are rais'd to Darknes, and to many  
kinds of Meat, and to certain innocent  
Actions: Approbations without Ground  
are rais'd in like manner. But in all these  
Instances, *Education* never makes us appre-  
hend any Qualitys in Objects, which we  
have not *naturally* Senses capable of per-  
ceiving. We know what Sickness of the  
Stomach is, and may without Ground be-  
lieve that very healthful Meats will raise  
this; we by our Sight and Smell receive  
disagreeable Ideas of the Food of Swine,  
and their Styes, and perhaps cannot pre-  
vent the recurring of these Ideas at Table:  
but never were Men naturally *Blind* pre-  
judic'd against Objects as of a disagreeable  
Colour, or in favour of others as of a beau-  
tiful Colour; they perhaps hear Men dis-  
praise one Colour, and may imagine this  
Colour to be some quite different sensible  
Quality of the other Senses, but that is all:  
And the same way, a Man naturally void  
of *Taste* could by no *Education* receive  
the Ideas of Taste, or be prejudic'd in fa-  
vour of Meats as delicious: So, had we  
no *natural Sense* of *Beauty* and *Harmony*,  
we could never be prejudic'd in favour  
of Objects or Sounds as *Beautiful* or *Har-*  
*monious*. *Education* may make an unat-  
tentive GOTH imagine that his *Country-*  
*men* have attain'd the Perfection of *Archi-*  
*tecture*;

Sect. 7. *teſture*; and an Averſion to their Enemies the ROMANS, may have join'd ſome diſagreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and excited them to their Demolition; but he had never form'd theſe Prejudices, had he been void of a *Senſe of Beauty*. Did ever *blind Men* debate whether *Purple* or *Scarlet* were the finer *Colour*? or could any *Education* prejudice them in favour of either as *Colours*?

THUS *Education* and *Custom* may influence our *internal Senſes*, where they are antecedently, by enlarging the Capacity of our Minds to retain and compare the Parts of complex Compoſitions: And then if the fineſt Objects are preſented to us, we grow conſcious of a Pleaſure far ſuperior to what common Performances excite. But all this preſuppoſes our *Senſe of Beauty* to be *natural*. Inſtruction in *Anatomy*, Obſervation of *Nature*, and of thoſe *Airs* of the Countenance and *Attitudes* of Body, which accompany any *Sentiment*, *Action*, or *Paſſion*, may enable us to know where there is a juſt Imitation: but why ſhould an exact Imitation pleaſe upon Obſervation, if we had not *naturally* a *Senſe of Beauty* in it, more than the obſerving the Situation of fifty or a hundred Pebbles thrown at random? and ſhould we obſerve them ever ſo often, we ſhould never dream of their growing *Beautiful*.

#### IV. THERE



Sect. 7.

Prejudices,  
how removed.

IV. THERE is something worth our Observation as to the manner of rooting out the *Prejudices* of *Education*, not quite foreign to the present purpose. When the *Prejudice* arises from Associations of Ideas without any natural Connection, we must frequently force our selves to bear Representations of those Objects, or the Use of them when separated from the disagreeable Idea; and this may at last disjoin the unreasonable Association, especially if we can join new agreeable Ideas to them: Thus Opinions of *Superstition* are best remov'd by pleasant Conversation of Persons we esteem for their *Virtue*, or by observing that they despise such Opinions. But when the *Prejudice* arises from an Apprehension or Opinion of *natural Evil*, as the Attendant, or Consequent of any Object or Action; if the *Evil* be apprehended to be the constant and immediate Attendant, a few Trials without receiving any Damage will remove the *Prejudice*, as in that against *Meats*: But where the *Evil* is not represented as the perpetual Concomitant, but as what may possibly or probably at some time or other accompany the use of the Object, there must be frequent Reasoning with our selves, or a long Series of Trials without any Detriment, to remove the *Prejudice*; such is the Case of our Fear of *Spirits* in the *dark*, and in *Church-yards*. And when

Sect. 7. when the *Evil* is represented as the Consequence perhaps a long time after, or in a *future State*, it is then hardest of all to remove the *Prejudice*; and this is only to be effected by slow Processes of Reason, because in this Case there can be no Trials made: and this is the Case of *superstitious Prejudices* against Actions apprehended as offensive to the DEITY; and hence it is that they are so hard to be rooted out.

*Example  
not the  
Cause of  
internal  
Sense.*

V. EXAMPLE seems to operate in this manner. We are conscious that we act very much for *Pleasure*, or *private Good*; and are thereby led to imagine that others do so too: hence we conclude there must be some *Perfection* in the Objects which we see others pursue, and *Evil* in those which we observe them constantly shunning. Or, the *Example* of others may serve to us as so many Trials to remove the Apprehension of *Evil* in Objects to which we had an Aversion. But all this is done upon an Apprehension of Qualities perceivable by the Senses which we have; for no *Example* will induce the *Blind* or *Deaf* to pursue Objects as *Colour'd* or *Sonorous*; nor could *Example* any more engage us to pursue Objects as *Beautiful* or *Harmonious*, had we no *natural Sense* of *Beauty* or *Harmony*.

EXAM-

EXAMPLE may make us conclude without Examination, that our Countrymen have obtain'd the Perfection of *Beauty* in their *Works*, or that there is less *Beauty* in the Orders of *Architecture* or *Painting* us'd in other *Nations*, and so content our selves with very imperfect Forms. And Fear of Contempt as void of *Taste* or *Genius*, often makes us join in approving the Performances of the reputed Masters in our Country, and restrains those who have *naturally* a fine *Genius*, or the *internal Senses* very acute, from studying to obtain the greatest Perfection; it makes also those of a bad *Taste* pretend to a Perception of *Beauty* which in reality they have not: But all this presupposes some *natural Power* of receiving Ideas of *Beauty* and *Harmony*. Nor can *Example* effect any thing further, unless it be to lead Men to pursue Objects by implicit Faith, for some Perfection which the Pursuer is conscious he does not know, or which perhaps is some very different Quality from the Idea perceiv'd by those of a good *Taste* in such Affairs.

## S E C T.



S E C T. VIII.

*Of the Importance of the internal Senses in Life, and the final Causes of them.*

*Importance  
of the in-  
ternal Sen-  
ses.*

I. **T**HE busy part of Mankind may look upon these things as airy Dreams of an inflam'd Imagination, which a wise Man should despise, who rationally pursues more solid Possessions independent on Fancy : but a little Reflection will convince us, " That the Gratifications of our " *internal Senses* are as *natural, real, and* " *satisfying* Enjoyments as any sensible " Pleasure whatsoever ; and that they are " the chief Ends for which we commonly " pursue *Wealth and Power.*" For how is *Wealth or Power* advantageous ? How do they make us *happy*, or prove good to us ? No otherwise than as they supply Gratifications to our *Senses* or *Facultys* of perceiving Pleasure. Now, are these *Senses* or *Facultys* only the *External ones* ? No : Every body sees, that a small portion of *Wealth or Power* will supply more Pleasures of the *external Senses* than we can enjoy ; we know that Scarcity often heightens these Perceptions more than Abundance,

bundance, which cloy's that Appetite which Sect. 8. is necessary to all Pleasure in Enjoyment : ~~~~~ and hence the *Poet's* Advice is perfectly just ;

—*Tu pulmentaria quere  
Sudando*—\*

In short, the only use of a great Fortune, above a very small one (except in *good Offices* and *moral Pleasures*) must be to supply us with the Pleasures of *Beauty, Order, and Harmony.*

IT is true indeed, that the Enjoyment of the noblest Pleasures of the *internal Senses*, in the Contemplation of the Works of *Nature*, is expos'd to every one without Expence ; the *Poor* and the *Low*, may have as free a use of these Objects, in this way, as the *Wealthy* or *Powerful*. And even in Objects which may be appropriated, the *Property* is of little Consequence to the Enjoyment of their Beauty, which is often enjoy'd by others beside the *Proprietor*. But then there are other Objects of these *internal Senses*, which require *Wealth*, or *Power* to procure the use of them as frequently as we desire ; as appears in *Architecture, Musick, Gardening, Painting, Dress, Equipage, Furniture* ; of which we cannot

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\* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 20.

Sect. 8. have the full Enjoyment without *Property*.

And there are some confus'd *Imaginations*, which often lead us to pursue *Property*, even in Objects where it is not necessary to the true Enjoyment of them. These are the *ultimate Motives* of our pursuing the greater Degrees of *Wealth*, where there are no generous Intentions of virtuous Actions.

THIS is confirm'd by the constant Practice of the very Enemys to these *Senses*. As soon as they think they are got above the *World*, or extricated from the Hurrys of *Avarice* and *Ambition*; banish'd *Nature* will return upon them, and set them upon Pursuits of *Beauty* and *Order* in their *Houses*, *Gardens*, *Dress*, *Table*, *Equipage*. They are never easy without some degree of this; and were their Hearts open to our View, we should see *Regularity*, *Decency*, *Beauty*, as what their Wishes terminate upon, either to themselves or their Posterity; and what their Imagination is always presenting to them as the possible Effects of their Labours. Nor without this, could they ever justify their Pursuits to themselves.

THERE may perhaps be some Instances of human Nature perverted into a thorough *Miser*, who loves nothing but Money, and whose Fancy arises no higher than the cold  
dull




dull Thought of Possession ; but such an Sect. 8.  
Instance in an Age, must not be made the ~~~~~  
Standard of Mankind against the whole  
Body.

IF we examine the Pursuits of the *Luxurious*, who in the opinion of the World is wholly devoted to his Belly ; we shall generally find that the far greater part of his Expence is employ'd to procure other Sensations than those of Taste ; such as *fine Attendants, regular Apartments, Services of Plate*, and the like. Besides, a large share of the Preparation must be suppos'd design'd for some sort of generous friendly Purposes, as to please *Acquaintance, Strangers, Parasites*. How few would be contented to enjoy the same Sensations alone, in a Cottage, or out of earthen Pitchers ? To conclude this Point, however these *internal Sensations* may be overlook'd in our Philosophical Inquiries about the human Facultys, we shall find in Fact, " That they  
" employ us more, and are more efficacious  
" in *Life*, either to our *Pleasure*, or *Uneasiness*, than all our *external Senses*  
" taken together."

II. As to the *final Causes* of this *internal Sense*, we need not enquire, " whether, <sup>Final Cause of the internal Sense</sup>  
" to an *almighty and all-knowing Being*,  
" there be any real Excellence in *regular Forms*, in acting by *general Laws*, in  
H 2 " know-

Sect. 8. “ knowing by *Theorems* ?” We seem scarce  
 capable of answering such Questions any  
 way ; nor need we enquire, “ whether o-  
 ther Animals may not discern *Uniformi-*  
*ty* and *Regularity* in Objects which escape  
 our Observation, and may not perhaps  
 have their Senses constituted so as to per-  
 ceive *Beauty*, from the same Foundation  
 which we do, in Objects which our Sen-  
 ses are not fit to examine or compare ?”  
 We shall confine our selves to a Subject  
 where we have some certain Foundation to  
 go upon, and only enquire, “ if we can  
 find any Reasons worthy of the great  
 AUTHOR of *Nature*, for making such  
 a Connection between regular Objects,  
 and the Pleasure which accompanys our  
 Perceptions of them ; or, what Reasons  
 might possibly influence him to create  
 the *World*, as it at present is, as far as  
 we can observe, every where full of  
*Regularity* and *Uniformity* ?”

LET it be here observ'd, that as far as  
 we know concerning any of the great Bodys  
 of the *Universe*, we see Forms and Motions  
 really *Beautiful* to our Senses ; and if  
 we were plac'd in any *Planet*, the *appa-*  
*rent Courses* would still be *Regular* and  
*Uniform*, and consequently *Beautiful* to  
 our Sense. Now this gives us no small  
 Ground to imagine, that if the Senses of  
 their Inhabitants are in the same manner  
 adapt-

adapted to their Habitations, and the Ob- Sect. 8.  
jects occurring to their View, as ours are  
here, their Senses must be upon the same  
general Foundation with ours. 

BUT to return to the Questions: What occurs to resolve them, may be contain'd in the following Propositions.

1. THE Manner of Knowledge by *universal Theorems*, and of Operation by *universal Causes*, as far as we can attain it, must be most convenient for *Beings* of limited Understanding and Power; since this prevents Distraction in their Understandings thro the Multiplicity of Propositions, and Toil and Weariness to their Powers of Action: and consequently their *Reason*, without any *Sense* of *Beauty*, must approve of such Methods when they reflect upon their apparent *Advantage*.

2. THOSE Objects of Contemplation in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*, are more distinctly and easily comprehended and retain'd, than *irregular Objects*; because the accurate Observation of one or two Parts often leads to the Knowledge of the Whole: Thus we can from a *Pillar* or two, with an intermediate *Arch*, and *Cornice*, form a distinct Idea of a whole *regular Building*, if we know of what Species it is, and have its Length and

H 3

Breadth:




Sect. 8. Breadth : From a *Side* and *solid Angle*, we have the whole *regular Solid* ; the measuring one *Side*, gives the whole *Square* ; one *Radius*, the whole *Circle* ; two *Diameters*, an *Oval* ; one *Ordinate* and *Abscissa*, the *Parabola* ; and so on in more complex Figures which have any *Regularity*, which can be entirely determin'd and known in every Part from a few *Data* : Whereas it must be a long Attention to a vast Multiplicity of Parts, which can ascertain or fix the Idea of any *irregular Form*, or give any distinct Idea of it, or make us capable of retaining it ; as appears in the Forms of *rude Rocks*, and *Pebbles*, and *confus'd Heaps*, even when the Multitude of sensible Parts is not so great as in the *regular Forms* : for such *irregular Objects* distract the *Mind* with *Variety*, since for every sensible Part we must have a quite different Idea.

3. FROM these two Propositions it follows, " That *Beings* of limited Understanding and Power, if they act rationally for their own *Interest*, must chuse to operate by the *simplest Means*, to invent *general Theorems*, and to study *regular Objects*, if they be as useful as *irregular ones* ; that they may avoid the endless Toil of producing each Effect by a separate Operation, of searching out each different Truth by a different

" In-



" Inquiry, and of imprinting the endless Sect. 8.  
 " *Variety* of dissimilar Ideas in *irregular*   
 " *Objects*."

4. BUT then, beside this Consideration of *Interest*, there does not appear to be any necessary Connection, antecedent to the Constitution of the AUTHOR of *Nature*, between *regular Forms, Actions, Theorems*, and that sudden sensible *Pleasure* excited in us upon observation of them, even when we do not reflect upon the Advantage mention'd in the former Proposition. And possibly, the DEITY could have form'd us so as to have receiv'd no Pleasure from such Objects, or connected Pleasure to those of a quite contrary Nature. We have a tolerable Presumption of this in the *Beautys* of various Animals; they give some small Pleasure indeed to every one who views them, but then every one seems vastly more delighted with the peculiar *Beautys* of its own *Species*, than with those of a different one, which seldom raise any desire but among Animals of the same Species with the one admir'd. This makes it probable, that the *Pleasure* is not the necessary Result of the *Form* it self, otherwise it would equally affect all Apprehensions in what Species soever; but depends upon a voluntary *Constitution*, adapted to preserve the *Regularity* of the *Universe*, and is probably not the Effect of *Necessity*

Sect. 8. but *Choice* in the SUPREME AGENT, who constituted our *Senses*.

From the  
divine  
Goodness.

5. Now from the whole we may conclude, " That supposing the DEITY so  
" *kind* as to connect *sensible Pleasure*  
" with certain Actions or Contemplations,  
" beside the *rational Advantage* perceivable in them; there is a great *moral Necessity*, from his *Goodness*, that the *internal Sense* of Men should be constituted  
" as it is at present, so as to make *Uniformity amidst Variety* the Occasion of  
" *Pleasure*." For were it not so, but on the contrary, if *irregular Objects*, *particular Truths*, and *Operations* pleased us, beside the endless Toil this would involve us in, there must arise a perpetual Dissatisfaction in all rational Agents with themselves; since *Reason* and *Interest* would lead us to simple *general Causes*, while a *contrary Sense* of *Beauty* would make us disapprove them: *Universal Theorems* would appear to our Understanding the best Means of increasing our Knowledge of what might be useful; while a *contrary Sense* would set us on the search after *particular Truths*: *Thought* and *Reflection* would recommend Objects with *Uniformity amidst Variety*, and yet this *perverse Instinct* would involve us in Labyrinths of *Confusion* and *Dissimilitude*. And hence we see " how suitable it is to the *sagacious*  
" *Bounty*

“ *Bounty* which we suppose in the DEITY, Sect. 8.  
 “ to constitute our *internal Senses* in the  
 “ manner in which they are; by which  
 “ Pleasure is join’d to the Contemplation  
 “ of *those Objects* which a finite *Mind*  
 “ can best imprint and retain the Ideas of  
 “ with the least Distraction; to *those Ac-*  
 “ *tions* which are most efficacious, and  
 “ fruitful in useful Effects; and to *those*  
 “ *Theorems* which most enlarge our *Minds*.”

III. As to the other Question, “ What Reason of  
 “ Reason might influence the DEITY, whom general  
 “ no Diversity of Operation could distract Laws.  
 “ or weary, to chuse to operate by *sim-*  
 “ *plest Means* and *general Laws*, and to  
 “ diffuse *Uniformity, Proportion* and *Si-*  
 “ *mitude* thro all the Parts of *Nature*  
 “ which we can observe ?” Perhaps there  
 may be some real Excellence in this Man-  
 ner of Operation, and in these Forms,  
 which we know not: but this we may  
 probably say, that since the *divine Good-*  
*ness*, for the Reasons above mention’d, has  
 constituted our *Sense of Beauty* as it is  
 at present, the same *Goodness* might de-  
 termine the *Great ARCHITECT* to a-  
 dorn this *vast Theatre* in a manner a-  
 greeable to the Spectators, and that part  
 which is expos’d to the Observation  
 of Men, so as to be pleasant to them;  
 especially if we suppose that he design’d to  
 discover himself to them as *Wise* and *Good*,  
 as



Sect. 8. as well as *Powerful*: for thus he has given them greater Evidences, thro the whole *Earth*, of his *Art, Wisdom, Design, and Bounty*, than they can possibly have for the *Reason, Counsel, and Good-will* of their fellow-Creatures, with whom they converse, with full Persuasion of these qualities in them, about their common Affairs.

As to the Operations of the DEITY by *general Laws*, there is still a further Reason from a *Sense* superior to these already consider'd, even that of *VIRTUE*, or the *Beauty of Action*, which is the Foundation of our greatest Happiness. For were there no *general Laws* fix'd in the Course of *Nature*, there could be no *Prudence* or *Design* in Men, no *rational Expectation* of Effects from Causes, no *Schemes* of Action projected, or any *regular Execution*. If then, according to the *Frame* of our *Nature*, our greatest Happiness must depend upon our Actions, as it may perhaps be made appear it does, "The *Universe* must be govern'd, "not by *particular Wills*, but by *general Laws*, upon which we can found "our Expectations, and project our "Schemes of Action." Nay further, tho *general Laws* did ordinarily obtain, yet if the DEITY usually stopp'd their Effects



fects whenever it was necessary to pre-Sect. 8.  
vent any particular Evils ; this would ef-  
fectually, and justly supersede all human  
*Prudence* and *Care* about Actions ; since  
a superior *Mind* did thus relieve Men from  
their Charge.

INQUIRY

ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS

Virtue or Moral Good.

*The End of the First Treatise.*



TREATISE II.  
VIZ.  
AN  
INQUIRY  
Concerning the  
ORIGINAL of our IDEAS  
OF  
*Virtue or Moral Good.*

---

*Quod magis ad nos  
Pertinet, & nescire malum est, agitamus: utrumne  
Divitiis homines, an sint Virtute beati:  
Quidve ad Amicitias, Usus, Rectumne, trahat nos  
Et que sit natura Boni, summumque quid ejus.*  
Hor. Sat. 6. Lib. 2. v. 72.

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Concerning the  
ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS  
OF  
Virtue or Moral Good.

*[Faint, illegible handwriting]*

A N  
INQUIRY  
CONCERNING  
MORAL GOOD and EVIL.

---

INTRODUCTION.

**T**HE Word MORAL GOOD-NESS, in this Treatise, denotes our Idea of *some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, and Love toward the Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the Action.* MORAL EVIL, denotes our Idea of a *contrary Quality, which excites Aversion, and Dislike toward the Actor, even from Persons unconcern'd in its natural Tendency.* We must be contented with these imperfect Descriptions, until we discover whether we really have such Ideas, and what general *Foundation* there is in Nature for this Difference

ference of Actions, as *morally Good* or *Evil*.

THESE Descriptions seem to contain an universally acknowledg'd Difference of *Moral Good* and *Evil*, from *Natural*. All Men who speak of *moral Good*, acknowledge that it procures Love toward those we apprehend possess'd of it ; whereas *natural Good* does not. In this matter Men must consult their own Breasts. How differently are they affected toward those they suppose possess'd of *Honesty*, *Faith*, *Generosity*, *Kindness*, even when they expect no Benefit from these admir'd Qualitys ; and those who are possess'd of the *natural Goods*, such as *Houses*, *Lands*, *Gardens*, *Vineyards*, *Health*, *Strength*, *Sagacity* ? We shall find that we necessarily love and approve the Possessors of the former ; but the Possession of the latter procures no Love at all toward the Possessor, but often contrary Affections of *Envy* and *Hatred*. In the same manner, whatever Quality we apprehend to be *morally Evil*, raises our Hatred toward the Person in whom we observe it, such as *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, *Ingratitude*, even when they are no way hurtful to our selves ; whereas we heartily love, esteem, and pity many who are expos'd to *natural Evils*, such as *Pain*, *Poverty*, *Hunger*, *Sickness*, *Death*, even when we

we our selves suffer Inconveniencies, by these *natural Evils* of others.

Now the first Question on this Subject is, " Whence arise these different Ideas of " Actions."

BECAUSE we shall afterwards frequently use the Words *Interest*, *Advantage*, *natural Good*, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of *natural Good*, or *Happiness*; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call'd *immediately Good*. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are call'd *Advantageous*: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of *Interest*, or from *Self-Love*.

OUR *Sense* of Pleasure is antecedent to *Advantage* or *Interest*, and is the Foundation of it. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects, because it is our *Interest* to do so; but Objects or Actions are *Advantageous*, and are pursu'd or undertaken from *Interest*, because we receive *Pleasure* from them. Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is *Advantageous* or *naturally Good* to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure *mediately*, or *immediately*. Such Objects as we know, either from Experience of Sense, or Reason, to be *immediately*,

I

or



or *mediately Advantageous*, or apt to minister Pleasure, we are said to pursue from *Self-Interest*, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which they have the Power of exciting. Thus *Meats, Drink, Harmony, fine Prospects, Painting, Statues*, are perceiv'd by our Senses to be *immediately Good*; and our Reason shews *Riches and Power* to be *mediately so*, that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of immediate Pleasure: and both Kinds of these *natural Goods* are pursu'd from *Interest*, or *Self-Love*.

Opinions  
about our  
Sense of  
moral Good  
and Evil.

Now the greatest part of our latter *Moralists* establish it as undeniable, " That all *moral Qualities* have necessarily some " Relation to the *Law* of a *Superior*, " of sufficient Power to make us *Happy* " or *Miserable*;" and since all *Laws* operate only by Sanctions of *Rewards*, or *Punishments*, which determine us to Obedience by Motives of *Self-Interest*, they suppose, " that it is thus that *Laws* do constitute some Actions *mediately Good*, or " *Advantageous*, and others the same way " *Disadvantageous*." They say indeed, " That a *benevolent Legislator* constitutes " no Actions *Advantageous* to the Agent " by Law, but such as in their own Nature tend to the *natural Good* of the " *Whole*, or, at least, are not inconsistent " with it; and that therefore we approve " the

“ the *Virtue* of others, because it has some  
 “ small Tendency to our *Happiness*, either  
 “ from its own Nature, or from this ge-  
 “ neral Consideration, That Obedience to  
 “ a *benevolent Legislator*, is in general  
 “ *Advantageous* to the *Whole*, and to us  
 “ in particular ; and that for the contrary  
 “ Reasons alone, we disapprove the *Vice*  
 “ of others, that is, the prohibited Action,  
 “ as tending to our particular *Detriment* in  
 “ some degree.” But then they maintain,  
 “ That we are determin’d to Obedience to  
 “ *Laws*, or deterr’d from Disobedience,  
 “ merely by Motives of *Self-Interest*, to  
 “ obtain either the *natural Good* arising  
 “ from the commanded Action, or the  
 “ *Rewards* promised by the Sanction ; or  
 “ to avoid the *natural evil* Consequences  
 “ of Disobedience, or at least the *Penal-*  
 “ *tys* of the *Law*.”


SOME other Moralists suppose “ an im-  
 “ mediate *natural Good* in the Actions  
 “ call’d *Virtuous* ; that is, That we are  
 “ determin’d to perceive some *Beauty* in  
 “ the Actions of others, and to love the  
 “ Agent, even without reflecting upon any  
 “ *Advantage* which can any way redound  
 “ to us from the Action ; that we have  
 “ also a secret Sense of Pleasure accom-  
 “ panying such of our own Actions as we  
 “ call *Virtuous*, even when we expect no  
 “ other *Advantage* from them.” But they

alledge at the same time, “ That we are  
 “ excited to perform these Actions, even  
 “ as we pursue, or purchase *Pictures, Sta-*  
 “ *tues, Landskips*, from *Self-Interest*, to  
 “ obtain this Pleasure which accompanys  
 “ the very Action, and which we neces-  
 “ sarily enjoy in doing it.” The Design of  
 the following Sections is to enquire into this  
 matter ; and perhaps the Reasons to be of-  
 fer’d may prove,

I. “ THAT some Actions have to Men  
 “ an *immediate Goodness* ; or, that by  
 “ a *superior Sense*, which I call a *Moral*  
 “ *one*, we perceive Pleasure in the Con-  
 “ templation of such Actions in others,  
 “ and are determin’d to love the Agent,  
 “ (and much more do we perceive Plea-  
 “ sure in being conscious of having done  
 “ such Actions our selves) without any  
 “ View of further *natural Advantage*  
 “ from them.”

II. IT may perhaps also appear, “ That  
 “ what excites us to these Actions which  
 “ we call *Virtuous*, is not an Intention  
 “ to obtain even this *sensible Pleasure* ;  
 “ much less the *future Rewards* from  
 “ Sanctions of Laws, or any other *natu-*  
 “ *ral Good*, which may be the Consequence  
 “ of the *virtuous Action* ; but an entirely  
 “ different Principle of Action from *Inte-*  
 “ *rest or Self-Love*.”

S E C T.



## S E C T. I.

*Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove them in others.*

I. **T**HAT the Perceptions of *moral* Different Ideas of Moral and Natural Good. *Good and Evil*, are perfectly different from those of *natural Good*, or *Advantage*, every one must convince himself, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds himself affected when these Objects occur to him. Had we no *Sense* of *Good* distinct from the *Advantage* or *Interest* arising from the external Senses, and the Perceptions of *Beauty* and *Harmony*; our *Admiration* and *Love* toward a *fruitful Field*, or *commodious Habitation*, would be much the same with what we have toward a *generous Friend*, or any *noble Character*; for both are, or may be *advantageous* to us: And we should no more admire any *Action*, or love any *Person* in a distant *Country*, or *Age*, whose *Influence* could not extend to us, than we love the *Mountains* of *PERU*, while we are unconcern'd in the *Spanish Trade*. We should have the same *Sentiments* and *Affections*



Sect. I. toward *inanimate Beings*, which we have toward *rational Agents*; which yet every one knows to be false. Upon Comparifon, we fay, “ Why fhould we admire or love “ with *Esteem inanimate Beings*? They “ have no Intention of *Good* to us; their “ *Nature* makes them fit for our Ufes, “ which they neither know nor ftudy to “ ferve. But it is not fo with *rational “ Agents*: they ftudy our *Interelt*, and “ delight in our *Happinefs*, and are *Bene- “ volent* toward us.”

WE are all then confcious of the Dif-  
ference between that *Love* and *Esteem*, or  
Perception of *moral Excellence*, which  
*Benevolence* excites toward the Perfon in  
whom we obferve it, and that Opinion  
of *natural Goodnefs*, which only raifes  
*Defire* of Poffeffion toward the good Ob-  
ject. Now “ what fhould make this Dif-  
“ ference, if all Approbation, or *Senf*e of  
“ *Good* be from Profpelt of *Advantage*?  
“ Do not *inanimate Objects* promote our  
“ *Advantage*, as well as *Benevolent Per-  
“ fons* who do us Offices of *Kindnefs*,  
“ and *Friendfhip*? Should we not then  
“ have the fame endearing Sentiments of  
“ both? or only the fame cold Opinion  
“ of *Advantage* in both?” The Reason  
why it is not fo, muft be this, “ That  
“ we have a diftinct Perception of *Beau-  
“ ty*, or *Excellence* in the kind Affec-  
“ tions

" tions of *rational Agents* ; whence we Sect. I.  
 " are determin'd to admire and love such  
 " *Characters and Persons.*"

SUPPOSE we reap the same *Advantage* In Actions done to our selves.  
 from two Men, one of whom serves us from *Delight* in our Happiness, and *Love* toward us ; the other from Views of *Self-Interest*, or by *Constraint* : both are in this Case equally beneficial or *advantageous* to us, and yet we shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Perceptions of *moral Actions* than those of *Advantage* : And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call'd a MORAL SENSE, since the Definition agrees to it, *viz.* a *Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, independent on our Will.\**

THIS perhaps will be equally evident Of Evil, Moral and Natural.  
 from our Ideas of *Evil*, done to us designedly by a *rational Agent*. Our Senses of *natural Good and Evil* would make us receive, with equal Serenity and Composure, an *Assault*, a *Buffet*, an *Affront* from a *Neighbour*, a *Cheat* from a *Partner*, or *Trustee*, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a *Beam*, a *Tile*, or a *Tempest* ; and we should have the same Affections and Sentiments of both. *Villany, Treachery,*

\* See the Preface, Page 6.

Se<sup>ct</sup>. 1. *Cruelty*, would be as meekly resent'd as a *Blast*, or *Mildew*, or an *overflowing Stream*. But I fancy every one is very differently affected on these Occasions, tho there may be equal *natural Evil* in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental, may occasion the strongest Anger, and Indignation, if they evidence only impotent Hatred, or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention of *moral Ideas* may prevent our Hatred of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest *natural Evil*. Thus the Opinion of *Justice* in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of *moral Evil* in the Execution, or Hatred toward the *Magistrate*, who is the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings.

*In Actions  
toward  
others.*

II. IN our Sentiments of Actions which affect our selves, there is indeed a Mixture of the Ideas of *natural* and *moral Good*, which require some Attention to separate them. But when we reflect upon the Actions which affect other Persons only, we may observe the *moral Ideas* unmix'd with those of *natural Good*, or *Evil*. For let it be here observ'd, that *those Senses* by which we perceive Pleasure in natural Objects, whence they are constituted *Advantageous*, could never raise in us any Desire of *publick Good*, but only of what was good to our selves

in



in particular. Nor could they ever make Sect. 1.  
 us approve an Action because of its promoting the Happiness of others. And yet as soon as any Action is represented to us as flowing from *Love, Humanity, Gratitude, Compassion, a Study of the good of others, and a Delight in their Happiness*, altho it were in the most distant Part of the World, or in some past Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praise its Author. And on the contrary, every Action represented as flowing from *Hatred, Delight in the Misery of others, or Ingratitude*, raises Abhorrence and Aversion.

It is true indeed, that the Actions we approve in others, are generally imagin'd to tend to the *natural Good of Mankind*, or of some *Parts* of it. But whence this *secret Chain* between *each Person and Mankind*? How is my *Interest* connected with the most distant *Parts* of it? And yet I must admire Actions which are beneficial to them, and love the Author. Whence this *Love, Compassion, Indignation and Hatred* toward even *feign'd Characters*, in the most distant Ages, and Nations, according as they appear *Kind, Faithful, Compassionate*, or of the *opposite Dispositions*, toward their imaginary Contemporaries? If there is no *moral Sense*, which makes rational Actions appear *Beautiful*,



Sect. 1. or *Deform'd*; if all Approbation be from  
 the *Interest* of the Approver,

*What's HECUBA to us, or we to  
 HECUBA?\**

*Moral  
 Ideas not  
 from In-  
 terest.*

III. SOME refin'd Explainers of *Self-Love* may tell us, "That we hate, or love *Characters*, according as we apprehend "we should have been supported, or injured by them, had we liv'd in their "Days." But how obvious is the Answer, if we only observe, that had we no Sense of *moral Good* in *Humanity*, *Mercy*, *Faithfulness*, why should not *Self-Love*, and our Sense of *natural Good* engage us always to the victorious Side, and make us admire and love the successful *Tyrant*, or *Traitor*? Why do not we love *SINON*, or *PYRRHUS*, in the *Aeneid*? for had we been *GREEKS*, these two would have been very *advantageous Characters*. Why are we affected with the Fortunes of *PRIAMUS*, *POLITES*, *CHOROEUBUS* or *AENEAS*? It is plain we have some *secret Sense* which determines our Approbation without regard to *Self-Interest*; otherwise we should always favour the *fortunate Side* without regard to *Virtue*, and suppose our selves engaged with that Party.

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\* *Tragedy of Hamlet.*

SUPPOSE any great Destruction occasion'd by mere *Accident*, without any Design, or Negligence of the Person who casually was the Author of it : This Action might have been as *disadvantageous* to us as design'd *Cruelty*, or *Malice* ; but who will say he has the same Idea of both Actions, or Sentiments of the Agents ? " Whence then this Difference ? "

AND further, Let us make a Supposition, which perhaps is not far from Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even *disadvantageous Actions*, and perceive *moral Good* in them. A few ingenious *Artisans*, persecuted in their own Country, flee to ours for Protection ; they instruct us in *Manufactures* which support Millions of Poor, increase the Wealth of almost every Person in the *State*, and make us formidable to our *Neighbours*. In a *Nation* not far distant from us, some resolute *Burgomasters*, full of Love to their *Country*, and Compassion toward their *Fellow-Citizens*, oppress'd in Body and Soul by a *Tyrant*, and *Inquisition*, with *indefatigable Diligence*, *public Spirit*, and *Courage*, support a tedious perilous War against the *Tyrant*, and form an *industrious Republick*, which rivals us in *Trade*, and almost in *Power*. All the World sees whether the *former* or the *latter* have been more *advantageous*

*Sect. I.* *vantageous* to us : and yet let every Man consult his own Breast, which of the two Characters he has the most agreeable Idea of ? whether of the *useful Refugee*, or the *public-spirited Burgomaster*, by whose Love to his own *Country*, we have often suffer'd in our *Interests* ? and I am confident he will find some other Foundation of Esteem than *Advantage*, and will see a just Reason, why the Memory of our *Artisans* is so obscure among us, and yet that of our *Rivals* is immortal.

*Self-Love  
not the  
Ground of  
Approba-  
tion.*

IV. *SOME Moralists*, who will rather twist *Self-Love* into a thousand Shapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than *Interest*, may tell us,  
 “ That whatever profits one Part without  
 “ detriment to another, profits *the Whole*,  
 “ and then some small Share will redound  
 “ to *each Individual*; that those Actions  
 “ which tend to the *Good of the Whole*, if  
 “ universally perform'd, would most ef-  
 “ fectually secure to *each Individual* his  
 “ own Happiness ; and that consequently,  
 “ we may approve such Actions, from the  
 “ Opinion of their tending ultimately to  
 “ our own *Advantage*.”

WE need not trouble these *Gentlemen* to shew by their nice Train of Consequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent in particular Instances, that  
 we



we in this Age reap any *Advantage* from Sect. 1. ORESTES's killing the *treacherous* ÆGYS-THUS, or from the Actions of CODRUS or DECIUS. Allow their Reasonings to be perfectly good, they only prove, that after long Reflection, and Reasoning, we may find out some ground, even from Views of *Interest*, to approve the same Actions which every Man admires as soon as he hears of them; and that too under a quite different Conception.

SHOULD any of our Travellers find some old *Grecian Treasure*, the *Miser* who hid it, certainly perform'd an Action more to the Traveller's *Advantage* than CODRUS or ORESTES; for he must have but a small Share of Benefit from their Actions, whose Influence is so dispers'd, and lost in various Ages, and Nations: Surely then this *Miser* must appear to the Traveller a prodigious Hero in *Virtue*! For *Self-Interest* will make us only esteem Men according to the *Good* they do to *our Selves*, and not give us high Ideas of *public Good*, but in proportion to our Share of it. But must a Man have the Reflection of CUMBERLAND, or PUFFENDORF, to admire *Generosity*, *Faith*, *Humanity*, *Gratitude*? Or reason so nicely to apprehend the *Evil* in *Cruelty*, *Treachery*, *Ingratitude*? Do not the former excite our *Admiration*, and Love,

2

and



Sect. I. and *Study* of Imitation, wherever we see them, almost at first View, without any such Reflection; and the *latter*, our *Hatred*, *Contempt*, and *Abhorrence*? Unhappy would it be for *Mankind*, if a *Sense of Virtue* was of as narrow an Extent, as a Capacity for such *Metaphysics*.

Our Moral  
Sense can-  
not be  
brib'd,

V. THIS *moral Sense*, either of our *own* Actions, or of those of *others*, has this in common with our other Senses, that however our Desire of *Virtue* may be counterballanc'd by *Interest*, our Sentiment or Perception of its *Beauty* cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of *Advantage*. Let us consider this both as to our *own* Actions and those of *others*.

In judging  
of our own  
Actions.


A *COVETOUS Man* shall dislike any Branch of Trade, how useful soever it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himself in it; here is an Aversion from *Interest*. Propose a sufficient Premium, and he shall be the first who sets about it, with full Satisfaction in his own Conduct. Now is it the same way with our *Sense of moral Actions*? Should any one advise us to wrong a *Minor*, or *Orphan*, or to do an ungrateful Action toward a *Benefactor*; we at first View abhor it: Assure us that it will be very *advantageous* to us, propose even a *Reward*; our

our *Sense* of the Action is not alter'd. It Sect. 1.  
 is true, these Motives may make us undertake it; but they have no more Influence upon us to make us approve it, than a Physician's Advice has to make a nauseous Portion pleasant to the Taste, when we perhaps force our selves to take it for the Recovery of Health.

HAD we no Notion of Actions, beside our Opinion of their *Advantage*, or *Disadvantage*, could we ever chuse an Action as *Advantageous*, which we are conscious is still *Evil*? as it too often happens in human Affairs. Where would be the need of such *high Bribes* to prevail with Men to abandon the Interests of a ruin'd Party, or of *Tortures* to force out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it so hard to convince Mens Understandings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that it is probably more advantageous to secure present Gain, and avoid present Evils, by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for the remote Possibility of future Good, upon a Revolution often improbable, and sometimes unexpected? And when Men are overpersuaded by *Advantage*, do they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, how often is their remaining Life odious, and shameful, in their *own Sense* of it, as well as in that of *others*, to whom the base Action was profitable?

IF

## Sect. I.



IF any one becomes satisfy'd with his own Conduct in such a Case, upon what Ground is it? How does he please himself, or vindicate his Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his *private Advantage*, or alledging this to others as a Vindication; but by gradually warping into the *moral Principles* of his *new Party*; for no Party is without them. And thus Men become pleas'd with their Actions under some Appearance of *moral Good*, distinct from *Advantage*.

Our Moral  
Sense not  
founded on  
Religion.

It may perhaps be alledg'd, "That in those Actions of our own which we call *Good*, there is *this* constant *Advantage*, superior to all others, which is the Ground of our Approbation, and the Motive to them from *Self-love*, viz. That we suppose the DEITY will reward them." This will be more fully consider'd \* afterwards: At present it is enough to observe, that many have high Notions of *Honour*, *Faith*, *Generosity*, *Justice*, who have scarce any Opinions about the DEITY, or any Thoughts of *future Rewards*; and abhor any thing which is *Treacherous*, *Cruel*, or *Unjust*, without any regard to *future Punishments*.

\* See Sect. ii. Art. 7.

BUT



BUT further, tho these *Rewards*, and *Punishments*, may make my own Actions appear *advantageous* to me, and make me approve them from *Self-Love*, yet they would never make me approve, and love *another* Person for the like Actions, whose Merit would not be imputed to me. Those Actions are *advantageous* indeed to the *Agent*; but his *Advantage* is not my *Advantage*: and *Self-Love* could never influence me to approve Actions as *advantageous* to others, or to love the Authors of them on that account.

THIS is the second thing to be consider'd, "Whether our *Sense* of the *moral* *Good* or *Evil*, in the Actions of others, "can be over-ballanc'd, or brib'd by Views "of *Interest*." Now I may indeed easily be capable of wishing, that another would do an Action I abhor as *morally Evil*, if it were very *Advantageous* to me: *Interest* in that Case may overballance my Desire of *Virtue* in another. But no *Interest* to my *self* will make me approve an Action as *morally Good*, which, without that *Interest* to my *self*, would have appear'd *morally Evil*; if, upon computing its whole Effects, it appears to produce as great a moment of *Good* in the Whole, when it is not beneficial to me, as it did before when it was. In our *Sense* of *moral Good* or

Our Moral  
Sense of  
the Ac-  
tions of o-  
thers, not  
to be  
brib'd.



W Sect. 1. *Evil*, our own private Advantage or Loss is of no more moment, than the Advantage or Loss of a third Person, to make an Action appear *Good* or *Evil*. This Sense therefore cannot be over-ballanc'd by *Interest*. How ridiculous an Attempt wou'd it be, to engage a Man by Rewards, or to threaten him into a good Opinion of an Action, which was contrary to his *moral Notions*? We may procure Dissimulation by such means, and that is all.

Not occasion'd by Praise.

VI. A LATE witty Author \* says, " That the Leaders of Mankind do not really admire such Actions as those of REGULUS, or DECIUS, but only observe, that Men of such Dispositions are very useful for the Defence of any State; and therefore by *Panegyricks*, and *Statues*, they encourage such Tempers in others, as the most *tractable*, and *useful*." Here first let us consider, If a *Traitor*, who would sell his own Country to us, may not often be as *advantageous* to us, as a *Hero* who defends us: And yet we can love the Treason, and hate the Traitor. We can at the same time praise a *gallant Enemy*, who is very *pernicious* to us. Is there nothing in all this but an Opinion of *Advantage*?

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\* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d Edition.

AGAIN,

AGAIN, upon this Scheme what could a *Statue* or *Panegyrick* effect?—Men love *Praise*—They will do the Actions which they observe to be *praised*.—*Praise*, with Men who have no other Idea of *Good* but *Self-Interest*, is the *Opinion* which a *Nation* or *Party* have of a *Man* as *useful* to *them*—REGULUS, or CATO, or DECIUS, had no *Advantage* by the Actions which profited their Country, and therefore they themselves could not admire them, however the Persons who reap'd the *Advantage* might praise such Actions.—REGULUS or CATO could not possibly praise or love another Hero for a *virtuous Action*; for this would not gain them the *Advantage* of *Honour*; and their own Actions they must have look'd upon as the hard Terms on which *Honour* was to be purchas'd, without any thing amiable in them, which they could contemplate or reflect upon with *Pleasure*.—Now how unlike is this to what the least Observation would teach a Man concerning such Characters?

BUT says \* he, “ These wondrous cunning Governours made Men believe, by their *Statues* and *Panegyricks*, that there was *publick Spirit*, and that this was in

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\* See the same Author in the same Place.

Sect. 1. “ it self *Excellent* ; and hence Men are  
 “ led to admire it in others, and to imi-  
 “ rate it in themselves, forgetting the Pur-  
 “ suit of their own *Advantage*.” So easy  
 a matter it seems to him, to quit judging of  
 others by what we feel in our selves !——  
 for a Person who is wholly *selfish*, to ima-  
 gine others to be *publick-spirited* !——  
 for one who has no Ideas of *Good* but in  
 his own *Advantage*, to be led, by the Per-  
 suasions of others, into a Conception of  
*Goodness* in what is avowedly detrimental  
 to himself, and profitable to others ; nay  
 so entirely, as not to approve the Action  
 thorowly, but so far as he was conscious  
 that it proceeded from a *disinterested Study*  
 of the *Good* of others !—— Yet this it  
 seems *Statues* and *Panegyricks* can ac-  
 complish !

*Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in nuce  
 duri ! \**

It is an easy matter for Men to assert  
 any thing in Words ; but our own Hearts  
 must decide the Matter, “ Whether some  
 “ *moral Actions* do not at first View ap-  
 “ pear *amiable*, even to those who are  
 “ unconcern’d in their Influence ? Whe-  
 “ ther we do not sincerely *love* a gene-  
 “ rous kind *Friend*, or *Patriot*, whose

\* Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v. 31.

# MORAL GOOD *and* EVIL. 133

“ Actions procure *Honour* to him only, Sect. 1.  
“ without any *Advantage* to our selves?” ~~~~~

It is true, that the Actions which we approve, are useful to Mankind ; but not always to the Approver. It would perhaps be useful to the *Whole*, that all Men agreed in performing such Actions ; and then every one would have his Share of the *Advantage*: But this only proves, that *Reason* and *calm Reflection* may recommend to us, from *Self-Interest*, those Actions, which at first View our *moral Sense* determines us to admire, without considering this *Interest*. Nay, our *Sense* shall operate even where the *Advantage* to our selves does not hold. We can approve the Justice of a Sentence against our selves : A condemn'd *Traitor* may approve the Vigilance of a Cicerò in discovering Conspiracies, tho it had been for the Traitor's Advantage, that there never had been in the World any Men of such Sagacity. To say that he may still approve such Conduct as tending to the *publick Good*, is a Jest from one whose only Idea of *Good* is *Self-Interest*. Such a Person has no Desire of *publick Good* further than it tends to his own *Advantage*, which it does not at all in the present Case.

VII. If what is said makes it appear, *Nor Custom, Education, &c.*  
that we have some other *amiable Idea* of  
Actions than that of *Advantageous* to our  
selves, we may conclude, “ That this




Sect. I.

“ Perception of *moral Good* is not deriv’d  
 “ from *Custom, Education, Example, or*  
 “ *Study.*” These give us no new Ideas :  
 They might make us see *Advantage* to our  
 selves in Actions whose Usefulness did not  
 at first appear ; or give us Opinions of some  
 Tendency of Actions to our *Detriment*,  
 by some nice Deductions of Reason, or by  
 a rash Prejudice, when upon the first View  
 of the Action we should have observ’d no  
 such thing : but they never could have  
 made us apprehend Actions as *amiable* or  
*odious*, without any Consideration of our  
 own *Advantage*.

VIII. It remains then, “ That as the  
 “ AUTHOR of *Nature* has determin’d us  
 “ to receive, by our *external Senses*, plea-  
 “ sant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects,  
 “ according as they are useful or hurtful to  
 “ our Bodys ; and to receive from *uniform*  
 “ *Objects* the Pleasures of *Beauty* and *Har-*  
 “ *mony*, to excite us to the Pursuit of Know-  
 “ ledge, and to reward us for it ; or to be  
 “ an Argument to us of his *Goodness*, as  
 “ the *Uniformity* it self proves his *Exis-*  
 “ *tence*, whether we had a *Sense* of *Beauty*  
 “ in *Uniformity* or not : in the same man-  
 “ ner he has given us a MORAL SENSE,  
 “ to direct our Actions, and to give us still  
 “ *nobler Pleasures* ; so that while we are  
 “ only intending the *Good* of others, we  
 “ unde-

“ undesignedly promote our own greatest Sect. 1.  
 “ *private Good.*”

WE are not to imagine, that this *moral* This Moral Sense does not infer innate Ideas or Propositions. *Sense*, more than the other Senses, supposes any *innate Ideas, Knowledge, or practical Proposition*: We mean by it only a *Determination of our Minds to receive amiable or disagreeable Ideas of Actions, when they occur to our Observation, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or Loss to redound to our selves from them*; even as we are pleas'd with a regular Form, or an harmonious Composition, without having any Knowledge of *Mathe-maticks*, or seeing any *Advantage* in that Form, or Composition, different from the immediate Pleasure.



## S E C T. II.

Concerning the immediate Motive to  
virtuous Actions.

**T**HE *Motives* of human Actions, or their *immediate Causes*, would be best understood after considering the *Passions* and *Affections*; but here we shall only consider the *Springs* of the Actions which we call *virtuous*, as far as it is necessary to settle the general Foundation of the *Moral Sense*.

*Affections,  
the Motives  
to Actions.*

I. EVERY Action, which we apprehend as either *morally good* or *evil*, is always suppos'd to flow from some *Affection* toward *rational Agents*; and whatever we call *Virtue* or *Vice*, is either some such *Affection*, or some *Action* consequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to make an Action, or Omission, appear *vitious*, if it argues the Want of such *Affection* toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted *morally good*. All the Actions counted *religious* in any Country, are suppos'd, by those who count them so, to flow from some *Affections* toward the DEITY; and whatever we call *social Virtue*, we still suppose to flow from  
Af.

Affections toward our *Fellow-Creatures* : Sect. 2.  
 for in this all seem to agree, " That exter-  
 " nal Motions, when accompany'd with no  
 " Affections toward GOD or *Man*, or  
 " evidencing no Want of the *expected* Af-  
 " fections toward either, can have no *mo-*  
 " *ral Good* or *Evil* in them."

Ask, for instance, the most *abstemious*  
*Hermit*, if *Temperance* of it self would be  
*morally good*, supposing it shew'd no Obe-  
 dience toward the DEITY, made us no fit-  
 ter for Devotion, or the Service of Mankind,  
 or the Search after Truth, than *Luxury*;  
 and he will easily grant, that it would be  
 no *moral Good*, tho still it might be *na-*  
*turally good* or *advantageous* to Health :  
 And mere *Courage*, or Contempt of Dan-  
 ger, if we conceive it to have no regard  
 to the Defence of the Innocent, or repair-  
 ing of Wrongs, or Self-Interest, wou'd on-  
 ly entitle its Possessor to *Bedlam*. When  
 such sort of Courage is sometimes admir'd,  
 it is upon some secret Apprehension of  
 a good Intention in the use of it, or  
 as a natural Ability capable of an use-  
 ful Application. *Prudence*, if it was on-  
 ly employ'd in promoting *private In-*  
*terest*, is never imagin'd to be a *Vir-*  
*tue* : and *Justice*, or observing a strict E-  
 quality, if it has no regard to the *Good*  
 of *Mankind*, the Preservation of *Rights*,  
 and securing *Peace*, is a Quality properer  
 for



Sect. 2. for its ordinary *Gestamen*, a *Beam* and *Scales*, than for a *rational Agent*. So that these four *Qualitys*, commonly call'd *Cardinal Virtues*, obtain that Name, because they are *Dispositions* universally necessary to promote *publick Good*, and denote *Affections* toward *rational Agents*; otherwise there would appear no *Virtue* in them.

*Affections,*  
*disinterest-*  
*ed.*

II. Now if it can be made appear, that none of these *Affections* which we call *virtuous*, spring from *Self-love*, or *Desire* of *private Interest*; since all *Virtue* is either some such *Affections*, or *Actions* consequent upon them; it must necessarily follow, "That *Virtue* is not pursued from " the *Interest* or *Self-love* of the *Pur-* " *suer*, or any *Motives* of his own *Ad-* " *vantage*."

*Love of*  
*Compla-*  
*cence, and*  
*Hatred of*  
*Displacence,*

THE *Affections* which are of most Importance in *Morals*, are *LOVE* and *HATRED*: All the rest seem but different *Modifications* of these two *original Affections*. Now in discoursing of *Love* toward *rational Agents*, we need not be caution'd nor to include that *Love* between the *Sexes*, which, when no other *Affections* accompany it, is only *Desire* of *Pleasure*, and is never counted a *Virtue*. *Love* toward *rational Agents*, is subdivided into *Love* of *Complacence* or *Esteem*, and *Love* of *Beneva-*

*nevolence*: And *Hatred* is subdivided into Sect. 2.  
*Hatred* of *Displacence* or *Contempt*, and  
*Hatred* of *Malice*. Concerning each of  
these separately we shall consider, " Whe-  
" ther they can be influenc'd by Motives  
" of *Self-Interest*."

LOVE of *Complacence*, *Esteem*, or *Good-*  
*liking*, at first view appears to be *disinte-*  
*rested*, and so the *Hatred* of *Displacence*  
or *Dislike*; and are entirely excited by  
some *moral Quality*s, *Good* or *Evil*, ap-  
prehended to be in the Objects; which  
*Quality*s the very *Frame* of our *Nature*  
determines us to *love* or *hate*, to approve  
or disapprove, according to the *moral Sense*  
\* above explain'd. Propose to a Man all  
the Rewards in the World, or threaten all  
the Punishments, to engage him to *love*  
with *Esteem*, and *Complacence*, a third  
Person entirely *unknown*, or if known,  
apprehended to be *cruel*, *treacherous*, *un-*  
*grateful*; you may procure external Ob-  
sequiousness, or good Offices, or Dissimu-  
lation of Love; but *real Love* of *Esteem*  
no Price can purchase. And the same is  
obvious as to *Hatred* of *Contempt*, which  
no Motive of *Advantage* can prevent.  
On the contrary, represent a Character  
as *generous*, *kind*, *faithful*, *humane*, tho  
in the most distant Parts of the World,  
and we cannot avoid *loving* it with *Es-*

Are en-  
tirely dis-  
interested.

\* See Sect. i.

Sect. 2. *teem*, and *Complacence*. A *Bribe* may possibly make us attempt to ruin such a Man, or some strong Motive of *Advantage* may excite us to oppose his Interest; but it can never make us *hate* him, while we apprehend him as *morally excellent*. Nay, when we consult our own Hearts, we shall find, that we can scarce ever persuade our selves to attempt any Mischief against such Persons, from any Motive of *Advantage*, nor execute it, without the strongest Reluctance, and Remorse, until we have blinded our selves into a bad Opinion of the Person in a *moral Sense*.

Benevo-  
lence and  
Malice,  
disinterest-  
ed.

III. As to the *Love* of *Benevolence*, the very Name excludes *Self-Interest*. We never call that Man *benevolent*, who is in fact useful to others, but at the same time only intends his *own Interest*, without any desire of, or delight in, the *Good* of *others*. If there be any *Benevolence* at all, it must be *disinterested*; for the most useful Action imaginable, loses all appearance of *Benevolence*, as soon as we discern that it only flowed from *Self-Love* or *Interest*. Thus, never were any human Actions more *advantageous*, than the Inventions of *Fire*, and *Iron*; but if these were casual, or if the *Inventor* only intended his *own Interest* in them, there is nothing which can be call'd *Benevolent* in them. Wherever then *Benevolence* is suppos'd, there it is imagin'd



imagin'd *disinterested*, and design'd for the Sect. 2.  
*Good* of others.

BUT it must be here observ'd, That as Self-Love  
 all Men have *Self-Love*, as well as Bene-<sup>join'd</sup>  
*volence*, these two Principles may jointly <sup>with Be-</sup>nevolence  
 excite a Man to the same Action; and then  
 they are to be consider'd as two Forces im-  
 pelling the same Body to Motion; some-  
 times they conspire, sometimes are indif-  
 ferent to each other, and sometimes are in  
 some degree opposite. Thus, if a Man  
 have such strong *Benevolence*, as would  
 have produc'd an Action without any Views  
 of *Self-Interest*; that such a Man has also  
 in View *private Advantage*, along with  
*publick Good*, as the Effect of his Action,  
 does no way diminish the *Benevolence* of  
 the Action. When he would not have pro-  
 duc'd so much *publick Good*, had it not  
 been for Prospect of *Self-Interest*, then the  
 Effect of *Self-Love* is to be deducted, and  
 his *Benevolence* is proportion'd to the re-  
 mainder of *Good*, which pure *Benevolence*  
 would have produc'd. When a Man's *Be-*  
*nevolence* is hurtful to himself, then *Self-*  
*Love* is opposite to *Benevolence*, and the  
*Benevolence* is proportion'd to the Sum of  
 the *Good* produc'd, added to the Resistance  
 of *Self-Love* surmounted by it. In most  
 Cases it is impossible for Men to know how  
 far their Fellows are influenc'd by the one  
 or other of these Principles; but yet the  
 gene-



Sect. 2. general Truth is sufficiently certain, That  
 this is the way in which the *Benevolence* of  
 Actions is to be computed. Since then, no  
*Love* to *rational Agents* can proceed from  
*Self-Interest*, every Action must be disinte-  
 rested, as far as it flows from *Love* to *rational Agents*.

Cause of  
*Benevo-*  
*lence.*

If any enquire, " Whence arises this  
 " *Love* of *Esteem*, or *Benevolence*, to  
 " good Men, or to Mankind in general,  
 " if not from some nice Views of *Self-*  
 " *Interest* ? Or, how we can be mov'd to  
 " desire the Happiness of *others*, without  
 " any View to our *own* ? " It may be an-  
 " swer'd, " That the *same Cause* which de-  
 " termines us to pursue Happiness for our  
 " selves, determines us both to *Esteem* and  
 " *Benevolence* on their proper Occasions ;  
 " even the very *Frame* of our *Nature*, or  
 " a *generous Instinct*, which shall be after-  
 " wards explain'd."

*Benevo-*  
*lence pre-*  
*supposes*  
*Esteem.*

IV. HERE we may observe, That as  
*Love* of *Esteem* and *Complacence* is al-  
 ways join'd with *Benevolence*, where there  
 is no strong Opposition of *Interest* ; so *Be-*  
*nevolence* seems to presuppose some small  
 degree of *Esteem*, not indeed of *actual*  
 good Qualitys ; for there may be strong  
*Benevolence*, where there is the *Hatred* of  
*Contempt* for actual Vices ; as a Parent may  
 have great *Benevolence* to a most abandon'd  
 Child,

# MORAL GOOD and EVIL. 143

Child, whose Manners he *hates* with the Sect. 2  
greatest *Displacence* : but *Benevolence* sup-  
poses a Being *capable* of *Virtue*. We  
judge of other rational Agents by our  
*selves*. The *human Nature* is a lovely  
Form ; we are all conscious of some *mo-*  
*rally good* Qualitys and Inclinations in our  
selves, how partial and imperfect soever  
they may be : we presume the *same* of  
every thing in human Form, nay almost  
of every living Creature : so that by this  
suppos'd remote Capacity of *Virtue*, there  
may be some small degree of *Esteem* along  
with our *Benevolence*, even when they  
incur our greatest Displeasure by their  
Conduct.

As to Malice, *Human Nature* seems Human  
Nature in-  
capable of  
sedate Ma-  
lice.  
scarce capable of *malicious disinterested Ha-*  
*tred*, or a sedate Delight in the Misery of  
others, when we imagine them no way  
pernicious to us, or opposite to our *In-*  
*terest* : And for that Hatred which makes  
us oppose *those* whose Interests are op-  
posite to *ours*, it is only the Effect of  
*Self-Love*, and not of *disinterested Ma-*  
*lice*. A sudden Passion may give us  
wrong Representations of our Fellow-  
Creatures, and for a little time represent  
them as *absolutely Evil* ; and during this  
Imagination perhaps we may give some Evi-  
dences of *disinterested Malice* : but as soon  
as we reflect upon *human Nature*, and  
form

Sect. 2. form just Conceptions, this *unnatural* Passion is allay'd, and only *Self-Love* remains, which may make us, from *Self-Interest*, oppose our Adversarys.

EVERY one at present rejoices in the Destruction of our *Pirates*; and yet let us suppose a Band of such Villains cast in upon some desolate Island, and that we were assur'd some Fate would confine them there perpetually, so that they should disturb Mankind no more. Now let us calmly reflect that these Persons are capable of Knowledge and Counsel, may be happy, and joyful, or may be involv'd in Misery, Sorrow, and Pain; that they may return to a State of *Love, Humanity, Kindness*, and become *Friends, Citizens, Husbands, Parents*, with all the sweet Sentiments which accompany these Relations: then let us ask our selves, when *Self-Love*, or regard to the Safety of better Men, no longer makes us desire their Destruction, and when we cease to look upon them, under the Ideas suggested by fresh Resentment of Injurys done to us or our Friends, as utterly incapable of any good *moral Quality*; whether we would wish them the Fate of CADMUS's *Army*, by plunging their Swords in each others Breast, or a worse Fate by the most exquisite Tortures; or rather that they should recover the ordinary Affections of Men,

3

be-

become *Kind, Compassionate, and Friend-ly*; contrive *Laws, Constitutions, Governments, Propertys*; and form an honest happy Society, with *Marriages, and*

*Relations dear, and all the Charities*  
Of *Father, Son, and Brother*———\*

I fancy the latter would be the Wish of every Mortal, notwithstanding our present just Abhorrence of them from *Self-Interest*, or *publick Love* and Desire of promoting the Interest of our Friends who are expos'd to their Fury. Now this plainly evidences, that we scarce ever have any *sedate Malice* against any Person, or delight in his Misery. Our *Hatred* is only from Opposition of *Interest*; or if we can entertain *sedate Malice*, it must be toward a Character apprehended *necessarily and unalterably Evil* in a *moral Sense*; such as a sudden Passion sometimes represents our Enemies to us: and perhaps no *such Being* occurs to us among the Works of a good DEITY.

V. HAVING offer'd what may perhaps prove, That our *Love* either of *Esteem*, or *Benevolence*, is not founded on *Self-Love*, or views of *Interest*; let us see  
“ if some *other Affections*, in which *Vir-*  
“ *tue* may be plac'd, do arise from *Self-*

\* *Milt. Par. Lost, B. iv. v. 756.*




Sect. 2. “ Love ;” such as *Fear*, or *Reverence*, arising from an Apprehension of *Goodness*, *Power*, and *Justice*. For no body apprehends any *Virtue* in *base Dread* and *Servitude* toward a *powerful Evil Being* : This is indeed the *meanest Selfishness*. Now the same Arguments which prove *Love* of *Esteem* to be *disinterested*, will prove this *honourable Reverence* to be so too ; for it plainly arises from an Apprehension of *amiable Qualitys* in the Person, and *Love* toward him, which raises an *Abhorrence* of offending him. Could we reverence a *Being* because it was our *Interest* to do so, a third Person might bribe us into *Reverence* toward a *Being* neither *Good*, nor *Powerful*, which every one sees to be a *Jest*. And this we might shew to be common to all other Passions, which have rational Agents for their Objects.

Objections. VI. THERE is one Objection against *disinterested Love*, which occurs from considering, “ That nothing so effectually excites our *Love* toward rational Agents, as their *Beneficence* to us ; whence we are led to imagine, that our *Love* of Persons, as well as irrational Objects, flows intirely from *Self-Interest*.” But let us here examine our selves more narrowly. Do we only love the *Beneficent*, because it is our *Interest* to love them ? Or do we chuse to love them, because our *Love* is the means

means of procuring their *Bounty*? If it be Sect. 2.  
 so, then we could indifferently love any Character, even to obtain the *Bounty* of a third Person; or we could be brib'd by a third Person to love the greatest Villain heartily, as we may be brib'd to external Offices: Now this is plainly impossible.

BUT further, is not our *Love* always the Consequent of *Bounty*, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew, Obsequiousness, and Dissimulation may precede an Opinion of *Beneficence*; but *real Love* always presupposes it, and shall necessarily arise even when we expect no more, from consideration of past Benefits. Or can any one say he only loves the *Beneficent*, as he does a *Field* or *Garden*, because of its *Advantage*? His *Love* then must cease toward one who has ruin'd himself in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as we cease to love an inanimate Object which ceases to be useful, unless a Poetical *Prosopopæia* animate it, and raise an imaginary Gratitude, which is indeed pretty common. And then again, our *Love* would be the same towards the worst Characters that 'tis towards the best, if they were *equally bountiful* to us, which is also false. *Beneficence* then must raise our *Love* as it is an amiable *moral Quality*: and hence we love even those who are *beneficent* to others.

## Sect. 2.



It may be further alledg'd, " That  
 " *Bounty* toward our selves is a stronger  
 " Incitement to *Love*, than *equal Bounty*  
 " toward others." This is true for a  
 Reason to be offer'd below\* : but it does  
 not prove, that in this Case our *Love*  
 of Persons is from Views of *Interest* ; since  
 this *Love* is not *prior* to the *Bounty*, as  
 the means to procure it, but *subsequent*  
 upon it, even when we expect no more.  
 In the Benefits which we receive our selves,  
 we are more fully sensible of their Value,  
 and of the Circumstances of the Action,  
 which are Evidences of a generous Temper  
 in the *Donor* ; and from the good Opinion  
 we have of our selves, we are apt to look  
 upon the Kindness as better employ'd, than  
 when it is bestow'd on others, of whom per-  
 haps we have less favourable Sentiments. It  
 is however sufficient to remove the Objec-  
 tion, that *Bounty* from a *Donor* apprehended  
 as *morally Evil*, or extorted by *Force*, or  
 conferr'd with some View of *Self-Interest*,  
 will not procure *real Love* ; nay, it may  
 raise *Indignation*, if we suspect Dissimula-  
 tion of *Love*, or a Design to allure us  
 into any thing Dishonourable : whereas  
 wisely employ'd *Bounty* is always approv'd,  
 and gains love to the Author from all who  
 hear of it.

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\* See Sect. v. Art. 2.



IF then no *Love* toward Persons be influenc'd by *Self-Love*, or Views of *Interest*, and all *Virtue* flows from *Love* toward Persons, or some other Affection equally *disinterested*; it remains, "That there must be some other Motive than *Self-Love*, or *Interest*, which excites us to the Actions we call *Virtuous*."

*Virtue disinterested.*

VII. THERE may perhaps still remain another Suspicion of *Self-Interest* in our Prosecution of *Virtue*, arising from this, "That the *whole Race* of Mankind seems persuaded of the Existence of an *Almighty Being*, who will certainly secure Happiness either *now*, or *hereafter*, to those who are *Virtuous*, according to their several Notions of *Virtue* in various Places: and upon this Persuasion, *Virtue* may in all Cases be pursued from Views \* of *Interest*." Here again we might appeal to all Mankind, whether there be no *Benevolence* but what flows from a View of *Reward* from the DEITY? Nay, do we not see a great deal of it among those who entertain few if any Thoughts of Devotion at all? Not to say that this *Benevolence* scarce deserves the Name, when we desire not, nor delight in the *Good* of others, further than it serves our own Ends.

*Objection from Religion.*

\* See above Sect. i. Art. 5. Par. 4.



BUT if we have no other Idea of *Good*, than *Advantage* to our selves, we must imagine that every *rational Being* acts only for its own *Advantage*; and however we may call a *beneficent Being*, a *good Being*, because it acts for our *Advantage*, yet upon *this Scheme* we should not be apt to think there is any *beneficent Being* in *Nature*, or a *Being* who acts for the *Good* of others. Particularly, if there is no *Sense* of Excellence in *publick Love*, and promoting the Happiness of others, whence should this Persuasion arise, "That the DEITY will make the *Virtuous* happy?" Can we prove that it is for the *Advantage* of the DEITY to do so? This I fancy will be look'd upon as very absurd, unless we suppose some *beneficent Dispositions* essential to the DEITY, which determine him to consult the *publick Good* of his *Creatures*, and reward such as co-operate with his *kind Intention*. And if there be such *Dispositions* in the DEITY, where is the impossibility of some small degree of this *publick Love* in his *Creatures*? And why must they be suppos'd incapable of acting but from *Self-Love*?

IN short, without acknowledging some other Principle of Action in rational Agents than *Self-Love*, I see no Foundation to expect *Beneficence*, or *Rewards* from

from God, or Man, further than it is the Sect. 2.  
*Interest of the Benefactor* ; and all Expectation of Benefits from a *Being* whose Interests are independent on us, must be *perfectly ridiculous*. What should engage the DEITY to reward *Virtue* ? *Virtue* is commonly suppos'd, upon *this Scheme*, to be only a consulting our own *Happiness* in the most artful way, consistently with the *Good of the Whole* ; and in *Vice* the same thing is foolishly pursu'd, in a manner which will not so probably succeed, and which is contrary to the *Good of the Whole*. But how is the DEITY concern'd in this *Whole*, if every Agent always acts from *Self-Love* ? And what Ground have we, from the Idea of a God it self, to believe the DEITY is good in the *Christian Sense*, that is, *studious of the Good of his Creatures* ? Perhaps the *Misery* of his Creatures may give him as much Pleasure, as their *Happiness* : And who can find fault, or blame such a *Being* to study their *Misery* ; for what else should we expect ? A *Manichean Evil God*, is a Notion which Men would as readily run into, as that of a *Good one*, if there is no Excellence in *disinterested Love*, and no *Being* acts but for its own *Advantage* ; unless we prov'd that the *Happiness of Creatures* was *advantageous* to the DEITY.

Sect. 2.

From Con-  
comitant  
Pleasure.

VIII. THE last, and only remaining Objection against what has been said, is this, "That *Virtue* perhaps is pursu'd because " of the *concomitant Pleasure*." To which we may answer, first, by observing, that this plainly supposes a *Sense* of *Virtue* antecedent to Ideas of *Advantage*, upon which this Advantage is founded; and that from the very *Frame* of our *Nature* we are determin'd to perceive Pleasure in the practice of *Virtue*, and to approve it when practis'd by our selves, or others.

BUT further, may we not justly question, whether all *Virtue* is *pleasant*? Or, whether we are not determin'd to some *amiable Actions* in which we find no Pleasure? 'Tis true, all the Passions, and Affections justify themselves; or, we approve our being affected in a certain manner on certain Occasions, and condemn a Person who is otherwise affected. So the *Sorrowful*, the *Angry*, the *Jealous*, the *Compassionate*, think it reasonable they should be so upon the several Occasions which move these Passions; but we should not therefore say that *Sorrow*, *Anger*, *Jealousy*, or *Pity* are pleasant, and that we chuse to be in these Passions because of the concomitant Pleasure. The matter is plainly this. The *Frame* of our *Nature*, on such Occasions as move these Passions, determines us to be thus af-




affected, and to approve our being so : Sect. 2.  
 Nay, we dislike any Person who is not thus affected upon such occasions, notwithstanding the uneasiness of these Passions. This uneasiness determines us to endeavour an Alteration in the state of the Object ; but not otherwise to remove the painful Affection, while the occasion is unalter'd : which shews that these Affections are neither chosen for their concomitant Pleasure, nor voluntarily brought upon our selves with a view to *private Good*. The Actions which these Passions move us to, tend generally to remove the uneasy Passion by altering the state of the Object ; but the Removal of our Pain is seldom directly intended in the uneasy *Benevolent Passions* : nor is the Alteration intended in the State of the Objects by such Passions, imagin'd to be a *private Good* to the Agent, as it always is in the *selfish Passions*. If our sole Intention, in *Compassion* or *Pity*, was the Removal of our Pain, we should run away, shut our Eyes, divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, to avoid the Pain of Compassion, which we seldom do : nay, we croud about such Objects, and voluntarily expose our selves to Pain, unless Reason, and Reflection upon our Inability to relieve the Miserable, countermand our Inclination ; or some selfish Affection, as fear of Danger, overballances it.

Now



## Sect. 2.



Now there are several *morally amiable* Actions, which flow from these Passions which are so uneasy ; such as Attempts of *relieving* the Distress'd, of *defending* the Injur'd, of *repairing* of Wrongs done by ourselves. These Actions are often accompany'd with no Pleasure in the mean time, nor have they any subsequent Pleasure, except as they are successful ; unless it be that which may arise from *calm Reflection*, when the Passion is over, upon our having been in a Disposition, which to our *moral Sense* appears *lovely* and *good* : but this Pleasure is never intended in the Heat of Action, nor is it any Motive extiting to it.

BESIDES, In the *pleasant Passions*, we do not *love*, because it is *pleasant* to love ; we do not *chuse* this State, because it is an *advantageous*, or *pleasant* State : This Passion necessarily arises from seeing its proper Object, a *morally good Character*. And if we could love, whenever we see it would be our *Interest* to love, *Love* could be brib'd by a third Person ; and we could never love Persons in Distress, for then our Love gives us Pain. The same Observation may be extended to all the *other Affections* from which *Virtue* is suppos'd to flow : And from the whole we may conclude, " That the *virtuous Agent*  
" is

“ is never apprehended by us as acting on- Sect. 2.  
 “ ly from Views of his *own Interest*, but  
 “ as *principally* influenc’d by some other  
 “ Motive.”

IX. HAVING remov’d these *false Springs* The true  
Spring of  
Virtue.  
 of *virtuous Actions*, let us next establish the  
 true one, viz. *some Determination of our*  
*Nature to study the Good of others*; or *some*  
*Instinct, antecedent to all Reason from*  
*Interest, which influences us to the Love*  
*of others*; even as the *moral Sense*, \* above  
 explain’d, determines us to *approve* the  
 Actions which flow from *this Love* in our  
 selves or others. This *disinterested Af-*  
*fection*, may appear strange to Men im-  
 press’d with Notions of *Self-Love*, as the  
*sole* Motive of Action, from the Pulpit,  
 the Schools, the Systems, and Conversa-  
 tions regulated by them: but let us consider  
 it in its strongest, and simplest Kinds; and  
 when we see the Possibility of it in these  
 Instances, we may easily discover its *uni-*  
*versal Extent*.

AN honest *Farmer* will tell you, that Natural  
Affection.  
 he studies the *Preservation* and *Happiness*  
 of his Children, and loves them without  
 any design of Good to himself. But say some  
 of our *Philosophers*, “ The Happiness of

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\* See Sect. i.

“ their

Sect. 2. “ their Children gives Parents Pleasure, and  
 “ their Misery gives them Pain ; and there-  
 “ fore to obtain the *former*, and avoid the  
 “ *latter*, they study, from *Self-Love*, the  
 “ Good of their Children.” Suppose several Merchants join’d in Partnership of their whole Effects ; one of them is employ’d abroad in managing the Stock of the Company ; his Prosperity occasions Gain to all, and his Losses give them Pain from their Share in the Loss : is this then the *same* Kind of Affection with *that* of Parents to their Children ? Is there the *same* tender, personal Regard ? I fancy no Parent will say so. In this Case of Merchants there is a plain Conjunction of Interest ; but whence the Conjunction of Interest between the *Parent* and *Child* ? Do the Child’s *Sensations* give Pleasure or Pain to the Parent ? Is the Parent *hungry, thirsty, sick*, when the Child is so ? “ No, but *his Love* to  
 “ the Child makes him affected with his  
 “ Pleasures or Pains.” *This Love* then is antecedent to the Conjunction of Interest, and the Cause of it, not the Effect : *this Love* then must be *disinterested*. “ No,  
 “ says another *Sophist*, Children are *Parts*  
 “ of our selves, and in loving them we but  
 “ love *our selves* in them.” A very good Answer ! Let us carry it as far as it will go. How are they *Parts* of our selves ? Not as a *Leg* or an *Arm* : We are not conscious of their Sensations. “ But *their*  
 “ Bodys



"Bodys were form'd from Parts of *ours*." Sect. 2.  
 So is a *Fly*, or a *Maggot* which may breed in any discharg'd Blood or Humour: Very dear Insects surely! There must be something else then which makes Children *Parts* of our selves; and what is this but *that Affection* which NATURE determines us to have toward them? *This Love* makes them *Parts* of our selves, and therefore does not flow from their being so before. This is indeed a good Metaphor; and wherever we find a Determination among several rational Agents to *mutual Love*, let *each Individual* be look'd upon as a *Part* of a great *Whole*, or *System*, and concern himself in the *publick Good* of it.

BUT a later Author observes, \* "That *natural Affection* in Parents is *weak*, "till the Children begin to give Evidences "of *Knowledge* and *Affections*." Mothers say they feel it strong from the very first: and yet I could wish for the Destruction of his Hypothesis, that what he alleges was true; as I fancy it is in some measure, tho we may find in some Parents an Affection toward Idiots. The observing of *Understanding* and *Affections* in Children, which make them appear *moral Agents*, can increase Love toward them without prospect of *Interest*; for I hope this

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\* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 68. 3d Ed.



Sect. 2. Increase of Love, is not from Prospect of Advantage from the Knowledge or Affections of Children, for whom Parents are still toiling, and never intend to be refunded their Expences, or recompens'd for their Labour, but in Cases of extreme Necessity. If then the observing a *moral Capacity* can be the occasion of increasing Love without *Self-Interest*, even from the *Frame* of our *Nature*; pray, may not *this* be a Foundation of *weaker* degrees of Love where there is no preceding tie of Parentage, and extend it to *all Mankind*?

Publick  
Affections,  
natural.

X. AND that this is so in fact, will appear by considering some more distant Attachments. If we observe any Neighbours, from whom perhaps we have receiv'd no good Offices, form'd into *Friendships*, *Familys*, *Partnerships*, and with Honesty and Kindness assisting each other; pray ask any Mortal if he would not be better pleas'd with their *Prosperity*, when their Interests are no way inconsistent with his own, than with their *Misery*, and *Ruin*; and you shall find a *Bond* of *Benevolence* further extended than a *Family* and *Children*, altho the Ties are not so strong. Again, suppose a Person, for Trade, had left his *native Country*, and with all his Kindred had settled his Fortunes abroad, without any View of returning; and only ima-

imagine he had receiv'd no Injurys from Sect. 2.  
 his Country : ask such a Man, would it  
 give him no Pleasure to hear of the *Pros-*  
*perity* of his Country ? Or could he, now  
 that his Interests are separated from that  
 of his Nation, as gladly hear that it was  
 laid waste by *Tyranny* or a *foreign Power* ?  
 I fancy his Answer would shew us a *Be-*  
*nevolence* extended beyond *Neighbourhoods*  
 or *Acquaintances*. Let a Man of a *com-*  
*pos'd* Temper, out of the hurry of his *pri-*  
*ivate* Affairs, only read of the *Constitution*  
 of a *foreign* Country, even in the *most*  
*distant* parts of the Earth, and observe  
*Art, Design,* and a *Study* of *publick*  
*Good* in the *Laws* of this Association ;  
 and he shall find his Mind mov'd in their  
 favour ; he shall be *contriving* *Recti-*  
*fications* and *Amendments* in their *Con-*  
*stitution*, and *regret* any unlucky part of  
 it which may be pernicious to their In-  
 terest ; he shall *bewail* any Disaster which  
 befalls them, and *accompany* all their For-  
 tunes with the Affections of a Friend.  
 Now this proves *Benevolence* to be in some  
 degree extended to all Mankind, where  
 there is no *interfering* Interest, which  
 from *Self-Love* may obstruct it. And  
 had we any Notions of *rational Agents*,  
 capable of moral Affections, in the *most*  
*distant* Planets, our *good Wishes* would  
 still attend them, and we should *delight*  
 in their Happiness.

## Sect. 2.

*National  
Love.*

XI. HERE we may transiently remark the Foundation of what we call *national Love*, or LOVE of one's *native Country*. Whatever place we have liv'd in for any considerable time, there we have most distinctly remark'd the *various Affections* of *human Nature*; we have known many *lovely Characters*; we remember the *Associations, Friendships, Familys, natural Affections*, and other *human Sentiments*: our *moral Sense* determines us to approve these *lovely Dispositions* where we have most distinctly observ'd them; and our *Benevolence* concerns us in the *Interests* of the *Persons* possess'd of them. When we come to observe the like as distinctly in *another Country*, we begin to acquire a *national Love* toward it also; nor has our *own Country* any other preference in our *Idea*, unless it be by an *Association* of the *pleasant Ideas* of our *Youth*, with the *Buildings, Fields, and Woods* where we receiv'd them. This may let us see, how *Tyranny, Faction, a Neglect* of *Justice*, a *Corruption* of *Manners*, and *any thing* which occasions the *Misery* of the *Subjects*, destroys this *national Love*, and the *dear Idea* of a *COUNTRY*.

*The Reason  
why natu-  
ral Affec-  
tions do not  
always ap-  
pear.*

WE ought here to observe, That the only Reason of that *apparent want* of *natural Affection* among *collateral Relations*,

tions, is, that these *natural Inclinations*, Sect. 2.  
 in many Cases, are overpower'd by *Self-Love*, where there happens any *Opposition* of Interests; but where this does not happen, we shall find all Mankind under its Influence, tho with different degrees of Strength, according to the *nearer* or *more remote* Relations they stand in to each other; and according as the *natural Affection* of *Benevolence* is join'd with and strengthen'd by *Esteem*, *Gratitude*, *Compassion*, or other kind *Affections*; or on the contrary, weaken'd by *Displeasure*, *Anger*, or *Envy*.

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## M S E C T.



## S E C T. III.

*The Sense of Virtue, and the various Opinions about it, reducible to one general Foundation. The Manner of computing the Morality of Actions.*

*All Virtue  
Benevo-  
lent.*

I. IF we examine all the Actions which are counted *amiable* any where, and enquire into the Grounds upon which they are *approv'd*, we shall find, that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they always appear as BENEVOLENT, or flowing from *Love of others*, and a Study of their Happiness, whether the Approver be one of the Persons belov'd, or profited, or not; so that all those *kind Affections* which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos'd to flow from *such Affections*, appear *morally Good*, if while they are *benevolent* toward some Persons, they be not *pernicious* to others. Nor shall we find any thing *amiable* in any Action whatsoever, where there is no *Benevolence* imagin'd; nor in any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos'd applicable to, and design'd for *benevolent Purposes*. Nay, as was before observ'd\*,

\* See Sect. ii. Art. 3. Par. 1. Art. 6. Par. 2.

the Actions which in fact are exceedingly Sect. 3.  
 useful, shall appear void of *moral Beauty*,  
 if we know they proceeded from no kind  
 Intentions toward others; and yet an un-  
 successful Attempt of Kindness, or of pro-  
 moting *publick Good*, shall appear as ami-  
 able as the most successful, if it flow'd from  
 as *strong Benevolence*.

II. HENCE those Affections which *Religion*  
 would lead us to do good to our Bene-  
 factor, shall appear *amiable*, and the con-  
 trary Affections *odious*, even when our  
 Actions cannot possibly be of any advan-  
 tage or hurt to him. Thus a *sincere Love*  
 and *Gratitude* toward our Benefactor, a  
*cheerful Readiness* to do whatever he shall  
 require, how burdensom soever, a *heartly*  
*Inclination* to comply with his Intentions,  
 and *Contentment* with the State he has  
 plac'd us in, are the strongest Evidences of  
*Benevolence* we can shew to such a Person;  
 and therefore they must appear exceedingly  
*amiable*. And under these is included all  
 the *rational Devotion*, or *Religion* toward  
 a DEITY apprehended as *Good*, which we  
 can possibly perform.

WE may here transiently observe one *Gratitude*  
 Circumstance in the *Frame* of our *Nature*,  
 which is wonderfully adapted to promote  
*Benevolence*, viz. that as a Benefit con-  
 ferr'd necessarily raises *Gratitude* in the

Sect. 3. Person who receives it, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even from the meanest of Mankind, are *wonderfully delightful* to the Benefactor. Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable, whose grateful Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we would not rather chuse to be lov'd, than hated, if their Love no way evidenc'd us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern'd in their Meanness. And thus the *most abject Person oblig'd* is capable, and inclin'd to make no small addition to our Happiness by his *Love*, and *Gratitude*, when he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none from him: Thus,

————— *A grateful Mind*  
*By owing owes not, and still pays, at once*  
*Indebted and discharg'd*————— \*

As to *external Performances* of Religion, they are no doubt very various in different Nations, and Ages; and *Education* may give Men Opinions, that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to the DEITY: but then wherever any external Rite of Worship is approv'd, there also it is look'd upon to proceed from *Love* toward the DEITY, or some other Affec-

\* Par. Lost, B. iv. l. 55.



tion necessarily join'd with *Love*, as *Reverence*, *Repentance*, or *Sorrow* to have offended. So that the general Principle of *Love*, is the Foundation of all the *apparent moral Excellence*, even in the most fantastick Rites of Worship which were ever approv'd. For as to Rites design'd only to appease a *furious Being*, no Mortal, I fancy, apprehends there is any *Virtue*, or *Excellence* in them; but that they are chosen only as the dishonourable Means of avoiding a greater Evil. Now as there are various speculative Opinions about what is acceptable to the DEITY, it necessarily follows, "That, accordingly, *Practices*, "and *Approbation*, must be *various*; tho' "all the *moral Goodness* of Actions is still "presum'd to flow from *Love*." Sect. 3.

III. AGAIN, that we may see how *Love*, *Social* or *Benevolence*, is the Foundation of all *Virtues*, apprehended *Excellence* in *social Virtues*, let us only observe, That amidst the diversity of Sentiments on this Head among various Sects, this is still allow'd to be the way of deciding the Controversy about any disputed Practice, *viz.* to enquire whether this Conduct, or the contrary, will most effectually promote the *publick Good*. The *Morality* is immediately adjusted, when the natural Tendency, or Influence of the Action upon the *universal natural Good* of *Mankind* is agreed upon. That which produces



Sect. 3. duces more *Good* than *Evil* in the *Whole*, is acknowledg'd *Good*; and what does not, is counted *Evil*. In this Case, we no other way regard the good of the *Actor*, or that of those who are thus enquiring, than as they make a Part of the great *System*.

IN our late Debates about *Passive Obedience*, and the Right of *Resistance* in Defence of *Privileges*, the Point disputed among Men of Sense was, "whether *universal Submission* would probably be attended with greater *natural Evils*, than *temporary Insurrections*, when *Privileges* are invaded; and not, whether what tended in the *Whole* to the *publick natural Good*, was also *morally Good*?" And if a *divine Command* was alledg'd in favour of the Doctrine of *Passive Obedience*, this would, no doubt, by its eternal Sanctions cast the ballance of *natural Good* to its own side, and determine our Election from *Interest*; and yet our *Sense* of the *moral Good* in *Passive Obedience*, would still be founded upon some Species of *Benevolence*, such as *Gratitude* toward the DEITY, and *Submission* to his Will to whom we are so much oblig'd. But I fancy those, who believe the DEITY to be *Good*, would not rashly alledge such a Command, unless they also asserted, that the thing commanded did tend more to the *universal Good*, than the contrary, either by preventing

ing the external Evils of *Civil War*, or Sect. 3. by enuring Men to *Patience*, or some other *Quality* which they apprehended necessary to their everlasting Happiness. And were it not so, *Passive Obedience* might be recommended as an *inglorious Method* of escaping a greater Mischief, but could never have any thing *morally amiable* in it.

BUT let us quit the Disputes of the *Learned*, on whom, it may be alledg'd, *Custom* and *Education* have a powerful Influence; and consider upon what Grounds, in common Life, Actions are approv'd or condemn'd, vindicated or excus'd. We are universally asham'd to say an Action is *just*, because it tends to my *Advantage*, or to the *Advantage* of the *Actor*: And we as seldom condemn a *beneficent kind Action*, because it is not *advantageous* to us, or to the *Actor*. *Blame*, and *Censure*, are founded on a Tendency to *publick Evil*, or a Principle of *private Malice* in the *Agent*, or *Neglect* at least of the *Good* of others; on *Inhumanity* of Temper, or at least such *strong Selfishness* as makes the *Agent* careless of the Sufferings of others: and thus we *blame* and *censure* when the Action no way affects our selves. All the moving and persuasive Vindications of Actions, which may, from some *partial evil* Tendency, appear *evil*, are taken from this, that they were necessary to some

Sect. 3. *greater Good which counterballanc'd the*  
 ~~~~~ *Evil*: "*Severity toward a few, is Com-*  
passion toward multitudes.—Transitory
Punishments are necessary for avoiding
more durable Evils.—Did not some suf-
fer on such Occasions, there would be no
living for honest Men."—and such like.
 And even when an Action cannot be en-
 tirely justify'd, yet how greatly is the Guilt
 extenuated, if we can alledge; "*That it*
was only the Effect of Inadvertence
without Malice, or of partial good Na-
ture, Friendship, Compassion, natural
Affection, or Love of a Party?" All
 these Considerations shew what is the *uni-*
versal Foundation of our Sense of moral
Good, or Evil, viz. Benevolence toward
others on one hand, and Malice, or even
Indolence, and Unconcernedness about the
apparent publick Evil on the other. And
 let it be here observ'd, that we are so far
 from imagining all Men to act only from
Self-Love, that we universally expect in
 others a Regard for the *Publick*; and do
 not look upon the want of this, as barely
 the absence of *moral Good, or Virtue*, but
 even as *positively evil and hateful*.

Moral
Evil not
always
Malice.

IV, CONTRARYS may illustrate each
 other; let us therefore observe the *general*
Foundation of our Sense of moral Evil
 more particularly. *Disinterested Malice,*
 or *Delight in the Misery of others*, is the
 highest

highest pitch of what we count *vicious*; and Sect. 3. every Action appears *evil*, which is imagin'd to flow from any degree of *this Affection*. Perhaps a *violent Passion* may hurry Men into it for a few Moments, and our *rash angry Sentiments* of our Enemys, may represent them as having such *odious Dispositions*; but it is very probable, from the Reasons offer'd above*, that there is no such degree of Wickedness in *human Nature*, as, in *cold blood*, to be pleas'd with the *Misery* of others, when it is conceiv'd no way useful to *our Interests*.

THE Story of NERO and PÆTUS may be alledg'd against this, but perhaps unjustly, even allowing the Fact to be true. NERO was conscious he was hated by those whom the World call'd *good Men*, and that they were dangerous to him; he fancy'd his best Security lay in being terrible, and appearing such on all Occasions, by making others miserable when he pleas'd, to let his Enemys see, that they should have no Security from that Compassion which a NERO would imagine argu'd Weakness. This *unfortunate Gentleman's* Happiness might by some *foolish Courtier* be so related, as to carry a Reproof of the *Tyrant's* unnatural Pursuits, whereby his Passion might be excited to cut off the Per-

* See Sect. ii. Art. 4.

Sect. 3. son admir'd, and prefer'd before him. Any of these Motives of *apparent Interest* seem more probably to have influenc'd him, than that we should in *him*, and a few *others*, suppose a Principle of *calm Malice* without *Interest*, of which the *rest* of *Mankind* seem entirely incapable.

Temper of
a Tyrant.

THE Temper of a *Tyrant* seems probably to be a continu'd state of *Anger*, *Hatred*, and *Fear*. To form our Judgment then of his Motives of Action, and those of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let us reflect upon the Apprehensions we form of Mankind, when we are under any of those Passions which to the *Tyrant* are *habitual*. When we are under the fresh Impressions of an Injury, we plainly find, that our Minds are wholly fill'd with Apprehensions of the Person who injur'd us, as if he was *absolutely Evil*, and *delighted* in doing Mischief: We overlook the Virtues, which, when calm, we could have observ'd in him: we forget that perhaps only *Self-Love*, and not *Malice*, was his Motive; or it may be some *generous* or *kind Intention* toward others. These, probably, are the Opinions which a *Tyrant* constantly forms concerning *Mankind*; and having very much weaken'd all *kind Affections* in himself, however he may pretend to them, he judges of the Tempers of others by his own. And were
Men

Men really *such* as he apprehends them, Sect. 3.
 his Treatment of them would not be very unreasonable. We shall generally find our Passions arising suitably to the Apprehensions we form of others: if these be rashly form'd upon some sudden flight Views, it is no wonder if we find Dispositions following upon them, very little suited to the *real State of human Nature*.

THE ordinary Springs of Vice then among Men, must be a *mistaken Self-Love*, made so violent, as to overcome *Benevolence*; or *Affections* arising from *false*, and *rashly form'd Opinions* of *Mankind*, which we run into thro the weakness of our *Benevolence*. When Men, who had good Opinions of each other, happen to have *contrary Interests*, they are apt to have their *good Opinions* of each other *abated*, by imagining a *design'd Opposition* from *Malice*; without this, they can scarcely *hate* one another. Thus two *Candidates* for the same Office wish each other *dead*, because that is an ordinary way by which Men make room for each other; but if there remains any Reflection on each other's Virtue, as there sometimes may in benevolent Tempers, then their Opposition may be without *Hatred*; and if another better Post, where there is no Competition, were be-

Sect. 3. bestow'd on one of them, the other shall
 rejoice at it.

*Self-Love
 indifferent.*

V. THE Actions which flow solely from *Self-Love*, and yet evidence no Want of *Benevolence*, having no hurtful Effects upon others, seem *perfectly indifferent* in a *moral Sense*, and neither raise the *Love* or *Hatred* of the Observer. Our Reason can indeed discover certain Bounds, within which we may not only act from *Self-Love*, consistently with the *Good* of the *Whole*, but every Mortal's acting thus within these Bounds for his own *Good*, is absolutely necessary for the *Good* of the *Whole*; and the Want of such *Self-Love* would be *universally pernicious*. Hence, he who pursues his own *private Good*, with an Intention also to concur with that Constitution which tends to the *Good* of the *Whole*; and much more he who promotes his *own Good*, with a direct View of making himself more capable of serving GOD, or doing good to *Mankind*; acts not only *innocently*, but also *honourably*, and *virtuously*: for in both these Cases, a Motive of *Benevolence* concurs with *Self-Love* to excite him to the Action. And thus a *Neglect* of our *own Good*, may be *morally evil*, and argue a Want of *Benevolence* toward the *Whole*. But when *Self-Love* breaks over the Bounds above-mention'd, and leads us into Actions detrimental

tal to *others*, and to the *whole*; or makes Sect. 3.
us insensible of the *generous kind Affec-*
tions; then it appears *vitious*, and is *dis-*
approv'd. So also, when upon any small
Injurs, or sudden Resentment, or any
weak superstitious Suggestions, our *Bene-*
volence becomes so faint, as to let us
entertain odious Conceptions of *Men*, or
any Part of them, without just Ground,
as if they were *wholly Evil*, or *Malici-*
ous, or as if they were a worse Sort of
Beings than they really are; these Con-
ceptions must lead us into *malevolent Af-*
fections, or at least weaken our *good ones*,
and make us *really Vitious*.

VI. HERE we must also observe, that every *moral Agent* justly considers himself as a *Part* of this *rational System*, which may be useful to the *Whole*; so that he may be, in part, an Object of his own *Benevo-*
lence. Nay further, as was hinted above, he may see, that the Preservation of the *System* requires every one to be *inno-*
cently solicitous about himself. Hence he may conclude, that an Action which brings *greater Evil* to the *Agent*, than *Good* to others, however it may evidence *strong Benevolence* or a *virtuous Dispo-*
sition in the *Agent*, yet it must be founded upon a mistaken Opinion of its Tendency to *publick Good*, when it has no such Tendency: so that a Man who reason'd
justly,

Self-Love
not exclu-
ded by Be-
nevolence.

Sect. 3. justly, and consider'd the Whole, would not be led into it, were his *Benevolence* ever so strong; nor would he recommend it to the Practice of others; however he might acknowledge, that the Detriment arising to the *Agent* from a kind *Action*, did evidence a strong Disposition to *Virtue*. Nay further, if any *Good* was propos'd to the Pursuit of an *Agent*, and he had a *Competitor* in every respect only equal to himself; the highest *Benevolence* possible would not lead a wise Man to prefer another to himself, were there no Ties of Gratitude, or some other external Circumstance to move him to yield to his *Competitor*. A Man surely of the strongest *Benevolence*, may just treat himself as he would do a third Person, who was a *Competitor* of equal Merit with the other; and as his preferring one to another, in such a Case, would argue no Weakness of *Benevolence*; so, no more would he evidence it by preferring himself to a Man of only equal *Abilitys*.

WHEREVER a Regard to *my self*, tends as much to the good of the *Whole*, as Regard to *another*; or where the *Evil* to *my self*, is equal to the *Good* obtain'd for another; tho by acting, in such Cases, for the good of *another*, I really shew a very amiable Disposition; yet by acting in the contrary manner, from Regard to
my

my self, I evidence no evil Disposition, Sect. 3.
 nor any want of the most extensive *Ben-
 evolence*; since the *Moment* of good to
 the *Whole* is, in both Cases, exactly equal.
 And let it be here observ'd, that this does
 not supersede the necessity of *Liberality*,
 or *gratuitous Gifts*, altho in such Actions
 the Giver loses as much as the other re-
 ceives; since the *Moment* of Good to
 any Person, in any given Case, is in a
compound Ratio of the *Quantity* of the
 Good it self, and the *Indigence* of the
 Person. Hence it appears, that a Gift
 may make a much greater *Addition* to
 the happiness of the *Receiver*, than the
Diminution it occasions in the happiness
 of the *Giver*: And that the most useful
 and important Gifts are those from the
Wealthy to the *Indigent*. Gifts from *E-
 quals* are not useless neither, since they
 often increase the Happiness of both, as
 they are strong Evidences of *mutual Love*:
 but Gifts from the *Poor* to the *Wealthy*
 are really foolish, unless they be only little
 Expressions of *Gratitude*, which are also
 fruitful of Joy on both Sides: for these
 Expressions of Gratitude are really de-
 lightful and acceptable to the *Wealthy*,
 if they have any Humanity; and their
 Acceptance of them is matter of Joy to
 the poor *Giver*.

In like manner, when an Action does
 more Harm to the *Agent*, than Good to
 the


Sect. 3. the *Publick*; the doing it evidences an amiable and truly virtuous Disposition in the *Agent*, tho 'tis plain he acts upon a mistaken View of his Duty. But if the private Evil to the *Agent* be so great, as to make him incapable at another time, of promoting a *publick Good* of greater moment than what is attain'd by this Action; the Action may really be Evil, so far as it evidences a prior Neglect of a greater attainable *publick Good* for a smaller one; tho at present this Action also flows from a virtuous Disposition.

Benevo-
lence, how
affected by
the Quali-
ties of its
Object.

VII. THE *moral Beauty*, or *Deformity* of Actions, is not alter'd by the *moral Quality*s of the Objects, any further than the *Quality*s of the Objects increase or diminish the *Benevolence* of the Action, or the *publick Good* intended by it. Thus *Benevolence* toward the worst Characters, or the Study of their *Good*, may be as amiable as any whatsoever; yea often more so than *that* toward the *Good*, since it argues such a strong Degree of *Benevolence* as can surmount the greatest Obstacle, the *moral Evil* in the Object. Hence the *Love* of unjust *Enemys*, is counted among the highest *Virtues*. Yet when our *Benevolence* to the *Evil*, encourages them in their bad Intentions, or makes them more capable of Mischief; this diminishes or destroys the *Beauty* of the Action, or even makes it

it *evil*, as it betrays a *Neglect* of the *Good* of *others* more valuable ; Beneficence toward *whom*, would have tended more to the *publick Good*, than *that* toward our *Favourites* : But *Benevolence* toward *evil* Characters, which neither encourages them, nor enables them to do *Mischief*, nor diverts our *Benevolence* from Persons more useful, has as much *moral Beauty* as any whatsoever.

VIII. IN comparing the *moral Qualities* of Actions, in order to regulate our *Election* among various Actions propos'd, to find which of them has the greatest *moral Excellency*, we are led by our *moral Sense* of *Virtue* to judge thus ; that in equal *Degrees* of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the *Virtue* is in proportion to the *Number* of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend ; (and here the *Dignity*, or *moral Importance* of Persons, may compensate Numbers) and in equal *Numbers*, the *Virtue* is as the *Quantity* of the Happiness, or natural Good ; or that the *Virtue* is in a *compound Ratio* of the *Quantity* of Good, and *Number* of Enjoyers. In the same manner, the *moral Evil*, or *Vice*, is as the *Degree* of Misery, and *Number* of Sufferers ; so that, *that Action* is *best*, which procures the *greatest Happiness* for the *greatest Numbers* ; and *that*,
N worst,

Sect. 3. *worst, which, in like manner, occasions*
 *Misery.*

*Consequen-
ces, how
they affect
the Mora-
lity of Ac-
tions.*

IX. AGAIN, when the *Consequences* of Actions are of a *mix'd* Nature, partly *Advantageous*, and partly *Pernicious*; *that Action* is good, whose good Effects preponderate the *evil*, by being useful to many, and pernicious to few; and *that, evil*, which is otherwise. Here also the *moral Importance* of Characters, or *Dignity* of Persons may compensate Numbers; as may also the *Degrees* of Happiness or Misery: for to procure an *inconsiderable* Good to many, but an *immense* Evil to few, may be *Evil*; and an *immense* Good to few, may preponderate a *small* Evil to many.

BUT the *Consequences* which affect the *Morality* of Actions, are not only the direct and natural Effects of the Actions themselves; but also all those *Events* which otherwise would not have happen'd. For many Actions which have no immediate or natural *evil Effects*, nay, which actually produce *good Effects*, may be *evil*; if a man foresees that the evil Consequences, which will probably flow from the *Folly* of others, upon his doing of such Actions, are so great as to overballance all the *Good* produc'd by those Actions, or all the *Evils* which would flow from the Omission of them: And in such Cases the

Pro-

Probability is to be computed on both sides. Sect. 3. Thus if an Action of mine will probably, thro the Mistakes or Corruption of others, be made a *Precedent* in unlike Cases, to very evil Actions; or when my Action, tho good in it self, will probably provoke Men to very evil Actions, upon some *mistaken Notion* of their Right; any of these Considerations foreseen by me, may make such an Action of mine *evil*, whenever the Evils which will probably be occasion'd by the *Action*, are greater than the Evils occasion'd by the *Omission*.

AND this is the Reason that many *Laws* prohibit Actions in general, even when some particular *Instances* of those Actions would be very useful; because an universal *Allowance* of them, considering the Mistakes Men would probably fall into, would be more pernicious than an universal *Prohibition*; nor could there be any more *special Boundaries* fix'd between the right and wrong Cases. In such Cases, it is the Duty of Persons to comply with the generally useful Constitution; or if in some very important Instances, the Violation of the Law would be of less *evil Consequence* than Obedience to it, they must patiently resolve to undergo those Penalties, which the State has, for valuable Ends to the Whole, appointed: and this Disobedience will have nothing criminal in it.

Sect. 3.

Partial
Benevo-
lence, how
virtuous.

X. FROM the two last Observations, we may see what Actions our *moral Sense* would most recommend to our Election, as the most *perfectly Virtuous*: viz. such as appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the *greatest and most extensive Happiness* of all the *rational Agents*, to whom our Influence can reach. All *Benevolence*, even toward a *Part*, is amiable, when not inconsistent with the *Good* of the *Whole*: But this is a smaller Degree of *Virtue*, unless our *Benevolence* be restrain'd by want of Power, and not want of Love to the *Whole*. All strict Attachments to *Partys*, *Sects*, *Factions*, have but an imperfect Species of *Beauty*, unless when the *Good* of the *Whole* requires a stricter Attachment to a *Part*, as in *natural Affection*, or *virtuous Friendships*; or when *some Parts* are so eminently useful to the *Whole*, that even *universal Benevolence* would determine us with special Care and Affection to study their Interests. Thus *universal Benevolence* would incline us to a more strong Concern for the Interests of *great and generous Characters* in a high Station, or make us more earnestly study the Interests of any *generous Society*, whose whole Constitution was contriv'd to promote *universal Good*. Thus a good Fancy in *Architecture*, would lead a Man, who was not able to bear the Expence
of

of a compleatly regular Building, to chuse Sect. 3.
 such a Degree of Ornament as he could
 keep uniformly thro the *Whole*, and not
 move him to make a vain unfinish'd At-
 tempt in *one Part*, of what he foresaw
 he could not succeed in as to *the Whole*.
 And the most perfect Rules of *Architecture*
 condemn an excessive Profusion of Orna-
 ment on *one Part*, above the Proportion
 of *the Whole*, unless *that Part* be some
 eminent Place of the *Edifice*, such as the
chief Front, or *publick Entrance*; the
 adorning of which, would beautify the
Whole more than an equal Expence of
 Ornament on any *other Part*.

THIS Increase of the *moral Beauty* of
 Actions, or Dispositions, according to the
Number of Persons to whom the good
 Effects of them extend, may shew us the
 Reason why Actions which flow from the
nearer Attachments of Nature, such as
that between the Sexes, and the *Love* of
our Offspring, are not so *amiable*, nor
 do they appear so *virtuous* as Actions of
equal Moment of Good towards Persons
 less attach'd to us. The Reason is plainly
 this. These strong Instincts are by Nature
 limited to small Numbers of Mankind, such
 as *our Wives* or *Children*; whereas a Dis-
 position, which would produce a *like Mo-*
ment of Good to others, upon no special
 Attachment, if it was accompany'd with

Sect. 3. natural Power to accomplish its Intention, would be incredibly more fruitful of great and good Effects to the *Whole*.

Moral Dispositions and Abilityys.

FROM this primary Idea of *moral Good* in Actions, arises the Idea of *Good* in those Dispositions, whether *natural* or *acquir'd*, which enable us to do good to others; or which are presum'd to be design'd, and acquir'd or cultivated for that purpose. And hence those Abilityys, while nothing appears contrary to our Presumption, may increase our Love to the Possessor of them; but when they are imagin'd to be intended for *publick Mischief*, they make us hate him the more: Such are a *penetrating Judgment*, a *tenacious Memory*, a *quick Invention*; *Patience of Labour, Pain, Hunger, Watching*; a *Contempt of Wealth, Rumour, Death*. These may be rather call'd *natural Abilityys*, than *moral Qualityys*. Now, a Veneration for these Qualityys, any further than they are employ'd for the *publick Good*, is foolish, and flows from our *moral Sense*, grounded upon a false Opinion; for if we plainly see them *maliciously* employ'd, they make the Agent more detestable.

How we compute the Morality of Actions in our Sense of them.

XI. To find a *universal Canon* to compute the *Morality* of any Actions, with all their Circumstances, when we judge of the Actions done by our selves, or by others,

we

we must observe the following *Propositions*, Sect. 32
or *Axioms*.

1. THE *moral Importance* of any *Agent*, or the *Quantity* of *publick Good* produc'd by him, is in a *compound Ratio* of his *Benevolence* and *Abilitys*: or (by substituting the initial Letters for the Words, as $M = \text{Moment of Good}$, and $\mu = \text{Moment of Evil}$) $M = B \times A$.

2. IN like manner, the *Moment* of *private Good*, or *Interest* produc'd by any *Person* to himself, is in a *compound Ratio* of his *Self-Love*, and *Abilitys*: or (substituting the initial Letters) $I = S \times A$.

3. WHEN in comparing the *Virtue* of two *Actions*, the *Abilitys* of the *Agents* are equal; the *Moment* of *publick Good* produc'd by them in like *Circumstances*, is as the *Benevolence*: or $M = B \times I$.

4. WHEN *Benevolence* in two *Agents* is equal, and other *Circumstances* alike; the *Moment* of *publick Good* is as the *Abilitys*: or $M = A \times I$.

5. THE *Virtue* then of *Agents*, or their *Benevolence*, is always *directly* as the *Moment* of *Good* produc'd in like *Circumstances*, and *inversely* as their *Abilitys*: or $B = \frac{M}{A}$.

6. But as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, some *good* to our selves, and *evil* to the Publick; and others *evil* to our selves, and *good* to the Publick; or either *useful* both to our selves and others, or *pernicious* to both; the entire Motive to good Actions is not always *Benevolence alone*; or Motive to Evil, *Malice alone*; (nay, this last is seldom any Motive at all) but in most Actions we must look upon *Self-Love* as another Force, sometimes conspiring with *Benevolence*, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of *private Interest*, as well as *publick Good*; and sometimes opposing *Benevolence*, when the good Action is any way *difficult* or *painful* in the Performance, or *detrimental* in its Consequences to the *Agent*. In the former Case, $M = B + S \times A$

$= BA + SA$; and therefore $BA = M - SA$

$M - I$, and $B = \frac{M - I}{A}$. In the latter Case,

$M = B - S \times A = BA - SA$; therefore $BA =$

$M + SA = M + I$, and $B = \frac{M + I}{A}$.

THESE *selfish Motives* shall be * hereafter more fully explain'd; here we may in general denote them by the Word *Interest*.

* Vide Sect. v.

Interest:

terest: which when it concurs with *Benevolence*, in any Action capable of Increase, or Diminution, must produce a greater Quantity of Good, than *Benevolence* alone in the same *Abilitys*; and therefore when the *Moment* of Good, in an Action partly intended for the Good of the *Agent*, is but equal to the *Moment* of Good in the Action of another *Agent*, influenc'd only by *Benevolence*, the former is less *virtuous*; and in this Case the *Interest* must be deducted to find the true Effect of the *Benevolence*, or *Virtue*. In the same manner, when *Interest* is opposite to *Benevolence*, and yet is surmounted by it; this *Interest* must be added to the *Moment*, to increase the *Virtue* of the Action, or the Strength of the *Benevolence*: Or thus, in advantageous *Virtue*, $B = \frac{M-I}{A}$. And in laborious, painful, dangerous or expensive *Virtue*, $B = \frac{M+I}{A}$. By *Interest*, in this last Case, is understood all the *Advantage* which the *Agent* might have obtain'd by omitting the Action, which is a *negative Motive* to it; and this, when subtracted, becomes *positive*.

BUT here we must observe, that no *Advantage*, not *intended*, altho casually, or naturally redounding to us from the Action, *Intention, and Foresight, affect Actions.* does

Sect. 3. does at all affect its *Morality* to make it less *amiable*; nor does any *Difficulty* or *Evil* unforeseen, or not resolved upon, make a kind Action more *virtuous*; since in such Cases *Self-Love* neither assists nor opposes *Benevolence*. Nay, *Self-Interest* then only diminishes the *Benevolence*, when without this View of *Interest* the Action would not have been undertaken, or so much *Good* would not have been produc'd by the *Agent*; and it extenuates the *Vice* of an *evil* Action, only when without this *Interest* the Action would not have been pleasing to the *Agent*, or so much *Evil* have been produc'd by him.

THE sixth Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men must judge, who do not see into each others Hearts; for it may really happen in many Cases, that Men may have *Benevolence* sufficient to surmount any *Difficulty*, and yet they may meet with none at all: And in that Case, it is certain there is as much *Virtue* in the *Agent*, tho he does not give such Proof of it to his Fellow-Creatures, as if he had surmounted *Difficultys* in his kind Actions. And this too must be the Case with the DEITY, to whom nothing is difficult.

SINCE

SINCE then *Benevolence*, or *Virtue* in any *Agent*, is as $\frac{M}{A}$, or as $\frac{M+I}{A}$, and no

Perfect
Virtue.

Being can act above his *natural Ability*; that must be the Perfection of *Virtue* where $M=A$, or when the *Being* acts to the utmost of his Power for the *publick Good*; and hence the Perfection of *Virtue* in this

Case, or $\frac{M}{A}$, is as *Unity*. And this may

shew us the only Foundation for the boasting of the *Stoicks*, "That a Creature suppos'd Innocent, by pursuing *Virtue* with his utmost Power, may in *Virtue* equal the *Gods*." For in their Case, if $[A]$ or the *Ability* be *Infinite*, unless $[M]$ or the *Good* to be produc'd in the whole, be so too, the *Virtue* is not *absolutely perfect*; and the *Quotient* can never surmount *Unity*.

XII. THE same Axioms may be apply'd to compute the *moral Evil* in Actions; that is, calling the Disposition which leads us to *Evil*, *Hatred*, tho it is oftner only *Self-Love*, with Inadvertence to its Consequences; then,

Moral
Evil, how
computed.

1st. THE *Moment* of *Evil* produc'd by any *Agent*, is as the *Product* of his *Hatred* into his *Ability*, or $M=H \times A$. And,

2^{dly}.

Sect. 3.

2dly. IN equal Abilitys, $H = \mu \times I$.

3dly. WHEN *Hatred* is equal ; $\mu = A \times I$:
And,

4thly. THE Degree of *moral Evil*, or *Vice*, which is equal to the *Hatred* or *Neglect* of *publick Good*, is thus expres'd,

$$H = \frac{\mu}{A}$$

5thly. THE Motives of *Interest* may co-operate with *Hatred*, or oppose it the same way as with *Benevolence* ; and then according as *Self-Interest* may partly excite to the Action, and so diminish the *Evil* ; or dissuade from it, and so increase it, the *Malice* which surmounts it, or $H = \frac{\mu + I}{A}$, in like manner as in the Case of *moral Good*.

*Intention,
Foresight.*

BUT we must observe, that not only *Innocence* is expected from all Mortals, but they are presum'd from their *Nature*, in some measure inclin'd to *publick Good* ; so that a bare Absence of this Desire is enough to make an *Agent* be reputed *Evil* : Nor is a direct Intention of *publick Evil* necessary to make an Action *evil*, it is enough that it flows from *Self-Love*, with a plain Neglect of the *Good* of others, or an Insensibility

bility of their Misery, which we either ac- Sect. 3.
tually foresee, or have a probable *Presump-*
tion of.

It is true indeed, that *that publick Evil* which I neither certainly foresee, nor have actual Presumptions of, as the Consequence of my Action, does not make my *present Action* Criminal, or Odious; even altho I might have foreseen this Evil by a serious Examination of my own Actions; because such Actions do not, at present, evidence either *Malice*, or *want of Benevolence*. But then it is also certain, that my *prior Negligence*, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is a plain Evidence of the want of *that* Degree of good Affections which is necessary to a virtuous Character; and consequently the *Guilt* properly lies in this *Neglect*, rather than in an *Action* which really flows from a *good Intention*. *Human Laws* however, which cannot examine the *Intentions*, or secret Knowledge of the *Agent*, must judge in gross of the *Action* itself; presupposing all that Knowledge as *actually* attain'd, which we are oblig'd to attain.

In like manner, no good Effect which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my Action *morally Good*; however *Human Laws* or *Governours*, who cannot search into *Mens Intentions*, or know their

Sect. 3. *secret Designs*, justly reward Actions which tend to the publick Good, altho the Agent was engag'd to those Actions only by *selfish Views*; and consequently had no virtuous Disposition influencing him to them.

THE difference in *degree of Guilt* between *Crimes of Ignorance*, when the Ignorance is *Vincible*, and *Faulty*, as to the natural Tendency of the Action; and *Crimes of Malice*, or direct evil Intention, consists in this; that the former, by a *prior Neglect*, argues a want of the due degree of *Benevolence*, or *right Affection*; the latter, evidences direct *evil Affections*, which are vastly more odious.

*Morality
distinct
from In-
terest.*

XIII. FROM Axiom the 5th, we may form almost a demonstrative Conclusion, "that we have a *Sense of Goodness* and *moral Beauty* in Actions, distinct from *Advantage*;" for had we no other Foundation of Approbation of Actions, but the *Advantage* which might arise to us from them, if they were done toward our selves, we should make no Account of the *Abilitys* of the *Agent*, but would barely esteem them according to their *Moment*. The *Abilitys* come in only to shew the Degree of *Benevolence*, which supposes *Benevolence* necessarily *amiable*. Who was ever the better pleas'd with a *barren rocky Farm*,

Farm, or an *inconvenient House*, by Sect. 3. being told that the *poor Farm* gave as great Increase as it could; or that the *House* accommodated its Possessor as well as it could? And yet in our Sentiments of Actions, whose *Moment* is very inconsiderable, it shall wonderfully increase the *Beauty* to alledge, "That it was all the *poor Agent* could do for the *Publick*, or his *Friend*."


XIV. THE *moral Beauty* of *Characters* Morality of Characters. arises from their Actions, or sincere Intentions of the *publick Good*, according to their Power. We form our Judgment of them according to what appears to be their *fix'd Disposition*, and not according to any *particular Sallys* of *unkind Passions*; altho these abate the *Beauty* of good *Characters*, as the *Motions* of the *kind Affections* diminish the *Deformity* of the *bad ones*. What then properly constitutes a *virtuous Character*, is not some few accidental *Motions* of *Compassion*, *natural Affection*, or *Gratitude*; but such a *fix'd Humanity*, or *Desire* of the *publick Good* of all, to whom our Influence can extend, as uniformly excites us to all Acts of *Beneficence*, according to our utmost Prudence and Knowledge of the Interests of others: and a *strong Benevolence* will not fail to make us careful of informing our selves right, concerning the truest Methods of

Sect. 3. of serving the Interests of Mankind. Every Motion indeed of the *kind Affections* appears in some degree *amiable*; but we denominate the *Character* from the *prevailing Principle*.

*Instinct
may be the
spring of
Virtue.*

XV. I KNOW not for what Reason some will not allow that to be *Virtue*, which flows from *Instincts*, or *Passions*; but how do they help themselves? They say, "*Virtue* arises from *Reason*." What is *Reason* but that *Sagacity* we have in prosecuting any *End*? The ultimate *End* propos'd by the common *Moralists* is the *Happiness* of the *Agent* himself, and this certainly he is determin'd to pursue from *Instinct*. Now may not another *Instinct* toward the *Publick*, or the *Good* of others, be as proper a Principle of *Virtue*, as the *Instinct* toward *private Happiness*? And is there not the same Occasion for the Exercise of our *Reason* in pursuing the *former*, as the *latter*? This is certain, that whereas we behold the *selfish* Actions of others, with *Indifference* at best, we see something *amiable* in every Action which flows from *kind Affections* or *Passions* toward others; if they be conducted by *Prudence*, so as any way to attain their *End*. Our *passionate* Actions, as we shew'd * above, are not always *Self-interested*; since our In-

* See Sect. ii. Art. 8.

tention is not to free our selves from the Sect. 3.
Uneasiness of the Passion, but to alter the 
 State of the Object.

IF it be said, " That Actions from
 " *Instinct*, are not the Effect of *Pru-*
 " *dence* and *Choice* ;" this Objection
 holds full as strongly against the Actions
 which flow from *Self-Love* ; since the use
 of our Reason is as requisite, to find the
 proper Means of promoting *publick Good*,
 as *private Good*. And as it must be an
Instinct, or a *Determination previous to*
Reason, which makes us pursue *private*
Good, as well as *publick Good*, as our
End ; there is the same occasion for *Pru-*
dence and *Choice*, in the Election of pro-
 per Means for promoting of either. I see
 no harm in supposing, " that Men are natu-
 " rally dispos'd to *Virtue*, and not left
 " merely indifferent, to be engag'd in Ac-
 " tions only as they appear to tend to their
 " own *private Good*." Surely, the Suppo-
 sition of a *benevolent universal Instinct*,
 would recommend *human Nature*, and its
 AUTHOR, more to the Love of a good
 Man, and leave room enough for the Ex-
 ercise of our Reason, in contriving and
 settling *Rights*, *Laws*, *Constitutions* ; in
inventing Arts, and *practising* them so as to
 gratify, in the most effectual manner, that
generous Inclination. And if we must bring
 in *Self-Love* to make *Virtue Rational*, a
 O little

Sect. 3. little Reflection will discover, as shall appear hereafter, that this *Benevolence* is our *greatest Happiness*; and thence we may resolve to cultivate, as much as possible, this *sweet Disposition*, and to despise every *opposite Interest*. Not that we can be *truly Virtuous*, if we intend only to obtain the Pleasure which accompanies *Beneficence*, without the *Love of others*: Nay, this very Pleasure is founded on our being conscious of *disinterested Love to others*, as the *Spring* of our Actions. But *Self-Interest* may be our *Motive*, in chusing to continue in this *agreeable State*, tho it cannot be the *sole*, or *principal Motive* of any Action, which to our *moral Sense* appears *Virtuous*.

Heroism,
in all situations.

THE applying a *mathematical Calculation* to *moral Subjects*, will appear perhaps at first *extravagant* and *wild*; but some *Corollarys*, which are easily and certainly deduc'd below *, may shew the *Conveniency* of this Attempt, if it could be further pursu'd. At present, we shall only draw this one, which seems the most joyful imaginable, even to the lowest rank of *Mankind*, *viz.* "That no external *Circumstances* of *Fortune*, no involuntary *Disadvantages*, can exclude any *Mortal* from "the *most heroick Virtue*." For how small soever the *Moment* of *publick Good* be,

* See Sect. vii. Art. 8, 9.

which

which any one can accomplish, yet if his *Abilities* are proportionably small, the *Quotient*, which expresses the Degree of *Virtue*, may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus, not only the *Prince*, the *Statesman*, the *General*, are capable of *true Heroism*, tho these are the chief Characters, whose Fame is diffus'd thro various Nations and Ages; but when we find in an *honest Trader*, the *kind Friend*, the *faithful prudent Adviser*, the *charitable and hospitable Neighbour*, the *tender Husband* and *affectionate Parent*, the *sedate yet chearful Companion*, the *generous Assistant of Merit*, the *cautious Allayer of Contention and Debate*, the *Promoter of Love and good Understanding* among Acquaintances; if we consider, that these were *all* the *good Offices* which his Station in the World gave him an Opportunity of performing to Mankind, we must judge *this Character* really as *amiable*, as those, whose external Splendor dazzles an injudicious World into an Opinion, "that they are the *only Heroes in Virtue*."

S E C T. IV.

All Mankind agree in this general Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions. The Grounds of the different Opinions about Morals.

This Moral Sense universal.

TO shew how far Mankind agree in that which we have made the *universal Foundation* of this *moral Sense*, viz. *BENEVOLENCE*, we have observ'd already *, that when we are ask'd the Reason of our Approbation of any Action, we perpetually alledge its *Usefulness* to the *Publick*, and not to the *Actor* himself. If we are vindicating a censur'd Action, and maintaining it lawful, we always make this one Article of our Defence, "That it injur'd no body, or did more *Good* than *Harm*." On the other hand, when we blame any piece of Conduct, we shew it to be *prejudicial* to others, besides the *Actor*; or to evidence at least a *Neglect* of their Interest, when it was in our power to serve them; or when *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or some other *disinterested Tye*


* See above, Sect. iii. Art. 3. Par. 3.

should

should have rais'd in us a Study of their Sect. 4.
 Interest. If we sometimes blame foolish
 Conduct in others, without any reflection
 upon its Tendency to *publick Evil*, it is
 still occasion'd by our *Benevolence*, which
 makes us concern'd for the Evils befalling
 the *Agent*, whom we must always look
 upon as a part of the *System*. We all
 know how great an Extenuation of Crimes
 it is, to alledge, "That the poor Man
 "does harm to no body but himself;"
 and how often this turns Hatred into Pity.
 And yet if we examine the Matter well, we
 shall find, that the greatest part of the Ac-
 tions which are *immediately prejudicial* to
 our selves, and are often look'd upon as *in-*
nocent toward others, do really tend to the
publick Detriment, by making us incapa-
 ble of performing the good Offices we could
 otherwise have done, and perhaps would
 have been inclin'd to do. This is the Case
 of *Intemperance* and *extravagant Luxury*.

II. AND further, we may observe, that
 no Action of any other Person was ever
 approv'd by us, but upon some Apprehen-
 sion, well or ill grounded, of some *really*
good moral Quality. If we observe the
 Sentiments of Men concerning Actions, we
 shall find, that it is always some *really amia-*
ble and benevolent Appearance which engages
 their Approbation. We may perhaps com-
 mit Mistakes, in judging that Actions tend

Benevo-
lence the
sole ground
of Appro-
bation.

 Sect. 4. to the publick Good, which do not ; or be so stupidly inadvertent, that while our Attention is fix'd on some *partial good Effects*, we may quite over-look many *evil Consequences* which counter-balance the *Good*. Our *Reason* may be very deficient in its Office, by giving us partial Representations of the tendency of Actions ; but it is still some *apparent Species* of *Benevolence* which commands our Approbation. And *this Sense*, like our other Senses, tho counter-acted from Motives of *external Advantage*, which are stronger than it, ceases not to operate, but has Strength enough to make us *uneasy* and *dissatisfy'd* with our selves ; even as the *Sense* of *Tasting* makes us loath, and dislike the nauseous Potion which we may force our selves, from Interest, to swallow.

False Approbations.

It is therefore to no purpose to alledge here, “ That many Actions are “ really done, and approv'd, which tend “ to the *universal Detriment*.” For the same way, Actions are often perform'd, and in the mean time approv'd, which tend to the *Hurt* of the *Actor*. But as we do not from the *latter*, infer the *Actor* to be void of *Self-Love*, or a *Sense* of *Interest* ; no more should we infer from the *former*, that such Men are void of a *Sense* of *Morals*, or a desire of *publick Good*.

Good. The matter is plainly this. Men Sect. 4.
are often mistaken in the Tendency of Ac-
tions either to *publick*, or *private Good* :
Nay, sometimes *violent Passions*, while
they last, will make them approve very bad
Actions in a *moral Sense*, or very *perni-
cious ones* to the *Agent*, as *advantageous* :
But this proves only, " That sometimes
" there may be some more *violent Motive*
" to Action, than a *Sense of moral Good* ;
" or that Men, by Passion, may become
" blind even to their own *Interest*."

BUT to prove that Men are void of a
moral Sense, we should find some Instan-
ces of *cruel, malicious Actions*, done, and
 approv'd in others, when there is no *Mo-
tive of Interest*, real or *apparent*, save
gratifying that very *Desire* of Mischief to
others : We must find a Country where
Murder in cold blood, *Tortures*, and *eve-
ry thing malicious*, without any *Advan-
tage*, is, if not *approv'd*, at least look'd
upon with *indifference*, and raises no *Aver-
sion* toward the Actors in the unconcern'd
Spectators : We must find Men with whom
the *Treacherous, Ungrateful, Cruel*, are
in the same account with the *Generous,
Friendly, Faithful, and Humane* ; and who
approve the *latter*, no more than the *for-
mer*, in all Cases where they are not affected
by the Influence of these Dispositions, or
when the *natural Good or Evil* befalls other

Sect. 4. Persons. And it may be question'd, whether the *Universe*, tho large enough, and stor'd with no inconsiderable variety of Characters, will yield us any Instance, not only of a *Nation*, but even of a *Club*, or a *single Person*, who will think all Actions *indifferent*, but those which regard his *own Concerns*.

Diversity
of Man-
ners ac-
counted
for.

III. FROM what has been said, we may easily account for the vast *Diversity* of *moral Principles*, in various *Nations*, and *Ages*; which is indeed a good Argument against *innate Ideas*, or *Principles*, but will not evidence Mankind to be void of a *moral Sense* to perceive *Virtue* or *Vice* in Actions, when they occur to their Observation.

THE Grounds of this *Diversity* are principally these:

From va-
rious No-
tions of
Happi-
ness.

1st. DIFFERENT Opinions of *Happiness*, or *natural Good*, and of the most effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there prevails a *courageous Disposition*, where *Liberty* is counted a *great Good*, and *War* an *inconsiderable Evil*, all Insurrections in Defence of Privileges, will have the Appearance of *moral Good* to our *Sense*, because of their appearing *benevolent*; and yet the *same Sense* of *moral Good* in *Benevolence*, shall

in another Country, where the Spirits of Sect. 4. Men are more *abject* and *timorous*, where *Civil War* appears the *greatest natural Evil*, and *Liberty* no great *Purchase*, make the same Actions appear *odious*. So in SPARTA, where, thro Contempt of Wealth, the Security of Possessions was not much regarded, but the thing chiefly desir'd, as *naturally good* to the State, was to abound in a *hardy shifting Youth*; *Theft*, if dexterously perform'd, was so little odious, that it receiv'd the Countenance of a Law to give it Impunity.

BUT in these, and all other Instances of the like nature, the Approbation is founded on *Benevolence*, because of some real, or apparent Tendency to the *publick Good*. For we are not to imagine, that *this Sense* should give us, without Observation, Ideas of complex Actions, or of their natural Tendency to *Good* or *Evil*: It only determines us to approve *Benevolence*, whenever it appears in any Action, and to hate *the contrary*. So our *Sense* of *Beauty* does not, without Reflection, Instruction, or Observation, give us Ideas of the *regular Solids, Temples, Cirques, and Theatres*; but determines us to approve and delight in *Uniformity amidst Variety*, wherever we observe it. Let us read the *Preambles* of any Laws we count unjust, or the *Vindications* of any disputed

Sect. 4. ted Practice by the *Moralists*, and we shall
 find no doubt, that Men are often mistaken
 in computing the Excess of the *natural*
Good, or *evil Consequences* of certain Ac-
 tions; but the Ground on which any Ac-
 tion is approv'd, is still some Tendency
 to the *greater natural Good* of others,
 apprehended by those who approve it.

Travellers
 accounts of
 barbarous
 Customs.

THE same Reason may remove also the
 Objections against the *Universality of this*
Sense, from some Storys of Travellers,
 concerning *strange Crueltys* practis'd to-
 ward the *Aged*, or *Children*, in certain
 Countrys. If such Actions be done in
 sudden angry Passions, they only prove,
 that other Motives, or Springs of Action,
 may overpower *Benevolence* in its *strongest*
Ties; and if they really be universally
 allow'd, look'd upon as innocent, and
 vindicated; it is certainly under some Ap-
 pearance of *Benevolence*; such as to se-
 cure them from Insults of Enemys, to a-
 void the Infirmitys of Age, which perhaps
 appear greater Evils than Death, or to free
 the vigorous and useful Citizens from the
 Charge of maintaining them, or the Trou-
 bles of Attendance upon them. A love of
 Pleasure and Ease, may, in the immediate
 Agents, be stronger in some Instances,
 than *Gratitude* toward Parents, or *natural*
Affection to Children. But that such Na-
 tions are continu'd, notwithstanding all the
 Toil

Toil in educating their Young, is still a sufficient Proof of *natural Affection*: For I fancy we are not to imagine any nice Laws in such Places, compelling Parents to a proper Education of some certain number of their Offspring. We know very well that an Appearance of *publick Good*, was the Ground of Laws, equally barbarous, enacted by LYCURGUS and SOLON, of killing the deform'd, or weak, to prevent a burdensome Croud of useless Citizens. Sect. 4.

A LATE ingenious Author * has justly observ'd the Absurdity of the *monstrous Taste*, which has possess'd both the *Readers* and *Writers* of *Travels*. They scarce give us any Account of the *natural Affections*, the *Familys*, *Associations*, *Friendships*, *Clans*, of the *Indians*; and as rarely do they mention their Abhorrence of *Treachery* among themselves; their *Proneness* to mutual Aid, and to the Defence of their several *States*; their Contempt of Death in defence of their Country, or upon points of *Honour*. "These are but *common Storys*.—No need to travel to the *Indies* for what we see in *Europe* every Day." The Entertainment therefore in these ingenious Studys consists chiefly in exciting *Horror*, and making Men *Stare*. The ordinary Employment of

* Ld. Shaftesbury, Vol. i. p. 346, 7, 8, 9, &c.

Sect. 4. the Bulk of the *Indians* in support of their Wives and Offspring, or Relations, has nothing of the *Prodigious*. But a *Human Sacrifice*, a Feast upon Enemys Carcases, can raise an Horror and Admiration of the wondrous Barbarity of *Indians*, in Nations no strangers to the *Massacre* at *Paris*, the *Irish Rebellion*, or the Journals of the *Inquisition*. These they behold with religious Veneration; but the *Indian Sacrifices*, flowing from a like Perversion of *Humanity* by *Superstition*, raise the highest Abhorrence and Amazement. What is most surprizing in these Studys, is the wondrous *Credulity* of some Gentlemen, of great Pretensions in other matters to Caution of Assent, for these *marvellous Memoirs* of Monks, Fryars, Sea-Captains, Pyrates; and for the *Histories, Annals, Chronologies*, receiv'd by Oral Tradition, or Hieroglyphicks.

Use of Reason in Morals.

MEN have *Reason* given them, to judge of the Tendency of their Actions, that they may not stupidly follow the first Appearance of *publick Good*; but it is still some Appearance of *Good* which they pursue. And it is strange, that *Reason* is universally allow'd to Men, notwithstanding all the stupid, ridiculous Opinions receiv'd in many Places, and yet absurd Practices, founded upon those very *Opinions*, shall seem an Argument against any *moral Sense*; altho

altho the bad Conduct is not owing to any Sect. 4. Irregularity in the *moral Sense*, but to a wrong *Judgment* or *Opinion*. If putting the *Aged* to death, with all its Consequences, really tends to the *publick Good*, and to the *lesser Misery* of the *Aged*, it is no doubt *justifiable*; nay, perhaps the *Aged* chuse it, in hopes of a *future State*. If a *deform'd*, or *weak Race*, could never, by *Ingenuity* and *Art*, make themselves useful to Mankind, but should grow an absolutely unsupportable Burden, so as to involve a whole State in Misery, it is *just* to put them to death. This all allow to be *just*, in the Case of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for *killing* of their Children, when Parents are sufficiently stock'd, it is perhaps practis'd, and allow'd from *Self-love*; but I can scarce think it passes for a good Action any where. If *Wood*, or *Stone*, or *Metal* be a *DEITY*, have *Government*, and *Power*, and have been the *Authors* of *Benefits* to us; it is *morally amiable* to praise and worship them. Or if the *true DEITY* be pleas'd with Worship before *Statues*, or any other *Symbol* of some more *immediate Presence*, or *Influence*; *Image-Worship* is *virtuous*. If he delights in *Sacrifices*, *Penances*, *Ceremonys*, *Crings*; they are *all laudable*. Our *Sense* of *Virtue*, generally leads us exactly enough according to our *Opinions*; and therefore the absurd
Prac-

Sect. 4. Practices which prevail in the World, are much better Arguments that Men have no *Reason*, than that they have no *moral Sense of Beauty* in Actions.

*Narrow
Systems
pervert the
moral
Sense.*

IV. THE next *Ground of Diversity* in Sentiments, is the *Diversity of Systems*, to which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine their *Benevolence*. We insinuated above*, that it is *regular and beautiful* to have *stronger Benevolence*, toward the *morally good* Parts of Mankind, who are *useful* to the *Whole*, than toward the *useless* or *pernicious*. Now if Men receive a *low, or base Opinion* of any *Body*, or *Sett* of Men; if they imagine them bent upon the Destruction of the more valuable Parts, or but *useless Burdens* of the Earth; *Benevolence* itself will lead them to neglect the Interests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason, why, among Nations who have high Notions of *Virtue*, every Action toward an Enemy may pass for *just*; why ROMANS, and GREEKS, could approve of making those they call'd *Barbarians, Slaves*.

*Sects pernicious to
Virtue.*

A LATE ingenious Author † justly observes, " That the various *Sects, Partys, Factions, Cabals* of Mankind in larger

* See *Sect. iii. Art. 10. Par. 1.*

† *Ld. Shaftesbury's Essay on Wit and Humour, Part iii. Sect. ii. Vol. 1. p. 110.*

" *Societys,*

“ Societys, are all influenc’d by a *publick* Sect. 4.
 “ *Spirit* : That some generous Notions of
 “ *publick* Good, some strong friendly Dis-
 “ positions, raise them at first, and excite
 “ Men of the same *Faction* or *Cabal* to
 “ the most disinterested mutual Succour and
 “ Aid : That all the Contentions of the
 “ different Factions, and even the fiercest
 “ Wars against each other, are influenc’d
 “ by a sociable *publick Spirit* in a limited
 “ System.” But certain it is, that Men
 are little oblig’d to those, who often art-
 fully raise and foment this Party Spirit ; or
 cantonize them into several Sects for the
 Defence of very trifling Causes. Associa-
 tions for innocent *Commerce*, or *Manufac-
 tures* ; Cabals for Defence of *Liberty* a-
 gainst a *Tyrant* ; or even lower Clubs for
Pleasantry, or *Improvement* by Conver-
 sation, are very amiable and good. But
 when Mens heads are filled with some
 trifling Opinions ; when designing Men
 raise in their Minds some unaccountable No-
 tion of *Sanctity*, and *Religion*, in Tenets
 or Practices, which neither increase our
 Love to GOD, or our own *Species* ; when
 the several Factions are taught to look upon
 each other as *Odious*, *Contemptible*, *Pro-
 fane*, because of their different Tenets, or
 Opinions ; even when these Tenets, whe-
 ther true or false, are perhaps perfectly use-
 less to the publick Good ; when the keenest
 Passions are rais’d about such Trifles, and
 Men

Sect. 4. Men begin to hate each other for what, of it self, has no Evil in it ; and to love the Zealots of their own Sect for what is no way valuable ; nay, even for their Fury, Rage, and Malice against opposite Sects ; (which is what all Partys commonly call *Zeal*) 'tis then no wonder if our *moral Sense* be much impair'd, and our *natural Notions* of *Good* and *Evil* almost lost ; when our *Admiration*, and *Love*, or *Contempt*, and *Hatred*, are thus perverted from their natural Objects.

IF any Mortals are so happy as never to have heard of the *Party-Tenets* of most of our Sects ; or if they have heard of them, have either never espous'd any Sect, or all equally ; they bid fairest for a truly *natural* and *good* Disposition, because their *Tempers* have never been soured about vain Trifles ; nor have they contracted any *Sullenness*, or *Rancour* against any Part of their own *Kind*. If any *Opinions* deserve to be contended for, they are those which give us lovely Ideas of the DEITY, and of our *Fellow-Creatures* : If any *Opinions* deserve Opposition, they are such as raise Scruples in our Minds about the *Goodness* of PROVIDENCE, or represent our *Fellow-Creatures* as *base* and *selfish*, by instilling into us some ill-natur'd, cunning, shreud Insinuations, " that our most
" generous Actions proceed wholly from
" *selfish*

"*selfish Views.*" This wise *Philosophy* Sect. 4. of some *Moderns*, after EPICURUS, must be fruitful of nothing but *Discontent*, *Suspicion*, and *Jealousy*; a State infinitely worse than any little transitory *Injurys* to which we might be expos'd by a good-natur'd *Credulity*. But thanks be to the kind AUTHOR of our Nature, that, in spite of such Opinions, our *Nature* it self leads us into *Friendship*, *Trust*, and *mutual Confidence*.

WERE we freely conversant with *Robbers*, who shew a *moral Sense* in the *equal* or *proportionable Division* of their Prey, and in *Faith* to each other, we should find they have their own sublime *moral Ideas* of their Party, as *Generous*, *Courageous*, *Trusty*, nay *Honest* too; and that those we call *Honest* and *Industrious*, are imagin'd by them to be *Mean-spirited*, *Selfish*, *Churlish*, or *Luxurious*; on whom that Wealth is ill bestow'd, which therefore they would apply to better Uses, to maintain gallanter Men, who have a Right to a Living as well as their Neighbours, who are their profess'd *Enemys*. Nay, if we observe the Discourse of our *profess'd Debauchees*, our *most dissolute Rakes*, we shall find their Vices cloth'd, in their Imaginations, with some amiable Dress of *Liberty*, *Generosity*, *just Resentment* against the Contrivers of artful Rules to

P

en-

Sect. 4. enslave Men, and rob them of their Pleasures.

PERHAPS never any Men pursu'd Vice long with Peace of Mind, without some such deluding Imagination of *moral Good* *, while they may be still inadvertent to the *barbarous* and *inhuman Consequences* of their Actions. The Idea of an *ill-natur'd Villain*, is too frightful ever to become familiar to any Mortal. Hence we shall find, that the *basest Actions* are dress'd in some *tolerable Mask*. What others call *Avarice*, appears to the *Agent* a *prudent Care* of a *Family*, or *Friends*; *Fraud*, *artful Conduct*; *Malice* and *Revenge*, a *just Sense* of *Honour*, and a *Vindication* of our *Right* in *Possessions*, or *Fame*; *Fire* and *Sword*, and *Desolation* among *Enemys*, a *just thorow Defence* of our *Country*; *Persecution*, a *Zeal* for the *Truth*, and for the *eternal Happiness* of Men, which *Hereticks* oppose. In all these Instances, Men generally act from a *Sense* of *Virtue* upon *false Opinions*, and *mistaken Benevolence*; upon *wrong* or *partial Views* of *publick Good*, and the means to promote it; or upon very *narrow Systems* form'd by like *foolish Opinions*. It is not a *Delight* in the *Misery* of others, or *Malice*, which occasions the horrid Crimes which fill our

* See below, *Seck*, vi. *Art.* 2. *Par.* 1.

Historys;


Historys ; but generally an *injudicious un-* Sect. 4.
reasonable Enthusiasm for some kind of li-
mitted Virtue.

*Insani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui,
 Ultra, quam satis est, VIRTUTEM
 si petat ipsam*.*

V. THE last Ground of *Diversity* which *False Opinions of the divine Laws.*
 occurs, are the *false Opinions* of the *Will* or *Laws* of the DEITY. To obey these
 we are determin'd from *Gratitude*, and a
Sense of *Right* imagin'd in the DEITY, to
 dispose at pleasure the Fortunes of his Crea-
 tures. This is so abundantly known to
 have produc'd *Follys*, *Superstitions*, *Mur-*
ders, *Devastations* of Kingdoms, from a
Sense of *Virtue* and *Duty*, that it is needless
 to mention particular Instances. Only we
 may observe, " That all those *Follys*, or
 " *Barbaritys*, rather confirm than destroy
 " the Opinion of a *moral Sense* ;" since
 the DEITY is believ'd to have a *Right* to
 dispose of his Creatures ; and *Gratitude* to
 him, if he be conceiv'd *good*, must move
 us to Obedience to his Will : if he be
 not conceiv'd *good*, *Self-love* may over-
 come our *moral Sense* of the Action which
 we undertake to avoid his Fury.

* Hor. Ep. 6. Lib. 1. v. 15.

Sect. 4.



As for the Vices which commonly proceed from *Love of Pleasure*, or any *violent Passion*, since generally the *Agent* is soon sensible of their *Evil*, and that sometimes amidst the heat of the *Action*, they only prove, “ That this *moral Sense*, “ and *Benevolence*, may be overcome by “ the more importunate *Sollicitations* of “ *other Desires*.”

*Objection
from Incest.*

VI. BEFORE we leave this Subject, it is necessary to remove one of the strongest Objections against what has been said so often, *viz.* “ That this *Sense* is *natural*, “ and independent on *Custom* and *Educa-* “ *tion*.” The Objection is this, “ That “ we shall find *some Actions* always at- “ tended with the strongest Abhorrence, “ even at first View, in some whole Na- “ tions, in which there appears nothing “ contrary to *Benevolence*; and that the “ *same Actions* shall in another Nation be “ counted *innocent*, or *honourable*. Thus “ Incest, among *Christians*, is abhorr’d at “ first appearance as much as *Murder*; “ even by those who do not know or “ reflect upon any necessary tendency of “ it to the detriment of Mankind. Now “ we generally allow, that what is from “ *Nature* in one Nation, would be so in all. “ This Abhorrence therefore cannot be “ from *Nature*, since in GREECE, the “ marrying


“ marrying half Sisters was counted *honourable* ; and among the *Persian* MAGI, Sect. 4.
 “ the marrying of Mothers. Say they
 “ then, may not all our *Approbation* or
 “ *Dislike* of Actions arise the same way
 “ from *Custom* and *Education* ? ”

THE Answer to this may be easily found from what is already said. Had we no *moral Sense natural* to us, we should only look upon *Incest* as hurtful to our selves, and shun it, and never hate other *incestuous Persons*, more than we do a *broken Merchant* ; so that still this Abhorrence supposes a *Sense of moral Good*. And further, it is true, that many who abhor *Incest* do not know, or reflect upon the natural tendency of some sorts of *Incest* to the *publick Detriment* ; but wherever it is hated, it is apprehended as offensive to the DEITY, and that it exposes the Person concern'd to his just Vengeance. Now it is universally acknowledg'd to be the grossest Ingratitude and Baseness, in any Creature, to counteract the Will of the DEITY, to whom it is under such Obligations. This then is plainly a *moral evil Quality* apprehended in *Incest*, and reducible to the general Foundation of *Malice*, or rather Want of *Benevolence*. Nay further, where this Opinion, “ that *Incest* is offensive to the DEITY,” prevails, *Incest* must have another direct Contrariety to *Benevolence* ; since

Sect. 4. we must apprehend the *Incestuous*, as exposing an Associate, who should be dear to him by the Ties of *Nature*, to the lowest State of *Misery*, and *Baseness*, *Infamy* and *Punishment*. But in those Countrys where no such Opinion prevails of the DEITY's abhorring or prohibiting *Incest*; if no obvious *natural Evils* attend it, it may be look'd upon as *innocent*. And further, as Men who have the *Sense* of *Tasting*, may, by *Company* and *Education*, have Prejudices against Meats they never tasted, as *unsavoury*; so may Men, who have a *moral Sense*, acquire an Opinion by implicit Faith, of the *moral Evil* of Actions, altho they do not themselves discern in them any tendency to *natural Evil*; imagining that others do: or, by Education, they may have some Ideas associated, which raise an abhorrence without Reason. But without a *moral Sense*, we could receive no Prejudice against Actions, under any other View than as *naturally disadvantageous* to our selves.

Moral
Sense not
from Edu-
cation.

VII. THE *Universality* of this *moral Sense*, and that it is antecedent to *Instruction*, may appear from observing the Sentiments of *Children*, upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain'd as soon as they understand Language. They always passionately interest themselves on that side where *Kindness* and *Humanity* are found; and detest the *Cruel*, the *Covetous*,
the

the *Selfish*, or the *Treacherous*. How Sect. 4.
 strongly do we see their Passions of *Joy*, 
Sorrow, *Love*, and *Indignation*, mov'd by
 these *moral Representations*, even tho there
 has been no pains taken to give them Ideas
 of a DEITY, of *Laws*, of a *future State*,
 or of the more intricate Tendency of the
universal Good to that of each *Individual*!

S E C T. V.

A further Confirmation that we have practical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our Nature; with a further Explication of our Instinct to Benevolence in its various Degrees; with the additional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame and Pity.

Degrees of I.
Benevo-
lence.

WE have already endeavour'd to prove, " That there is a *universal Determination to Benevolence in Mankind*, even toward the most distant parts of the Species:" But we are not to imagine that this *Benevolence* is equal, or in the same degree toward *all*. There are some nearer and stronger Degrees of *Benevolence*, when the Objects stand in some nearer relations to our selves, which have obtain'd distinct Names; such as *natural Affection*, and *Gratitude*; or when *Benevolence* is increas'd by *greater Love of Esteem*.

Natural
Affection.

ONE Species of *natural Affection*, viz. that in *Parents* towards their *Children*, has
3 been

been consider'd already *; we shall only Sect. 5. observe further, That there is the same kind of *Affection* among *collateral Relations*, tho in a weaker degree; which is universally observable where no Opposition of *Interest* produces contrary Actions, or counterballances the Power of this *natural Affection*.

WE may also observe, that as to the *Affection* of *Parents*, it cannot be entirely founded on *Merit* or *Acquaintance*; not only because it is antecedent to all Acquaintance, which might occasion the *Love* of *Esteem*; but because it operates where Acquaintance would produce *Hatred*, even toward *Children* apprehended to be *vicious*. And this *Affection* is further confirm'd to be from NATURE, because it is always observ'd to *descend*, and not *ascend* from *Children* to *Parents* mutually. NATURE, who seems sometimes frugal in her Operations, has strongly determin'd *Parents* to the Care of their *Children*, because they universally stand in absolute need of Support from them; but has left it to *Reflection*, and a *Sense* of *Gratitude*, to produce Returns of *Love* in *Children*, toward such *tender kind Benefactors*, who very seldom stand in such absolute need of Support from their Posterity, as their Chil-

Not founded on Merit, or Acquaintance.

* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 9. Par. 2, 3.


Sect. 5. *dren* did from them. Now did *Acquaintance*, or *Merit* produce *natural Affection*, we surely should find it strongest in *Children*, on whom all the Obligations are laid by a thousand good Offices; which yet is quite contrary to Observation. Nay, this Principle seems not confin'd to *Mankind*, but extends to other *Animals*, where yet we scarcely ever suppose any Ideas of *Merit*; and is observ'd to continue in them no longer than the Necessitys of their Young require. Nor could it be of any service to the Young that it should, since when they are grown up, they can receive little Benefit from the Love of their *Dams*. But as it is otherwise with *rational Agents*, so *their Affections* are of longer continuance, even during their whole lives.

Gratitude.

II. But nothing will give us a juster Idea of the *wise Order* in which *human Nature* is form'd for *universal Love*, and *mutual good Offices*, than considering that *strong attraction* of *Benevolence*, which we call *Gratitude*. Every one knows that *Beneficence* toward our selves makes a much deeper Impression upon us, and raises *Gratitude*, or a *stronger Love* toward the *Benefactor*, than *equal Beneficence* toward a *third Person* *. Now because of the vast Numbers of Mankind, their distant Habi-

* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6. Par. 3.

tations,

rations, and the Incapacity of any one to Sect. 5.
 be remarkably useful to vast Multitudes; 
 that our *Benevolence* might not be quite
 distracted with a multiplicity of Objects,
 whose equal Virtues would equally recom-
 mend them to our regard; or become use-
 less, by being equally extended to Multi-
 tudes at vast distances, whose Interests we
 could not understand, nor be capable of
 promoting, having no Intercourse of Offices
 with them; NATURE has more powerfully
 determin'd us to *admire*, and *love* the *moral*
Qualitys of others which affect our selves,
 and has given us more powerful Impressions
 of *Good-will* toward those who are *bene-*
ficent to our selves. This we call *Gra-*
titude. And thus a Foundation is laid for
joyful Associations in all kinds of *Business*,
 and *virtuous Friendships*.

By *this Constitution* also the *Benefactor*
 is more encourag'd in his *Beneficence*,
 and better secur'd of an *increase* of Hap-
 piness by *grateful Returns**, than if his
Virtue were only to be honour'd by the
 colder general Sentiments of Persons un-
 concern'd, who could not know his Neces-
 sitys, nor how to be profitable to him;
 especially, when they would all be equally
 determin'd to love innumerable Multitudes,
 whose equal Virtues would have the same
 Pretensions to their Love, were there not

* See above, Sect. iii. Art. 2. Par. 2.

Sect. 5. an *increase* of *Love*, according as the Object is more *nearly attach'd* to us, or our *Friends*, by good Offices which affect our *selves*, or *them*.

THIS *universal Benevolence* toward all Men, we may compare to that Principle of *Gravitation*, which perhaps extends to all Bodys in the *Universe*; but, like the *Love* of *Benevolence*, *increases* as the Distance is diminish'd, and is *strongest* when Bodys come to *touch* each other. Now this *increase* of *Attraction* upon nearer Approach, is as necessary to the *Frame* of the *Universe*, as that there should be any *Attraction* at all. For a *general Attraction*, equal in all Distances, would by the Contrariety of such multitudes of equal Forces, put an end to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it altogether.

THIS *increase* of *Love* toward the *Benevolent*, according to their *nearer Approaches* to our *selves* by their *Benefits*, is observable in the high degree of *Love*, which *Heroes* and *Law-givers* universally obtain in their own Countrys, above what they find abroad, even among those who are not insensible of their *Virtues*; and in all the strong Ties of *Friendship*, *Acquaintance*, *Neighbourhood*, *Partnership*; which are exceedingly necessary to the Order and Happiness of human Society.

III. FROM

III. FROM considering *that strong Determination* in our Nature to *Gratitude*, and *Love* toward our *Benefactors*, which was already shewn to be *disinterested**; we are easily led to consider *another Determination* of our *Minds*, equally *natural* with the *former*, which is to *delight* in the *good Opinion* and *Love* of *others*, even when we expect no other *Advantage* from them, except what flows from *this Constitution*, whereby HONOUR is made an *immediate Good*. This Desire of *Honour* I would call AMBITION, had not *Custom* join'd some evil Ideas to that Word, making it denote such a *violent desire* of *Honour*, and of *Power* also, as will make us stop at no base Means to obtain them. On the other hand, we are by NATURE subjected to a *grievous Sensation* of *Misery*, from the unfavourable *Opinions* of others concerning us, even when we dread no other *Evil* from them. This we call SHAME; which in the same manner is constituted an *immediate Evil*, as we said *Honour* was an *immediate Good*.

Now were there no *moral Sense*, or had we no other Idea of Actions but as *advantageous* or *hurtful*, I see no reason why we should be *delighted* with *Honour*, or sub-


* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6.

Sect. 5. jected to the *uneasiness* of *Shame* ; or how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is secure from Punishment for any Action, should ever be *uneasy* at its being known to *all the World*. The *World* may have the worse Opinion of him for it ; but what subjects my Ease to the Opinion of the *World*? Why, perhaps, we shall not be so much trusted henceforward in Business, and so suffer Loss. If this be the only reason of *Shame*, and it has no *immediate Evil*, or *Pain* in it, distinct from Fear of Loss ; then wherever we expose our selves to Loss, we should be *asham'd*, and endeavour to conceal the Action : and yet it is quite otherwise.

A MERCHANT, for instance, lest it should impair his Credit, conceals a *Shipwreck*, or a very bad *Market*, which he has sent his Goods to. But is this the same with the Passion of SHAME? Has he that *Anguish*, that *Dejection of Mind*, and *Self-condemnation*, which one shall have whose *Treachery* is detected? Nay, how will Men sometimes glory in their Losses, when in a Cause imagin'd *morally good*, tho they really weaken their Credit in the Merchant's Sense ; that is, the Opinion of their *Wealth*, or *fitness* for Business? Was any Man ever *asham'd* of impoverishing himself to serve his *Country*, or his *Friend*?

IV. THE *Opinions* of our Country are by some made the first Standard of *Virtue*. They alledge, "That by comparing Actions to them, we first distinguish between moral Good, and Evil: And then, say they, AMBITION, or the Love of Honour, is our chief Motive." But what is Honour? It is not the being universally known, no matter how. A covetous Man is not honour'd by being universally known as covetous; nor a weak, selfish, or luxurious Man, when he is known to be so: Much less can a treacherous, cruel, or ungrateful Man, be said to be honour'd for his being known as such. A Posture-master, a Fire-eater, or Practiser of Leger-de-main, is not honour'd for these publick Shews, unless we consider him as a Person capable of giving the Pleasures of Admiration and Surprise to Multitudes. Honour then is the Opinion of others concerning our morally good Actions, or Abilitys presum'd to be apply'd that way; for Abilitys constantly apply'd to other Purposes, procure the greatest Infamy. Now, it is certain, that Ambition, or Love of Honour is really selfish; but then this Determination to love Honour, presupposes a Sense of moral Virtue, both in the Persons who confer the Honour, and in him who pursues it.

AND



AND let it be observ'd, that if we knew an *Agent* had no other Motive of Action than *Ambition*, we should apprehend no Virtue even in his most useful Actions, since they flow'd not from any *Love* to others, or *Desire* of their Happiness. When *Honour* is thus constituted by NATURE pleasant to us, it may be an *additional Motive* to *Virtue*, as we said above*, the Pleasure arising from *Reflection* on our *Benevolence* was : but the Person whom we imagine *perfectly virtuous*, acts immediately from the *Love* of others ; however these refin'd Interests may be *joint Motives* to him to set about such a Course of Actions, or to cultivate every *kind Inclination*, and to despise every *contrary Interest*, as giving a smaller Happiness than *Reflection* on his own Virtue, and *Consciousness* of the Esteem of others.

SHAME is in the same manner constituted an *immediate Evil*, and influences us the same way to abstain from *moral Evil* ; not that any Action or Omission would appear *virtuous*, where the *sole Motive* was Fear of *Shame*.

Opinions
flow from
the Moral
Sense.


V. BUT to enquire further, how far the Opinions of our Company can raise a Sense of *moral Good* or *Evil*. If any Opinion

* See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 2.

be universal in any Country, Men of little Reflection will probably embrace it. If an Action be believ'd to be *advantageous* to the *Agent*, we may be led to believe so too, and then *Self-Love* may make us undertake it ; or may, the same way, make us shun an Action reputed *pernicious* to the *Agent*. If an Action pass for *advantageous* to the *Publick*, we may believe so too ; and what next ? If we have no *disinterested Benevolence*, what shall move us to undertake it ? “ Why, “ we love *Honour* ; and to obtain this Pleasure, we will undertake the Action from “ *Self-Interest*.” Now, is *Honour* only the Opinion of our Country that an Action is *advantageous* to the *Publick* ? No : we see no Honour paid to the *useful Treachery* of an Enemy whom we have brib'd to our Side, to *casual undesign'd Services*, or to the most useful Effects of *Compulsion* on Cowards ; and yet we see Honour paid to *unsuccessful Attempts* to serve the *Publick* from sincere Love to it. *Honour* then presupposes a *Sense* of something *amiable* besides *Advantage*, viz. a *Sense* of *Excellence* in a *publick Spirit* ; and therefore the *first Sense* of *moral Good* must be antecedent to *Honour*, for *Honour* is founded upon it. The Company we keep may lead us, without examining, to believe that certain Actions tend to the *publick Good* ; but that our Company *honours* such Actions, and *loves* the *Agent*, must flow from a *Sense* of *some*

Q

Ex.

Sect. 5. *Excellence in this Love of the Publick,*
 and serving its Interests.

“ WE therefore, say they again, pretend to *love* the *Publick*, altho we only
 “ desire the Pleasure of *Honour*; and we
 “ will applaud all who seem to act in that
 “ manner, either that we may reap *Advantage*
 “ from their Actions, or that others may believe we *really love* the
 “ *Publick*.” But shall any Man ever *really love* the *Publick*, or study the *Good* of others in his heart, if *Self-love* be the only spring of his Actions? No: that is impossible. Or, shall we ever really love Men who appear to *love* the *Publick*, without a *moral Sense*? No: we could form no Idea of such a Temper; and as for these Pretenders to *publick Love*, we should hate them as Hypocrites, and our Rivals in Fame. Now this is all which could be effected by the Opinions of our Country, even supposing they had a *moral Sense*, provided we had none our selves: They never could make us admire *Virtue*, or *virtuous Characters* in others; but could only give us Opinions of *Advantage*, or *Disadvantage* in Actions, according as they tended procure to us the Pleasures of *Honour*, or the Pain of *Shame*.

BUT if we suppose that Men have, by
 NATURE, a *moral Sense* of Goodness in
 Ac-

Actions, and that they are capable of *disinterested Love*; all is easy. The Opinions of our Company may make us rashly conclude, that certain Actions tend to the universal Detriment, and are *morally Evil*, when perhaps they are not so; and then *our Sense* may determine us to have an Aversion to them, and their Authors; or we may, the same way, be led into implicit Prejudices in favour of Actions as *good*; and then our desire of *Honour* may co-operate with *Benevolence*, to move us to such Actions: but had we no *Sense* of *moral Qualities* in Actions, nor any Conceptions of them, except as *advantageous* or *hurtful*, we never could have *honour'd* or *lov'd Agents* for *publick Love*, or had any regard to their Actions, further than they affected our selves in particular. We might have form'd the metaphysical Idea of *publick Good*, but we had never desir'd it, further than it tended to our own *private Interest*, without a Principle of *Benevolence*; nor admir'd and lov'd those who were studious of it, without a *moral Sense*. So far is *Virtue* from being (in the Language of a late * Author) *the Offspring of Flattery, begot upon Pride*; that *Pride*, in the bad meaning of that Word, is *the spurious Brood of Ignorance by our moral Sense, and Flattery only an Engine, which the*

* Author of the Fable of the Bees, Pag. 37. 3d Ed.

Sect. 5. *Cunning may use to turn this moral Sense in others, to the Purposes of Self-love in the Flatterer.*

*Moral
Sense, not
from Love
of Honour.*

VI. To explain what has been said of the Power of *Honour*. Suppose a STATE or PRINCE, observing the Money which is drawn out of *England* by *Italian Musicians*, should decree *Honours, Statues, Titles*, for great *Musicians*: This would certainly excite all who had hopes of Success, to the Study of *Musick*; and Men of a good *Ear* would approve of the good Performers as useful Subjects, as well as very entertaining. But would this give all Men a good *Ear*, or make them delight in *Harmony*? Or could it ever make us really love a *Musician*, who study'd nothing but his own Gain, in the same manner we do a *Patriot*, or a generous *Friend*? I doubt not. And yet *Friendship*, without the Assistance of *Statues*, or *Honours*, can make Persons appear exceedingly amiable.

LET us take another Instance. Suppose *Statues*, and triumphal *Arches* were decreed, as well as a large Sum of Money, to the Discoverer of the *Longitude*, or any other useful Invention in *Mathematicks*: This would raise a universal Desire of such Knowledge from *Self-Love*; but would Men therefore love a *Mathematician* as they do a virtuous Man? Would a *Mathematician*

tician love every Person who had attain'd Sect. 5.
 Perfection in that Knowledge, wherever he observ'd it, altho he knew that it was not accompany'd with any *Love* to *Mankind*, or *Study* of their *Good*, but with *Ill-nature*, *Pride*, *Covetousness*? In short, let us honour other Qualitys by external Shew as much as we please, if we do not discern a *benevolent Intention* in the Application, or presume upon it; we may look upon these Qualitys as useful, enriching, or otherwise advantageous to any one who is possess'd of them; but they shall never meet with those endearing Sentiments of *Esteem* and *Love*, which our *Nature* determines us to appropriate to *Benevolence*, or *Virtue*.

LOVE of *Honour*, and Aversion to *Shame*, may often move us to do Actions for which others profess to honour us, even tho we see no *Good* in them our selves: And *Compliance* with the Inclinations of others, as it evidences Humanity, may procure some Love to the *Agent*, from Spectators who see no *moral Good* in the Action it self. But without some *Sense* of *Good* in the Actions, Men shall never be fond of such Actions in Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfection in them, or for practising them in Solitude; and much less shall they be dissatisfy'd with themselves when they act otherwise in Solitude. Now this is the case with us, as to *Virtue*; and therefore we must

Sect. 5. have, by NATURE, a *moral Sense* of it antecedent to *Honour*.

THIS will shew us with what Judgment a late * Author compares the Original of our Ideas of *Virtue*, and Approbation of it, to the manner of regulating the Behaviour of aukard Children by Commendation. It shall appear afterward†, that our Approbation of some *Gestures*, and what we call *Decency* in Motion, depends upon some *moral Ideas* in People of advanc'd Years. But before Children come to observe this Relation, it is only *good Nature*, an *Inclination* to please, and *Love* of *Praise*, which makes them endeavour to behave as they are desir'd; and not any Perception of *Excellence* in this Behaviour. Hence they are not solicitous about *Gestures* when alone, unless with a View to please when they return to Company; nor do they ever love or approve others for any Perfection of this kind, but rather envy or hate them; till they either discern the Connexion between *Gestures*, and *moral Quality*s; or reflect on the *good Nature*, which is evidenc'd by such a Compliance with the desire of the Company.

* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 38. 3d. Ed.

† See Sect. vi. Art. 4.

VII. THE considering *Honour* in the manner above explain'd, may shew us the reason, why Men are often *asham'd* for things which are not *vitious*, and *honour'd* for what is not *virtuous*. For, if any Action only appears *vitious* to any Persons or Company, altho it be not so, they will have a bad Idea of the *Agent*; and then he may be *asham'd*, or suffer Uneasiness in being thought *morally Evil*. The same way, those who look upon an Action as *morally good*, will honour the *Agent*, and he may be pleas'd with the *Honour*, altho he does not himself perceive any *moral Good* in what has procur'd it.

False Honour.


AGAIN, we shall be *asham'd* of every Evidence of *moral Incapacity*, or Want of *Ability*; and with good ground, when this Want is occasion'd by our own Negligence. Nay further, if any Circumstance be look'd upon as *indecent* in any Country, *offensive* to others, or *deform'd*; we shall, out of our Love to the good Opinions of others, be *asham'd* to be found in such Circumstances, even when we are sensible that this Indecency or Offence is not founded on *Nature*, but is merely the Effect of *Custom*. Thus being observ'd in those Functions of Nature which are counted *indecent* and *offensive*, will make us *uneasy*, altho we are sensible that they really do

Moral Incapacity, matter of Shame,

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Sect. 5. not argue any *Vice* or *Weakness*. But on the contrary, since *moral Ability*s of any kind, upon the general Presumption of a good Application, procure the Esteem of others, we shall value our selves upon them, or grow proud of them, and be asham'd of any Discovery of our want of such *Ability*s. This is the reason that *Wealth* and *Power*, the great *Engines* of *Virtue*, when presum'd to be intended for *benevolent* Purposes, either toward our Friends or our Country, procure *Honour* from others, and are apt to beget *Pride* in the Possessor; which, as it is a general Passion which may be either *good* or *evil*, according as it is grounded, we may describe to be *the Joy which arises from the real or imagin'd Possession of Honour, or Claim to it*. The same are the Effects of *Knowledge*, *Sagacity*, *Strength*; and hence it is that Men are apt to boast of them.

BUT whenever it appears that Men have only their *private Advantage* in view, in the application of these *Ability*s, or *natural Advantages*, the *Honour* ceases, and we study to conceal them, or at least are not fond of displaying them; and much more when there is any Suspicion of an *ill-natur'd* Application. Thus some *Misers* are asham'd of their *Wealth*, and study to conceal it; as the *malicious* or *selfish* do their *Power*: Nay, this is very often done where there is

no positive evil Intention ; because the diminishing their *Abilities*, increases the *moral*  *Good* of any little kind Action, which they can find in their hearts to perform.

IN short, we always see Actions which flow from *publick Love*, accompany'd with generous Boldness and Openness ; and not only *malicious*, but even *selfish ones*, the matter of Shame and Confusion ; and that Men study to conceal them. The Love of *private Pleasure* is the ordinary occasion of *Vice* ; and when Men have got any lively Notions of *Virtue*, they generally begin to be asham'd of every thing which betrays *Selfishness*, even in Instances where it is innocent. We are apt to imagine, that others observing us in such Pursuits, form mean Opinions of us, as too much set on private Pleasure ; and hence we shall find such Enjoyments, in most polite Nations, conceal'd from those who do not partake with us. Such are *venereal Pleasures* between *Persons marry'd*, and even *eating and drinking* alone, any nicer sorts of Meats or Drinks ; whereas a *hospitable Table* is rather matter of boasting ; and so are all other kind, generous Offices between *marry'd Persons*, where there is no Suspicion of *Self-love* in the *Agent* ; but he is imagin'd as acting from Love to his *Associate*. This, I fancy, first introduc'd Ideas of *Modesty* in polite Nations, and *Custom* has strengthen'd them

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Sect. 5. them wonderfully ; so that we are now
 ~~~~~ asham'd of many things, upon some con-  
 fus'd implicit Opinions of *moral Evil*, tho  
 we know not upon what account.

*Honour  
 and Shame,  
 often from  
 some Asso-  
 ciations of  
 Ideas.*

HERE too we may see the reason, why  
 we are not asham'd of any of the Methods  
 of *Grandeur*, or *high-Living*. There is  
 such a Mixture of *moral Ideas*, of *Bene-  
 volence*, of *Abilitys* kindly employ'd ; so  
 many Dependants *supported*, so many Friends  
*entertain'd, assisted, protected* ; such a *Ca-  
 pacity* imagin'd for *great and amiable Acti-  
 ons*, that we are never asham'd, but rather  
 boast of such things : We never affect Ob-  
 scurity or Concealment, but rather desire  
 that our *State* and *Magnificence* should be  
 known. Were it not for this Conjunction  
 of *moral Ideas*, no Mortal could bear the  
 Drudgery of *State*, or abstain from laughing  
 at those who did. Could any Man be pleas'd  
 with a Company of *Statues* surrounding his  
 Table, so artfully contriv'd as to consume  
 his various Courses, and inspir'd by some  
 Servant, like so many Puppets, to give the  
 usual trifling Returns in praise of their Fare ?  
 Or with so many *Machines* to perform the  
 Cringes and Whispers of a Levee ?

THE *Shame* we suffer from the Meanness  
 of *Dress, Table, Equipage*, is entirely  
 owing to the same reason. This Meanness is  
 often imagin'd to argue *Avarice, Meanness*  
 of

of *Spirit*, want of *Capacity*, or *Conduct* in Sect. 5. Life, of *Industry*, or *moral Abilitys* of one kind or other. To confirm this, let us observe that Men will glory in the Meanness of their Fare, when it was occasion'd by a *good* Action. How many would be ashamed to be surpriz'd at a Dinner of *cold Meat*, who will boast of their having fed upon *Dogs* and *Horses* at the Siege of *Derry*? And they will all tell you that they were not, nor are ashamed of it.

THIS ordinary Connexion in our Imagination, between *external Grandeur*, *Regularity* in *Dress*, *Equipage*, *Retinue*, *Badges of Honour*, and some *moral Abilitys* greater than ordinary, is perhaps of more consequence in the World than some *recluse Philosophers* apprehend, who pique themselves upon despising these external Shews. This may possibly be a great, if not the only Cause of what some count *miraculous*, viz. That *Civil Governors* of no greater Capacity than their Neighbours, by some inexpressible *Awe*, and *Authority*, quell the Spirits of the *Vulgar*, and keep them in subjection by such small Guards, as might easily be conquer'd by those Associations which might be rais'd among the *Disaffected*, or *Factions* of any *State*; who are daring enough among their *Equals*, and shew a sufficient Contempt of Death for undertaking such an Enterprize.

. HENCE

## AN INQUIRY concerning

HENCE also we may discover the reason, why the gratifying our *superior Senses* of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, or the Enjoyment of the Pleasures of *Knowledge*, never occasions any Shame or Confusion, tho our Enjoyment were known to all the *World*. The Objects which furnish this Pleasure, are of such a nature, as to afford the same Delights to multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one, which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment. So that altho we pursue these Enjoyments from *Self-love*, yet, since our Enjoyment cannot be prejudicial to others, no Man is imagin'd any way *inhumanly selfish*, from the fullest Enjoyment of them which is possible. The same *Regularity* or *Harmony* which delights me, may at the same time delight multitudes; the same *Theorem* shall be equally fruitful of Pleasure, when it has entertain'd thousands. Men therefore are not alarm'd of such Pursuits, since they never, of themselves, seduce us into any thing *malicious*, *envious*, or *ill-natur'd*; nor does any one apprehend another *too selfish*, from his pursuing Objects of unexhausted universal Pleasure.

THIS View of *Honour* and *Shame* may also let us see the reason, why most Men are uneasy at being prais'd, when they themselves are present. Every one is delighted with

with the Esteem of others, and must enjoy Sect. 5.  
 great Pleasure when he hears himself com-  
 mended; but we are unwilling others should  
 observe our Enjoyment of this Pleasure,  
 which is really *selfish*; or that they should  
 imagine us fond of it, or influenc'd by  
 hopes of it in our good Actions: and there-  
 fore we chuse Secrecy for the Enjoyment of  
 it, as we do with respect to other Pleasures,  
 in which others do not share with us.

VIII. LET us next consider another De-  
 termination of our *Mind*, which strongly  
 proves *Benevolence* to be *natural* to us,  
 and that is COMPASSION; by which we  
 are dispos'd to study the *Interest* of others,  
 without any *Views of private Advantage*.  
 This needs little Illustration. Every Mortal  
 is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he  
 sees another involv'd in, unless the Person  
 be imagin'd *evil*, in a *moral Sense*: Nay,  
 it is almost impossible for us to be unmov'd,  
 even in that Case. *Advantage* may make  
 us do a cruel Action, or may overcome  
*Pity*; but it scarce ever extinguishes it.  
 A sudden Passion of *Hatred* or *Anger* may  
 represent a Person as *absolutely evil*, and  
 so extinguish *Pity*; but when the Passion is  
 over, it often returns. Another *disinte-*  
*rested* View may even in cold blood over-  
 come *Pity*; such as *Love* to our *Country*,  
 or *Zeal* for *Religion*. *Persecution* is ge-  
 nerally occasion'd by *Love of Virtue*, and  
 a



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Sect. 5. a *Desire* of the *eternal Happiness* of *Man-kind*, altho our *Folly* makes us chuse absurd Means to promote it ; and is often accompany'd with *Pity* enough to make the *Persecutor* uneasy, in what, for prepollent Reasons, he chuses ; unless his Opinion leads him to look upon the *Heretick* as *absolutely and entirely evil*.

WE may here observe how wonderfully the Constitution of *human Nature* is adapted to move *Compassion*. Our *Misery* or *Distress* immediately appears in our *Countenance*, if we do not study to prevent it, and propagates some Pain to all Spectators ; who from Observation, universally understand the meaning of those *dismal Airs*. We *mechanically* send forth *Shrieks* and *Groans* upon any surprizing Apprehension of *Evil* ; so that no regard to Decency can sometimes restrain them. This is the Voice of NATURE, understood by all Nations, by which all who are present are rous'd to our Assistance, and sometimes our *injurious Enemy* is made to relent.

WE observ'd above \*, that we are not immediately excited by *Compassion* to desire the *Removal* of our own Pain : we think it just to be so affected upon the Occasion, and dislike those who are not so. But we

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\* See Sect. ii. Art. 8. Par. 2.

are excited directly to desire the *Relief* of Sect. 5. the Miserable; without any imagination that this Relief is a *private Good* to our selves: And if we see this impossible, we may by *Reflection* discern it to be vain for us to indulge our *Compassion* any further; and then *Self-love* prompts us to retire from the Object which occasions our Pain, and to endeavour to divert our Thoughts. But where there is no such *Reflection*, People are hurry'd by a *natural, kind Instinct*, to see Objects of *Compassion*, and expose themselves to this Pain when they can give no reason for it; as in the Instance of *publick Executions*.

THIS same Principle leads men to *Tragedys*; only we are to observe, that another strong reason of this, is the *moral Beauty* of the *Characters* and *Actions* which we love to behold. For I doubt, whether any Audience would be pleas'd to see fictitious Scenes of Misery, if they were kept strangers to the *moral Quality*s of the Sufferers, or their *Characters* and *Actions*. As in such a case, there would be no *Beauty* to raise Desire of seeing such Representations, I fancy we would not expose our selves to Pain alone, from Misery which we knew to be fictitious.


IT was the same Cause which croud'd the *Roman Theatres* to see *Gladiators*. There the

SECT. 5. the People had frequent Instances of great *Courage*, and *Contempt* of Death, two great *moral Abilitys*, if not *Virtues*. Hence CICEERO looks upon them as great Instructions in *Fortitude*. The *Antagonist Gladiator* bore all the blame of the Cruelty committed, among People of little Reflection; and the *courageous* and *artful* one, really obtain'd a Reputation of *Virtue*, and Favour among the Spectators, and was vindicated by the Necessity of *Self-defence*. In the mean time they were inadvertent to this, that their crouding to such Sights, and favouring the Persons who presented them with such Spectacles of Courage, and with Opportunitys of following their *natural Instinct* to *Compassion*, was the true occasion of all the real Distress, or Assaults which they were sorry for.

WHAT Sentiments can we imagine a *Candidate* would have rais'd of himself, had he presented his Countrymen only with Scenes of *Misery*; had he drain'd *Hospitals* and *Infirmariys* of all their pittyable Inhabitants, or had he bound so many *Slaves*, and without any Resistance, butcher'd them with his own Hands? I should very much question the Success of his Election, (however *Compassion* might cause his Shews still to be frequented) if his *Antagonist* chose a Diversion apparently

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more

more *virtuous*, or with a *Mixture* of Scenes Sect. 5.  
of *Virtue*. 

How independent this Disposition to *Compassion* is on *Custom*, *Education*, or *In-* *Compassion*  
*natural*  
*struction*, will appear from the Prevalence of it in *Women* and *Children*, who are less influenc'd by these. That *Children* delight in some Actions which are *cruel* and *tormenting* to Animals which they have in their Power, flows not from *Malice*, or want of *Compassion*, but from their *Ignorance* of those signs of Pain which many Creatures make; together with a *Curiosity* to see the various Contortions of their Bodys. For when they are more acquainted with these Creatures, or come by any means to know their Sufferings, their *Compassion* often becomes too strong for their *Reason*; as it generally does in beholding *Executions*, where as soon as they observe the evidences of Distress, or Pain in the *Malefactor*, they are apt to condemn this necessary Method of Self-defence in the *State*.

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S E C T. VI.

*Concerning the Importance of this moral Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its Influence on human Affairs.*

*Importance  
of the Mo-  
ral Sense.*

I. **I**T may now probably appear, that notwithstanding the Corruption of Manners so justly complain'd of every where, this *moral Sense* has a greater Influence on *Mankind* than is generally imagin'd, altho it is often directed by very partial imperfect Views of *publick Good*, and often overcome by *Self-love*. But we shall offer some further Considerations, to prove, " That it gives us more *Pleasure* and *Pain* than all our *other Facultys*." And to prevent Repetitions, let us observe, " That where-ever any *morally good Quality* gives Pleasure from *Reflection*, or from *Honour*, the contrary *evil one* will give proportionable Pain, from *Remorse* and *Shame*." Now we shall consider the *moral Pleasures*, not only *separately*, but as they are the *most delightful Ingredient* in the ordinary Pleasures of *Life*.

ALL

ALL MEN seem persuaded of some *Excellency* in the Possession of *good moral Qualitys*, which is superior to all other Enjoyments; and on the contrary, look upon a State of *moral Evil*, as worse and more wretched than any other whatsoever. We must not form our Judgment in this matter from the Actions of Men; for however they may be influenc'd by *moral Sentiments*, yet it is certain, that *Self-interested Passions* frequently overcome them, and *partial Views* of the Tendency of Actions, make us do what is really *morally evil*, apprehending it to be *good*. But let us examine the Sentiments which Men universally form of the State of others, when they are no way immediately concern'd; for in these Sentiments *human Nature* is *calm* and *undisturb'd*, and shews its *true Face*.

Now should we imagine a *rational Creature* in a sufficiently happy State, tho his Mind was, without *Interruption*, wholly occupy'd with pleasant Sensations of *Smell, Taste, Touch, &c.* if at the same time all other Ideas were excluded? Should we not think the State *low, mean* and *sordid*, if there were no *Society*, no *Love* or *Friendship*, no *good Offices*? What then must that State be wherein there are no Pleasures but those of the *external Senses*, with such long Intervals as *human Nature* at present

Sect. 6. must have ? Do these short Fits of Pleasure make the *Luxurious* happy ? How *insipid* and *joyless* are the Reflections on past Pleasure ? And how poor a Recompence is the Return of the transient Sensation, for the *nauseous Satiety*, and *Languors* in the Intervals ? This *Frame* of our *Nature*, so incapable of long Enjoyments of the *external Senses*, points out to us, “ That there “ must be some other more *durable Pleasure*, without such *tedious Interruptions*, “ and *nauseous Reflections*.”

LET us even join with the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, the Perceptions of *Beauty, Order, Harmony*. These are no doubt more *noble Pleasures*, and seem to enlarge the *Mind* ; and yet how *cold* and *joyless* are they, if there be no *moral Pleasures* of *Friendship, Love* and *Beneficence* ? Now if the bare Absence of *moral Good*, makes, in our Judgment, the State of a rational Agent contemptible ; the Presence of *contrary Dispositions* is always imagin'd by us to sink him into a degree of Misery, from which no other Pleasures can relieve him. Would we ever wish to be in the same Condition with a *wrathful, malicious, revengeful, or envious Being*, tho we were at the same time to enjoy all the Pleasures of the *external and internal Senses* ? The internal Pleasures of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, contribute greatly indeed toward soothing the  
Mind

Mind into a forgetfulness of *Wrath, Malice or Revenge*; and they must do so, before we can have any tolerable Delight or Enjoyment: for while *these Affections* possess the Mind, there is nothing but *Torment and Misery*. Sect. 6. 

WHAT *Castle-builder*, who forms to himself imaginary Scenes of Life, in which he thinks he should be happy, ever made *acknowledg'd Treachery, Cruelty, or Ingratitude*, the Steps by which he mounted to his wish'd for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had attain'd it? We always conduct our selves in such *Reveries*, according to the Dictates of *Honour, Faith, Generosity, Courage*; and the lowest we can sink, is hoping we may be enrich'd by some innocent Accident. *Castle-builders prove it.*

O *si urnam Argenti* FORS quâ mihi  
monstret! \* —

But *Labour, Hunger, Thirst, Poverty, Pain, Danger*, have nothing so detestable in them, that our *Self-love* cannot allow us to be often expos'd to them. On the contrary, the Virtues which these give us occasions of displaying, are so amiable and excellent, that scarce ever is any imaginary Hero in *Romance, or Epic*, brought to his high-

\* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 6. v. 10.



Sect. 6. est Pitch of Happiness, without going thro  
 them *all*. Where there is no *Virtue*, there  
 is nothing worth Desire or Contemplation ;  
 the *Romance*, or *Epos* must end. Nay, the  
*Difficulty*\*, or *natural Evil*, does so much  
 increase the *Virtue* of the good Action  
 which it accompanys, that we cannot easily  
 sustain these Works after the Distress is over ;  
 and if we continue the Work, it must be  
 by presenting a new Scene of *Benevolence*  
 in a prosperous Fortune. A Scene of *ex-*  
*ternal Prosperity* or *natural Good*, with-  
 out any thing *moral* or *virtuous*, cannot  
 entertain a Person of the dullest Imagina-  
 tion, had he ever so much interested himself  
 in the Fortunes of his Hero ; for where  
*Virtue* ceases, there remains nothing worth  
 wishing to our Favourite, or which we can  
 be delighted to view his Possession of,  
 when we are most studious of his Happi-  
 ness.

*Virtue*  
*own'd su-*  
*perior to*  
*all Plea-*  
*sure.*

LET us take a particular Instance, to try  
 how much we prefer the Possession of *Vir-*  
*tue* to all other Enjoyments, and how we  
 look upon *Vice* as worse than any other  
 Misery. Who could ever read the History  
 of REGULUS, without concerning himself  
 in the Fortunes of that *gallant* Man, sor-  
 rowing at his Sufferings, and wishing him a  
 better Fate ? But how a better Fate ? Should

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\* Sect. iii. Art. 11. Axiom 5.

he have comply'd with the Terms of the Sect. 6. CARTHAGINIANS, and preserv'd himself from the intended Tortures, tho to the detriment of his Country? Or should he have violated his plighted Faith and Promise of returning? Will any Man say, that either of these is the better Fate he wishes his Favourite? Had he acted thus, *that* Virtue would have been gone, which interests every one in his Fortunes.—“ Let him take his Fate like other common Mortals.”—What else do we wish then, but that the CARTHAGINIANS had relented of their Cruelty, or that PROVIDENCE, by some unexpected Event, had rescued him out of their hands.

Now may not this teach us, that we are indeed determin'd to judge *Virtue* with Peace and Safety, preferable to *Virtue* with Distress; but that at the same time we look upon the State of the *Virtuous*, the *Publick-spirited*, even in the utmost natural Distress, as preferable to all affluence of other Enjoyments? For this is what we chuse to have our Favourite Hero in, notwithstanding all its Pains and natural Evils. We should never have imagin'd him happier, had he acted otherwise; or thought him in a more eligible State, with Liberty and Safety, at the expence of his *Virtue*. We secretly judge the Purchase too dear; and therefore we never imagine he acted foolishly in secu-

~ Sect. 6. ring his *Virtue*, his *Honour*, at the expence of his *Ease*, his *Pleasure*, his *Life*. Nor can we think these *latter* Enjoyments worth the keeping, when the *former* are entirely lost.

Necessary  
in other  
Pleasures.

II. LET us in the same manner examine our Sentiments of the Happiness of others in common Life. WEALTH and EXTERNAL PLEASURES bear no small bulk in our Imaginations; but does there not always accompany this Opinion of Happiness in *Wealth*, some suppos'd *beneficent Intention* of doing good Offices to Persons dear to us, at least to our *Familys*, or *Kinsmen*? And in our imagin'd Happiness from *external Pleasure*, are not some Ideas always included of some *moral* Enjoyments of *Society*, some *Communication* of Pleasure, something of *Love*, of *Friendship*, of *Esteem*, of *Gratitude*? Who ever pretended to a *Taste* of these Pleasures without *Society*? Or if any seem violent in pursuit of them, how *base* and *contemptible* do they appear to all Persons, even to those who could have no expectation of Advantage from their having a more generous Notion of Pleasure?

Now were there no *moral Sense*, no Happiness in *Benevolence*, and did we act from no other Principle than *Self-love*; sure there is no Pleasure of the external Senses,

ses, which we could not enjoy alone, with Sect. 6.  
 less trouble and expence than in *Society*. ~~~~~  
 But a *Mixture* of the *moral Pleasures*  
 is what gives the *alluring Relish*; 'tis  
 some Appearance of *Friendship*, of *Love*,  
 of *communicating* Pleasure to others, which  
 preserves the Pleasures of the *Luxurious*  
 from being *nauseous* and *insipid*. And this  
 partial Imagination of some *good moral*  
*Qualities*, some *Benevolence*, in Actions  
 which have many *cruel, inhuman, and de-*  
*structive* Consequences toward others, is  
 what has kept *Vice* more in countenance  
 than any other Consideration\*.

BUT to convince us further wherein the  
 Happiness of *Wealth*, and *external Plea-*  
*sure* lies; let us but suppose *Malice, Wrath,*  
*Revenge*; or only *Solitude*, Absence of  
*Friendship*, of *Love*, of *Society*, of *Es-*  
*teem*, join'd with the Possession of them;  
 and all the Happiness vanishes like a Dream.  
 And yet *Love, Friendship, Society, Hu-*  
*manity*, tho accompany'd with *Poverty* and  
*Toil*, nay even with smaller degrees of *Pain*,  
 such as do not wholly occupy the Mind, are  
 not only the Object of Love from others,  
 but even of a sort of Emulation: which  
 plainly shews, " That *Virtue* is the chief  
 " *Happiness* in the Judgment of *all Man-*  
 " *kind*."

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\* See above, Sect. iv. Art. 4. Par. 4, 5.



## Sect. 6.

*The  
Charm in  
Beauty.*

III. THERE is a further Consideration which must not be pass'd over, concerning the EXTERNAL BEAUTY of Persons, which all allow to have a great Power over human Minds. Now it is some apprehended *Morality*, some natural or imagin'd Indication of *concomitant Virtue*, which gives it this powerful Charm above all other kinds of *Beauty*. Let us consider the Characters of *Beauty*, which are commonly admir'd in Countenances, and we shall find them to be *Sweetness, Mildness, Majesty, Dignity, Vivacity, Humility, Tenderness, Good-nature*; that is, that certain *Airs, Proportions, je ne scai quoy's*, are natural Indications of such Virtues, or of Abilities or Dispositions toward them. As we observ'd above \* of *Misery, or Distress* appearing in Countenances; so it is certain, almost all *habitual Dispositions of Mind*, form the Countenance in such a manner, as to give some Indications of them to the Spectator. Our *violent Passions* are obvious at first view in the Countenance; so that sometimes no Art can conceal them: and smaller degrees of them give some less obvious Turns to the Face, which an accurate Eye will observe. Now when the *natural Air* of a Face approaches to that which any Passion would form it unto, we make a

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\* See Sect. V. Art. 8. Par. 2.

conjecture from this concerning the *leading Disposition* of the Person's *Mind*. Sect. 6.

As to those Fancys which prevail in certain Countrys toward *large Lips, little Noses, narrow Eyes*; unless we knew from themselves under what Idea such Features are admir'd, whether as *naturally beautiful* in Form, or Proportion to the rest of the Face; or as presum'd Indications of some *moral Quality*s; we may more probably conclude that it is the *latter*; since this is so much the Ground of Approbation, or Aversion towards Faces among our selves. And as to those Features which we count *naturally disagreeable* as to Form, we know the Aversion on this account is so weak, that *moral Quality*s shall procure a liking, even to the Face, in Persons who are sensible of the *Irregularity*, or want of that *Regularity* which is common in others. With us, certain Features are imagin'd to denote *Dulness*; as *hollow Eyes, large Lips*; a *Colour* of Hair, *Wantonness*: and may we not conclude the like *Association of Ideas*, perhaps in both Cases without Foundation in *Nature*, to be the Ground of those Approbations which appear unaccountable to us?

IN the same manner, when there is nothing *grossly* disproportion'd in any Face, what is it we dispraise? It is *Pride, Haughtiness,*

Sect. 6. *tiness, Sourness, Ill-nature, Discontent, Folly, Levity, Wantonness*; which some Countenances discover in the manner above hinted at? And *these Airs*, when brought by Custom upon the most *regular Set* of Features, have often made them very disagreeable; as the *contrary Airs* have given the strongest Charms to Countenances, which were far from Perfection in *external Beauty*.

ONE cannot but observe the Judgment of HOMER, in his Character of HELEN. Had he ever so much rais'd our Idea of her *external Beauty*, it would have been ridiculous to have engag'd his Countrymen in a War for such a HELEN as VIRGIL has drawn her. He therefore still retains something amiable in a *moral Sense*, amidst all her Weakness, and often suggests to his Reader,

——— Ἑλένης ὀρμήματα τε σοναχάς τε\*,

as the Spring of his Countrymens Indignation and Revenge.

*The Cause  
of different  
Fancys of  
Beauty.*

THIS Consideration may shew us one Reason, among many others, for Mens *different Fancys*, or *Relishes* of *Beauty*. The *Mind* of Man, however generally dispos'd to esteem *Benevolence* and *Virtue*, yet by more particular Attention to some

\* See Homer, *Iliad* 2, v. 356, 390.

kinds of it than others, may gain a stronger Sect. 6.  
 Admiration of some *moral Dispositions* than others. *Military Men*, may admire *Courage* more than other Virtues; Persons of *smaller Courage*, may admire *Sweetness of Temper*; Men of *Thought and Reflection*, who have more extensive Views, will admire the *like Qualitys* in others; Men of *keen Passions*, expect equal Returns of all the kind Affections, and are wonderfully charm'd by *Compliance*: the *Proud*, may like those of *higher Spirit*, as more suitable to their Dignity; tho' *Pride*, join'd with *Reflection* and *good Sense*, will recommend to them *Humility* in the Person below'd. Now as the *various Tempers* of Men make *various Tempers* of others agreeable to them, so they must differ in their *Relishes* of *Beauty*, according as it denotes the several *Qualitys* most agreeable to themselves.

THIS may also shew us, how in *virtuous Love* there may be the greatest Beauty, without the least Charm to engage a Rival. *Love* it self gives a Beauty to the *Lover*, in the Eyes of the Person *below'd*, which no other Mortal is much affected with. And this perhaps is the *strongest Charm* possible, and that which will have the greatest Power, where there is not some very great Counter-balance from *worldly Interest*, *Vice*, or *gross Deformity*.

IV. THIS



## Sect. 6.

*Air, Motion, Gestures.*

IV. THIS same Consideration may be extended to the whole AIR and MOTION of any Person. Every thing we count agreeable, some way denotes *Chearfulness*, *Ease*, a *Condescension*, and *Readiness* to oblige, a *Love of Company*, with a *Freedom* and *Boldness* which always accompanys an *honest, undesigning Heart*. On the contrary, what is shocking in *Air*, or *Motion*, is *Roughness*, *Ill-nature*, a *Disregard* to others, or a *foolish Shame-facedness*, which evidences a Person to be unexperienc'd in Society, or Offices of Humanity.

WITH relation to these *Airs*, *Motions*, *Gestures*, we may observe, that considering the different *Ceremonys*, and *Modes* of shewing respect, which are practis'd in different Nations, we may indeed probably conclude that there is no *natural* Connexion between any of these *Gestures*, or *Motions*, and the *Affections* of *Mind* which they are by *Custom* made to express. But when *Custom* has made any of them pass for Expressions of *such Affections*, by a constant *Association* of Ideas, some shall become agreeable and lovely, and others *extremely offensive*, altho they were both, in their own Nature, *perfectly indifferent*.

V. HERE

V. HERE we may remark the manner in which NATURE leads *Mankind* to the Continuance of their Race, and by its strongest Power engages them to what occasions the greatest Toil and Anxiety of Life; and yet supports them under it with an inexpressible delight. We might have been excited to the Propagation of our Species, by such an uneasy Sensation as would have effectually determin'd us to it, without any great prospect of Happiness; as we see *Hunger* and *Thirst* determine us to preserve our Bodys, tho' few look upon eating and drinking as any considerable Happiness. The *Sexes* might have been engag'd to Concurrence, as we imagine the *Brutes* are, by *Desire* only, or by a *Love* of *sensual Pleasure*. But how dull and insipid had Life been, were there no more in MARRIAGE? Who would have had Resolution enough to bear all the Cares of a *Family*, and Education of *Children*? Or who, from the general Motive of *Benevolence* alone, would have chosen to subject himself to *natural Affection* toward an *Offspring*, when he could so easily foresee what Troubles it might occasion?

THIS Inclination therefore of the *Sexes*, is founded on something stronger, and more efficacious and joyful, than the Sollicitations of *Uneasiness*, or the bare *desire* of

*Sect. 6. sensible Pleasure.* BEAUTY gives a favourable Presumption of good *moral Dispositions*, and *Acquaintance* confirms this into a real *Love of Esteem*, or begets it, where there is little *Beauty*. This raises an expectation of the greatest *moral Pleasures* along with the *sensible*, and a thousand tender Sentiments of *Humanity* and *Generosity*; and makes us impatient for a *Society* which we imagine big with unspeakable *moral Pleasures*: where nothing is indifferent, and every trifling Service, being an Evidence of *this strong Love of Esteem*, is mutually receiv'd with the Rapture and Gratitude of the greatest Benefit, and of the most substantial Obligation. And where *Prudence* and *Good-nature* influence both sides, this *Society* may answer all their Expectations.

NAY, let us examine those of looser Conduct with relation to the *fair Sex*, and we shall find, that *Love of sensible Pleasure* is not the chief Motive of *Debauchery*, or *false Gallantry*. Were it so, the *meanest Prostitutes* would please as much as any. But we know sufficiently, that Men are fond of *Good-nature, Faith, Pleasantry of Temper, Wit*, and many other *moral Qualitys*, even in a *Mistress*. And this may furnish us with a Reason for what appears pretty unaccountable, *viz.* "That *Chastity* it self has a powerful Charm in  
 " the

“ the Eyes of the *Dissolute*, even when Sect. 6.  
 “ they are attempting to destroy it.”

THIS powerful Determination even to a *limited Benevolence*, and other *moral Sentiments*, is observ'd to give a strong bias to our Minds toward a *universal Goodness, Tendernefs, Humanity, Generosity*, and *Contempt of private Good* in our whole Conduct; besides the obvious Improvement it occasions in our *external Deportment*, and in our relish of *Beauty, Order, and Harmony*. As soon as a Heart, before *hard and obdurate*, is soften'd in this Flame, we shall observe, arising along with it, a Love of *Poetry, Musick, the Beauty of Nature* in rural Scenes, a *Contempt* of other selfish Pleasures of the *external Senses*, a *neat Dress*, a *humane Deportment*, a *Delight* in and *Emulation* of every thing which is *gallant, generous and friendly*.

IN the same manner we are determin'd to common Friendships and Acquaintances, not by the fullen Apprehensions of our *Necessitys*, or Prospects of *Interest*; but by an incredible variety of little agreeable, engaging Evidences of *Love, Good-nature*, and other *morally amiable Qualitys* in those we converse with. And among the rest, none of the least considerable is an Inclination to *Chearfulness*, a *Delight* to raise *Mirth* in others, which procures a secret

Society,  
 Friend-  
 ships, from  
 our Moral  
 Sense.

S

Ap-



Sect. 6. Approbation and Gratitude toward the Person who puts us in such an *agreeable, innocent, good-natur'd, and easy state* of Mind, as we are conscious of while we enjoy pleasant Conversation, enliven'd by *moderate Laughter*.


*The Power of Oratory founded on it.*

VI. UPON this *moral* Sense is founded all the Power of the ORATOR. The various Figures of Speech, are the several Manners which a lively Genius, warm'd with Passions suitable to the Occasion, naturally runs into, only a little diversify'd by *Custom*: and they only move the *Hearers*, by giving a lively Representation of the Passions of the *Speaker*; which are communicated to the *Hearers*, as we \* observ'd above of one Passion, *viz. Pity*.

Now the Passions which the *Orator* attempts to raise, are all founded on *moral Qualityts*. All the bold *Metaphors*, or *Descriptions*, all the artificial Manners of *Expostulation*, *Arguing*, and *addressing* the *Audience*, all the *Appeals* to *Mankind*, are but more lively Methods of giving the *Audience* a stronger impression of the *moral Qualityts* of the Person *accus'd*, or *defended*; of the *Action advis'd*, or *dissuaded*: And all the *Antitheses*, or *Witticisms*; all the *Cadences* of sonorous Periods, whatever

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\* See Sect. v. Art. 8. Par. 2.

inferior kind of Beauty they may have sepa- Sect. 6.  
 rately, are of no consequence to persuade,   
 if we neglect moving the Passions by some  
 Species of *Morality*. They may perhaps  
 raise a little Admiration of the *Speaker*, a-  
 mong those who already favour his Party,  
 but they oftner raise Contempt in his *Ad-*  
*versarys*. But when you display the *Be-*  
*neficence* of any Action, the *good Effect*  
 it shall have on the *Publick* in promoting  
 the Welfare of the *Innocent*, and relieving  
 the *unjustly distressed*; if you prove your  
 Allegations, you make every Mortal ap-  
 prove the undertaking it. When any Per-  
 son is to be *recommended*, display his *Hu-*  
*manity*, *Generosity*, *Study* of the *publick*  
*Good*, and *Capacity* to promote it, his  
*Contempt* of Dangers, and private Pleasures;  
 and you are sure to procure him *Love* and  
*Esteem*. If at the same time you shew his  
*Distress*, or the *Injurys* he has suffer'd,  
 you raise *Pity*, and every *tender Affec-*  
*tion*.

ON the contrary, represent the *Bar-*  
*barity*, or *Cruelty* of any Action, the  
*Misery* it shall procure to the *Kind*, the  
*Faithful*, the *Generous*, or only to the  
*Innocent*; and you raise an Abhorrence of  
 it in the Breasts of the *Audience*, tho they  
 were not the Persons who would have suf-  
 fer'd by it. The same way, would you  
 make a Person *infamous*, and *despis'd* and  
 hated,

Sect. 6. *hated*, represent him as *cruel*, *inhuman*,  
 or *treacherous* toward the most distant ra-  
 tional Agents; or shew him only to be  
*selfish*, and given to *solitary Luxury*, with-  
 out regard to any *Friend*, or the *Interest*  
 of others; and you have gain'd your Point  
 as soon as you prove what you alledge.  
 Nay, how does it stop our Admiration  
 of any *celebrated Action*, to suggest,  
 "That the *Author* of it was no *Fool*;  
 "he knew it would turn to his own *Ad-*  
 "vantage?"

Now, are the *Learned* and *Polite* the  
 only Persons who are mov'd by such  
 Speeches? Must Men know the Schemes  
 of the *Moralists* and *Politicians*, or the  
*Art of Rhetorick*, to be capable of being  
 persuaded? Must they be nicely conversant  
 in all the Methods of promoting *Self-Inter-*  
*est*? Nay, do we not see on the contrary,  
 the *rude undisciplin'd Multitude* most af-  
 fected? Where had *Oratory* so much Pow-  
 er as in *popular States*, and that too be-  
 fore the Perfection of the Sciences? *Re-*  
*flexion*, and *Study*, may raise in Men a  
 Suspicion of Design, and Caution of Assent,  
 when they have some knowledge of the  
 various Topicks of Argument, and find  
 them employ'd upon themselves: but *rude*  
*Nature* is still open to every *moral Im-*  
*pression*, and carry'd furiously along with-  
 out Caution, or Suspense. It was not the  
 Groves

*Groves* of the *Academy*, or the *polish'd* Sect. 6.  
*Stones* of the *Portico*, or the *manag'd* ~~~~~  
*Horses* of GREECE, which listen'd to the  
Harp of an AMPHION, or an ORPHEUS;  
but the *Trees*, and *Rocks*, and *Tygers* of  
the *Forest*: which may shew us, " That  
" there is some *Sense* of *Morality* antece-  
" dent to Instruction, or metaphysical Ar-  
" guments proving the *private Interest* of  
" the Person who is persuaded, to be con-  
" nected with the *publick Good*."

VII. WE shall find this *Sense* to be the *Poetry*  
Foundation also of the chief Pleasures *pleases*  
of POETRY. We hinted, in the former *from this*  
Treatise, at the Foundation of Delight *Moral*  
in the *Numbers*, *Measures*, *Metaphors*, *Sense*,  
*Similitudes* \*. But as the Contemplation  
of *moral Objects*; either of *Vice* or *Vir-*  
*tue*, affects us more strongly, and moves  
our Passions in a quite different and more  
powerful manner, than *natural Beauty*, or  
(what we commonly call) *Deformity*; so  
the most moving Beautys bear a Relation  
to our *moral Sense*, and affect us more ve-  
hemently, than the Representation of *na-*  
*tural Objects* in the liveliest Descriptions.  
*Dramatic*, and *Epic* Poetry, are entirely  
address'd to this *Sense*, and raise our Pas-  
sions by the Fortunes of *Characters*, dis-  
tinctly represented as *morally good*, or

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\* See Treatise I, Sect. ii. Art. 13. Sect. iv. Art. 3.



Sect. 6. *evil*; as might be seen more fully, were we to consider the Passions separately.

WHERE we are studying to raise any *Desire*, or *Admiration* of an Object *really beautiful*, we are not content with a *bare Narration*, but endeavour, if we can, to present the *Object* it self, or the most *lively Image* of it. And hence the *Epic Poem*, or *Tragedy*, gives a vastly greater Pleasure than the Writings of *Philosophers*, tho both aim at recommending *Virtue*. The representing the Actions themselves, if the Representation be *judicious*, *natural*, and *lively*, will make us admire the *Good*, and detest the *Vicious*, the *Inhuman*, the *Treacherous* and *Cruel*, by means of our *moral Sense*, without any Reflections of the *Poet* to guide our Sentiments. It is for this Reason that HORACE has justly made Knowledge in *Morals* so necessary to a good *Poet*:


*Scribendi recte SAPERE est & principium & fons \**.

And again:

*Qui didicit Patriæ quid debeat, & quid Amicis,*

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\* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 309.

*Quo sit amore Parens, quo Frater aman-* Sect. 6.  
*das, & Hospes,* 

*Quod sit Conscripti, quod Judicis offi-*  
*cium, quæ*

*Partes in bellum missi Ducis ; ille pro-*  
*fecto*

*Reddere Personæ scit convenientia cui-*  
*que †.*

UPON this same Sense is founded the Imagery in Poetry founded on the Moral Sense.  
 Power of that great Beauty in Poetry, the PROSOPOPOEIA, by which every Affection is made a Person ; every natural Event, Cause, Object, is animated by moral Epithets. For we join the Contemplation of moral Circumstances and Qualitys, along with natural Objects, to increase their Beauty or Deformity ; and we affect the Hearer in a more lively manner with the Affections describ'd, by representing them as Persons. Thus a shady Wood must have its solemn venerable Genius, and proper rural Gods ; every clear Fountain, its sacred chaste Nymph ; and River, its bountiful God, with his Urn, and perhaps a Cornucopia diffusing Plenty and Fruitfulness along its Banks. The Day-light is holy, benign, and powerful to banish the pernicious Spirits of the Night. The Morning is a kind, officious Goddess, tripping over the dewy Mountains, and ushering

† Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 312, &c.

Sect. 6. in Light to Gods and Men. War is an *impetuous, cruel, undistinguishing Monster*, whom no *Virtue*, no Circumstance of *Compassion*, can move from his bloody Purposes. The Steel is *unrelenting*; the Arrow and Spear are *impatient* to destroy, and carry *Death* on their Points. Our modern Engines of War are also *frightful Personages*, counterfeiting with their rude Throats the Thunder of Jove. The *moral Imagery* of *Death* is every where known, *viz.* his *Insensibility to Pity*, his *Inflexibility*, and *universal impartial Empire*. FORTUNE is inimitably drawn by HORACE \*, with all her *Retinue* and *Votaries*, and with her *rigid severe Minister, Necessity*. The *Qualitys of Mind* too become *Persons*. Love becomes a VENUS, or a CUPID; *Courage*, or *Conduct*, a MARS, or a PALLAS *protecting and assisting* the Hero; before them march *Terror and Dread, Flight and Pursuit, Shouts, and Amazement*. Nay, the *most sacred Poets* are often led into this *Imagery*, and represent *Justice and Judgment* as *supporting* the ALMIGHTY's Throne, and *Mercy and Truth* going before his Face: They shew us *Peace* as *springing up* from the Earth, and *Mercy* looking down from Heaven.

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\* See Lib. 1. Od. 35.

EVERY one perceives a greater Beauty in this manner of Representation, this Imagery, this Conjunction of *moral Ideas*, than in the fullest Narration, or the most lively natural Description. When one reads the fourth Book of HOMER, and is prepar'd, from the Council of the Gods, to imagine the bloody Sequel, and amidst the most beautiful Description which ever was imagin'd of *shooting* an Arrow, meets with its *moral Epithet*,

— *μῆλαιαν ἔμ' ὀδυράν* \*,

— *The Source of blackest Woes* ;

he will find himself more mov'd by this Circumstance, than by all the Profusion of natural Description which Man could imagine.

VIII. HISTORY derives its chief Excellence from the representing the *Manners* and *Characters* ; the Contemplation of which in *Nature* being very affecting, they must necessarily give Pleasure when well related. History.

IX. It is well known too, that a Collection of the best Pieces of *Face-painting* is but a poor Entertainment, when compar'd with those Pieces which represent *moral Actions*, *Passions*, and *Characters*. Painting.

\* See Homer, *Iliad* 4. v. 117.





## S E C T. VII.

*A Deduction of some Complex moral Ideas, viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External, Alienable, and Unalienable, from this moral Sense.*

I. **T**O conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been said, see the true Original of moral Ideas, viz. This moral Sense of Excellence in every Appearance, or Evidence of Benevolence. It remains to be explain'd, how we acquire more particular Ideas of Virtue and Vice, abstracting from any Law, Human, or Divine.

*Obligation.* IF any one ask, Can we have any Sense of OBLIGATION, abstracting from the Laws of a Superior? We must answer according to the various Senses of the word Obligation. If by Obligation we understand a Determination, without regard to our own Interest, to approve Actions, and to perform them; which Determination shall also make us displeas'd with our selves, and uneasy upon having acted contrary to it; in this meaning of the word Obligation, there

there is *naturally* an *Obligation* upon all Men Sect. 7.  
 to *Benevolence*; and they are still under its  
 Influence, even when by false, or partial Opi-  
 nions of the natural Tendency of their Ac-  
 tions, this *moral Sense* leads them to *Evil*;  
 unless by long inveterate Habits it be ex-  
 ceedingly weaken'd. For it scarce seems pos-  
 sible wholly to extinguish it. Or, which is  
 to the same purpose, this *internal Sense*,  
 and *Instinct* toward *Benevolence*, will ei-  
 ther influence our Actions, or else make us  
 very uneasy and dissatisfy'd; and we shall  
 be conscious that we are in a base unhappy  
 State, even without considering any *Law*  
 whatsoever, or any external Advantages  
 lost, or Disadvantages impending from its  
 Sanctions. And further, there are still  
 such Indications given us of what is in the  
 whole *benevolent*, and what not; as may  
 probably discover to us the true Tendency  
 of every Action, and let us see, some time  
 or other, the evil Tendency of what upon  
 a partial View appear'd *benevolent*: or if  
 we have no Friends so faithful as to admo-  
 nish us, the Persons injur'd will not fail to  
 upbraid us. So that no Mortal can secure  
 to himself a perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction,  
 and Self-approbation, but by a *serious In-*  
*quiry* into the Tendency of his Actions,  
 and a *perpetual Study* of *universal Good*,  
 according to the justest Notions of it.

But

Sect. 7.  
~

BUT if by *Obligation*, we understand a *Motive from Self-interest*, sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own Advantage wisely, to a certain Course of *Actions*; we may have a Sense of such an *Obligation*, by reflecting on this *Determination* of our *Nature* to approve *Virtue*, to be pleas'd and happy when we reflect upon our having done *virtuous Actions*, and to be uneasy when we are conscious of having acted otherwise; and also by considering how much superior we esteem the Happiness of *Virtue* to any other Enjoyment\*. We may likewise have a Sense of this sort of *Obligation*, by considering those Reasons which prove a constant Cause of *benevolent* and *social Actions*, to be the most probable means of promoting the *natural Good* of every *Individual*; as CUMBERLAND and PUFFENDORF have prov'd: And all this without Relation to a *Law*.

BUT further, if our *moral Sense* be suppos'd exceedingly weaken'd, and the *selfish Passions* grown strong, either thro some general Corruption of *Nature*, or inveterate Habits; if our *Understanding* be weak, and we be often in danger of being hurry'd by our *Passions* into precipitate and rash

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\* See above, *Sect. vi. Art. 1, 2.*

Judgments, that *malicious Actions* shall Sect. 7.  
 promote our Advantage more than *Bene-*  
*ficence*; in such a Case, if it be inquir'd  
 what is necessary to engage Men to *bene-*  
*ficent Actions*, or induce a steady Sense of  
 an *Obligation* to act for the *publick Good*;  
 then, no doubt, "A *Law* with Sanctions,  
 " given by a *superior Being*, of sufficient  
 " Power to make us happy or miserable,  
 " must be necessary to counter-balance  
 " those apparent Motives of *Interest*, to  
 " calm our *Passions*, and give room for  
 " the recovery of our *moral Sense*, or at  
 " least for a just View of our *Interest*."

II. Now the principal Business of the *moral Philosopher* is to shew, from solid How far  
 Virtue can  
 be taught.  
 Reasons, "That *universal Benevolence*  
 " tends to the Happiness of the *Benevo-*  
 " *lent*, either from the Pleasures of *Re-*  
 " *flection*, *Honour*, *natural Tendency* to  
 " engage the good Offices of Men, upon  
 " whose Aid we must depend for our *Hap-*  
 " *piness* in this World; or from the Sanc-  
 " tions of *divine Laws* discover'd to us  
 " by the Constitution of the *Universe*;  
 that so no apparent Views of *Interest* may  
 counteract this *natural Inclination*: but  
 not to attempt proving, "That Prospects  
 " of our *own Advantage* of any kind, can  
 " raise in us *real Love* to others." Let the  
 Obstacles from *Self-love* be only remov'd,  
 and NATURE it self will incline us to *Be-*  
*nevolence*.



Sect. 7. *nevolence.* Let the Misery of *excessive Selfishness*, and all its Passions, be but once explain'd, that so *Self-love* may cease to counteract our *natural Propensity* to *Benevolence*, and when this *noble Disposition* gets loose from these Bonds of *Ignorance*, and false Views of *Interest*, it shall be assisted even by *Self-love*, and grow strong enough to make a *noble virtuous Character*. Then he is to enquire, by *Reflection* upon human Affairs, what Course of Action does most effectually promote the *universal Good*, what universal Rules or Maxims are to be observ'd, and in what Circumstances the Reason of them alters, so as to admit Exceptions; that so our *good Inclinations* may be directed by *Reason*, and a *just Knowledge* of the *Interests* of *Mankind*. But *Virtue* it self, or *good Dispositions* of *Mind*, are not directly taught, or produc'd by *Instruction*; they must be originally implanted in our Nature, by its *great AUTHOR*; and afterwards strengthen'd and confirm'd by our own Cultivation.

Objection.

III. WE are often told, " That there  
 " is no need of supposing such a *Sense*  
 " of *Morality* given to Men, since *Re-*  
 " *flection*, and *Instruction* would recom-  
 " mend the same Actions from Arguments  
 " of *Self-Interest*, and engage us, from  
 " the acknowledg'd Principle of *Self-love*,  
 " to

“ to the Practice of them, without this Sect. 7.  
 “ *unintelligible Determination to Bene-*  
 “ *volence, or the occult Quality of a mo-*  
 “ *ral Sense.*”

IT is perhaps true, that *Reflection* and *Moral Reason* might lead us to approve the same *Sense, not from Re-*  
*Actions as advantageous.* But would not *fection.*  
 the same *Reflection* and *Reason* likewise, generally recommend the same *Meats* to us which our *Taste* represents as pleasant? And shall we thence conclude that we have no *Sense* of *Tasting*? Or that such a *Sense* is *useless*? No: The use is plain in both Cases. Notwithstanding the mighty *Reason* we boast of above other Animals, its Processes are too slow, too full of doubt and hesitation, to serve us in every Exigency, either for our own Preservation, without the *external Senses*, or to direct our Actions for the *Good* of the *Whole*, without this *moral Sense*. Nor could we be so strongly determin'd at all times to what is most conducive to either of these Ends, without these *expeditious Monitors*, and *importunate Sollicitors*; nor so nobly rewarded, when we act vigorously in pursuit of these Ends, by the calm dull Reflections of *Self-Interest*, as by those delightful Sensations.

THIS *natural Determination* to approve and admire, or hate and dislike Actions, is no doubt an *occult Quality*. But  
 2 is

Sect. 7. is it any way more mysterious that the Idea  
 of an Action should raise *Esteem*, or *Con-*  
*tempt*, than that the motion, or tearing of  
 Flesh should give *Pleasure*, or *Pain*; or  
 the Act of Volition should move *Flesh* and  
*Bones*? In the latter Case, we have got  
 the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal  
 Spirits, and elastic Fluids, like the *Indian's*  
*Elephant*, and *Tortoise*, to bear the Burden  
 of the Difficulty: but go one step further,  
 and you find the whole as difficult as at  
 first, and equally a Mystery with *this De-*  
*termination* to love and approve, or hate  
 and despise *Actions* and *Agents*, without  
 any Views of *Interest*, as they appear *be-*  
*nevolent*, or the contrary.

WHEN they offer it as a Presumption  
 that there can be no such *Sense*, antecedent  
 to all Prospect of *Interest*, " That these  
 " Actions for the most part are really *ad-*  
 " *vantageous*, one way or other, to the  
 " *Actor*, the *Approver*, or *Mankind* in  
 " general, by whose Happiness our own  
 " State may be some way made better ;"  
 may we not ask, supposing the DEITY in-  
 tended to impress such a *Sense* of something  
*amiable* in Actions, (which is no impossible  
 Supposition) what sort of Actions would  
 a good GOD determine us to *approve*?  
 Must we deny the possibility of such a  
 Determination, if it did not lead us to ad-  
 mire Actions of no *Advantage* to *Man-*  
*kind*,



kind, or to love *Agents* for their being eminent *Triflers*? If then the Actions which a wise and good GOD must determine us to approve, if he give us any such *Sense* at all, must be Actions *useful* to the *Publick*, this *Advantage* can never be a Reason against the *Sense* it self. After the same manner, we should deny all *Revelation* which taught us good *Sense*, *Humanity*, *Justice*, and a *rational Worship*, because *Reason* and *Interest* confirm and recommend such *Principles*, and *Services*; and should greedily embrace every *Contradiction*, *Foppery*, and *Pageantry*, as a truly *divine Institution*, without any thing *humane*, or *useful* to *Mankind*.

IV. THE Writers upon opposite Schemes, who deduce all Ideas of Good and Evil from the *private Advantage* of the Actor, or from Relation to a *Law* and its *Sanctions*, either known from *Reason*, or *Revelation*, are perpetually recurring to this *moral Sense* which they deny; not only in calling the *Laws* of the DEITY just and good, and alledging *Justice* and *Right* in the DEITY to govern us; but by using a set of Words which import something different from what they will allow to be their only meaning. *Obligation*, with them, is only such a *Constitution*, either of *Nature*, or some governing *Power*, as makes it advantageous for the Agent to

Moral  
Sense judges  
of Laws.

T

act



*Sect. 7.* *act in a certain manner.* Let this Definition be substituted, wherever we meet with the words, *ought*, *should*, *must*, in a moral Sense, and many of their Sentences would seem very strange; as that the DEITY *must* act rationally, *must* not, or *ought* not to punish the Innocent, *must* make the state of the *Virtuous* better than that of the *Wicked*, *must* observe Promises; substituting the Definition of the Words, *must*, *ought*, *should*, would make these Sentences either ridiculous, or very disputable.

V. But that our first Ideas of *moral Good* depend not on *Laws*, may plainly appear from our constant Inquiries into the *Justice* of *Laws themselves*; and that not only of *human Laws*, but of the *divine*. What else can be the meaning of that universal Opinion, "That the *Laws* of GOD "are *just*, and *holy*, and *good*?" *Human Laws* may be call'd *good*, because of their Conformity to the *Divine*. But to call the *Laws* of the *supreme DEITY* *good*, or, *holy*, or *just*, if all *Goodness*, *Holiness*, and *Justice* be constituted by *Laws*, or the *Will* of a *Superior* any way reveal'd, must be an insignificant Tautology, amounting to no more than this, "That "GOD *wills* what he *wills*."

It must then first be suppos'd, that there is something in Actions which is apprehended

ed *absolutely good*; and this is *Benevolence*, or a Tendency to the *publick natural Happiness* of *rational Agents*; and that our *moral Sense* perceives this *Excellence*: and then we call the *Laws* of the DEITY *good*, when we imagine that they are contriv'd to promote the *publick Good* in the most effectual and impartial manner. And the DEITY is call'd *good*, in a *moral Sense*, when we apprehend that his *whole Providence* tends to the universal Happiness of his *Creatures*; whence we conclude his *Benevolence*, and *Delight* in their Happiness.

SOME tell us, " That the *Goodness* of the *divine Laws*, consists in their Conformity to some *essential Rectitude* of his *Nature*." But they must excuse us from assenting to this, till they make us understand the meaning of this Metaphor, *essential Rectitude*, and till we discern whether any thing more is meant by it than a *perfectly wise, uniform, impartial Benevolence*.

HENCE we may see the Difference between *Constraint*, and *Obligation*. There is indeed no Difference between *Constraint*, and the second Sense of the word *Obligation*, viz. a *Constitution which makes an Action eligible from Self-Interest*, if we only mean *external Interest*, distinct from

Difference  
between  
Constraints  
and Obligation.

Sect. 7. the delightful Consciousness which arises from the *moral Sense*. The Reader need scarcely be told, that by *Constraint*, we do not understand an *external Force* moving our Limbs without our Consent, for in that Case we are not *Agents* at all ; but that *Constraint* which arises from the threatening and presenting some *Evil*, in order to make us act in a certain manner. And yet there seems a universally acknowledg'd Difference between even this sort of *Constraint*, and *Obligation*. We never say we are *oblig'd* to do an Action which we count base, but we may be *constrain'd* to it ; we never say that the *divine Laws*, by their Sanctions, *constrain* us, but *oblige* us ; nor do we call Obedience to the DEITY *Constraint*, unless by a Metaphor, tho many own they are influenc'd by fear of Punishments. And yet supposing an *almighty evil Being* should require, under grievous Penalties, *Treachery, Cruelty, Ingratitude*, we would call this *Constraint*. The difference is plainly this. When any Sanctions co-operate with our *moral Sense*, in exciting us to Actions which we count *morally good*, we say we are *oblig'd* ; but when Sanctions of Rewards or Punishments oppose our *moral Sense*, then we say we are *brib'd* or *constrain'd*. In the former Case we call the *Lawgiver good*, as designing the *publick Happiness* ; in the latter we call him *evil*, or *unjust*, for the suppos'd contrary

In-



## MORAL GOOD and EVIL. 277

Intention. But were all our Ideas of *moral* Sect. 7.  
*Good or Evil*, deriv'd solely from Opinions  
 of *private Advantage* or *Loss* in Actions,  
 I see no possible difference which could be  
 made in the meaning of these words.

VI. FROM this Sense too we derive our *Rights*.  
 Ideas of RIGHTS. Whenever it appears  
 to us, that a *Faculty of doing, demand-*  
*ing, or possessing any thing, universally al-*  
*low'd in certain Circumstances, would in*  
*the whole tend to the general Good*, we say  
 that any Person in such Circumstances, has  
 a *Right to do, possess, or demand that*  
*Thing*. And according as this Tendency  
 to the *publick Good* is *greater or less*, the  
*Right* is *greater or less*.

THE *Rights* call'd *perfect*, are of such *Perfect*  
*necessity to the publick Good, that the uni-* *Rights*  
*versal Violation of them would make hu-*  
*man Life intolerable*; and it actually makes  
 those miserable, whose *Rights* are thus *vi-*  
*olated*. On the contrary, to fulfil these  
*Rights* in every Instance, tends to the  
*publick Good*, either *directly*, or by pro-  
 moting the innocent Advantage of a *Part*.  
 Hence it plainly follows, " That to allow  
 " a violent Defence, or Prosecution of such  
 " *Rights*, before Civil Government be con-  
 " stituted, cannot in any particular Case be  
 " more detrimental to the *Publick*, than  
 " the Violation of them with Impunity."



Sect. 7. And as to the general Consequences, the universal Use of Force in a *State of Nature*, in pursuance of *perfect Rights*, seems exceedingly *advantageous* to the *Whole*, by making every one dread any Attempts against the *perfect Rights* of others.

Right of  
War, and  
Punish-  
ment.

THIS is the *moral Effect* which attends *proper Injury*, or a *Violation of the perfect Rights of others*, viz. A *Right to War*, and all *Violence* which is necessary to oblige the *Injurious* to repair the *Damage*, and give *Security* against such *Offences* for the future. This is the sole *Foundation* of the *Rights of punishing Criminals*, and of *violent Prosecutions* of our *Rights*, in a *State of Nature*. And these *Rights*, belonging originally to the *Persons injur'd*, or their *voluntary*, or *invited Assistants*, according to the *Judgment* of indifferent *Arbitrators*, in a *State of Nature*, being by the *Consent* of the *Persons injur'd*, transferr'd to the *Magistrate* in a *Civil State*, are the true *Foundation* of his *Right of Punishment*. Instances of *perfect Rights* are those to our *Lives*; to the *Fruits* of our *Labours*; to demand *Performance of Contracts* upon valuable *Considerations*, from Men capable of performing them; to *direct* our own *Actions* either for *publick*, or *innocent private Good*, before we have submitted them to the *Direction* of others in any *measure*; and many others of like nature.

IMPER-

IMPERFECT *Rights* are such as, when universally violated, would not necessarily make Men miserable. These *Rights* tend to the improvement and increase of positive Good in any Society, but are not absolutely necessary to prevent universal Misery. The Violation of them, only disappoints Men of the Happiness expected from the Humanity or Gratitude of others; but does not deprive Men of any Good which they had before. From this Description it appears, "That a violent Prosecution of such *Rights*, would generally occasion greater *Evil* than the Violation of them." Besides, the allowing of Force in such Cases, would deprive Men of the greatest Pleasure in Actions of Kindness, Humanity, Gratitude; which would cease to appear amiable, when Men could be constrain'd to perform them. Instances of imperfect *Rights* are those which the Poor have to the Charity of the Wealthy; which all Men have to Offices of no trouble or expence to the Performer; which Benefactors have to returns of Gratitude, and such like.

Imperfect  
Rights.

THE Violation of imperfect *Rights*, only argues a Man to have such weak Benevolence, as not to study advancing the positive Good of others, when in the least opposite to his own: but the Violation of per-

Sect. 7. *fect Rights*, argues the *injurious Person* to be *positively evil* or *cruel*; or at least so *immoderately selfish*, as to be *indifferent* about the *positive Misery* and *Ruin* of others, when he imagines he can find his *Interest* in it. In violating the *former*, we shew a weak Desire of *publick Happiness*, which every small View of *private Interest* over-ballances; but in violating the *latter*, we shew our selves so entirely negligent of the *Misery* of others, that Views of increasing our own *Good*, overcome all our *Compassion* toward their *Sufferings*. Now as the absence of *Good*, is more easily born than the presence of *Misery*; so our *good Wishes* toward the *positive Good* of others, are weaker than our *Compassion* toward their *Misery*. He then who violates *imperfect Rights*, shews that his *Self-love* overcomes only the Desire of *positive Good* to others; but he who violates *perfect Rights*, betrays such a *selfish* Desire of advancing his own *positive Good*, as overcomes all *Compassion* toward the *Misery* of others.

*External Rights,*

BESIDE these two sorts of *Rights*, there is a third call'd *External*; as when the doing, possessing, or demanding of any thing is really detrimental to the *Publick* in any particular Instance, as being contrary to the *imperfect Right* of another; but yet the universally denying Men this Faculty of



## MORAL GOOD and EVIL. 281

of doing, possessing, or demanding that Sect. 7.  
*Thing, or of using Force in pursuance of*  
*it, would do more mischief than all the*  
*Evils to be fear'd from the Use of this*  
*Faculty.* And hence it appears, " That  
 " there can be no Right to use Force in  
 " opposition even to *external Rights*, since  
 " it tends to the *universal Good* to allow  
 " Force in pursuance of them."

CIVIL Societys substitute *Actions in*  
*Law*, instead of the Force allow'd in the  
*State of Nature.*

INSTANCES of *external Rights* are  
 these ; that of a *wealthy Miser* to recal his  
 Loan from the most industrious poor Trade-  
 man at any time ; that of demanding the  
 Performance of a *Covenant* too burdensom  
 on one side ; the Right of a *wealthy Heir*  
 to refuse Payment of any Debts which  
 were contracted by him under Age, with-  
 out Fraud in the Lender ; the Right of  
 taking advantage of a *positive Law*, con-  
 trary to what was *Equity* antecedent to  
 that Law ; as when a *register'd Deed*  
 takes place of one not register'd, altho  
 prior to it, and known to be so before the  
 second Contract.

Now whereas no *Action, Demand, or* *What*  
*Possession*, can at once be either necessary to *Rights,*  
 the *publick Good*, or conducive to it, and *can be*  
 at *opposite.*




Sect. 7. at the same time its *contrary* be either necessary or conducive to the same end; it follows, "That there can be no Opposition of *perfect Rights* among themselves, " of *imperfect* among themselves, or between *perfect* and *imperfect Rights*." But it may often tend to the *publick Good*, to allow a *Right* of *doing, possessing, or demanding*, and of using *Force* in pursuance of it, while perhaps it would have been more *humane* and *kind* in any Person to have acted otherwise, and not have claim'd his *Right*. But yet a violent Opposition to *these Rights*, would have been vastly more *pernicious* than all the Inhumanity in the use of them. And therefore, tho *external Rights* cannot be opposite among themselves; yet they may be opposite to *imperfect Rights*; but *imperfect Rights*, tho violated, give no *Right* to *Force*. Hence it appears, "That there can never " be a *Right* to *Force* on both Sides, or a " just *War* on both Sides at the same " time."

*Rights*  
*alienable,*  
*and un-*  
*alienable.*

VII. THERE is another important Difference of *Rights*, according as they are *Alienable*, or *Unalienable*. To determine what *Rights* are *alienable*, and what not, we must take these two Marks:

1<sup>st</sup>. If the Alienation be within our natural Power, so that it be possible for us in Fact

Fact to transfer our *Right* ; and if it be so, Sect. 7.  
then, 

2dly. It must appear, that to transfer such *Rights* may serve some valuable Purpose.

By the *first* Mark it appears, " That the "*Right of private Judgment, or of our inward Sentiments, is unalienable;*" since we cannot command ourselves to think what either we our selves, or any other Person pleases. So are also our *internal Affections*, which necessarily arise according to our Opinions of their Objects. By the *second* Mark it appears, " That our *Right of serving God, in the manner which we think acceptable, is not alienable;*" because it can never serve any valuable purpose, to make Men worship him in a way which seems to them displeasing to him. The same way, a *direct Right* over our *Lives* or *Limbs*, is not *alienable* to any Person ; so that he might at Pleasure put us to death, or maim us. We have indeed a *Right* to hazard our Lives in any good Action which is of importance to *the Publick* ; and it may often serve a most valuable end, to subject the direction of such perilous Actions to the Prudence of others in pursuing a *publick Good* ; as *Soldiers* do to their *General*, or to a *Council of War* : and so far this *Right* is *alienable*. These may serve as  
In-

*Sect. 7.* Instances to shew the Use of the two Marks of *alienable Rights*, which must both concur to make them so, and will explain the manner of applying them in other Cases.

*The Foundation of Property.*

VIII. THAT we may see the Foundation of some of the more *important Rights* of *Mankind*, let us observe, that probably nine Tenths, at least, of the things which are useful to Mankind, are owing to their *Labour* and *Industry*; and consequently, when once Men become so numerous, that the *natural Product* of the Earth is not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure; a necessity arises, for the support of the increasing *System*, that such a *Tenour* of Conduct be observ'd, as shall most effectually promote *Industry*; and that Men abstain from all Actions which would have the contrary effect. It is well known, that *general Benevolence* alone, is not a Motive strong enough to *Industry*, to bear *Labour* and *Toil*, and many other Difficultys which we are averse to from *Self-love*. For the strengthening therefore our Motives to *Industry*, we have the strongest Attractions of *Blood*, of *Friendship*, of *Gratitude*, and the additional Motives of *Honour*, and even of *external Interest*. *Self-love* is really as necessary to the *Good* of the *Whole*, as *Benevolence*; as that *Attraction* which causes the Cohesion of the Parts, is as necessary to the *regular State*

*State of the Whole, as Gravitation.* With- Sect. 7.  
 out these additional Motives, *Self-love* would  
 generally oppose the Motions of *Benevo-*  
*lence*, and concur with *Malice*, or influence  
 us to the same Actions which *Malice* would.  
 “ That Tenour of Action then, which  
 “ would take away the stronger Ties of  
 “ *Benevolence*, or the additional Motives  
 “ of *Honour* and *Advantage*, from our  
 “ *Minds*, and so hinder us from pursuing  
 “ *industriously* that Course which really  
 “ increases the *Good* of the *Whole*, is  
 “ *evil*; and we are oblig’d to shun it.”

FIRST then, the depriving any Person of  
 the Fruits of his own innocent Labour, takes  
 away all Motives to *Industry* from *Self-*  
*love*, or the nearer *Ties*; and leaves us no  
 other Motive than *general Benevolence*:  
 nay, it exposes the *Industrious* as a constant  
 Prey to the *Slothful*, and sets *Self-love*  
 against *Industry*. This is the Ground of  
 our *Right* of *Dominion* and *Property* in  
 the *Fruits* of our *Labours*; without which  
*Right*, we could scarce hope for any *In-*  
*dustry*, or any thing beyond the Product of  
 uncultivated Nature. *Industry* will be con-  
 fin’d to our present Necessitys, and cease  
 when they are provided for; at least it will  
 only continue from the weak Motive of  
*general Benevolence*, if we are not allow’d  
 to store up beyond present Necessity, and  
 to dispose of what is above our Necessitys,  
 2 either



*Sect. 7.* either in Barter for other kinds of Necessaries, or for the Service of our Friends or Familys. And hence appears the *Right* which Men have to lay up for the *future*, the Goods which will not be spoil'd by it; of alienating them in *Trade*; of Donation to *Friends, Children, Relations*: otherwise we deprive *Industry* of all the Motives of *Self-love, Friendship, Gratitude, and natural Affection*. The same Foundation there is for the *Right* of Disposition by *Testament*. The *Presumption* of this Disposition, is the Ground of the *Right* of Succession to the *Intestate*.

THE *external Right* of the *Miser* to his useless Hoards, is founded also on this, that allowing Persons by Violence, or without Consent of the Acquirer, to take the Use of his Acquisitions, would discourage *Industry*, and take away all the Pleasures of *Generosity, Honour, Charity*, which cease when Men can be forc'd to these Actions. Besides, there is no determining in many Cases, who is a *Miser*, and who is not.

*Right of Marriage.*

MARRIAGE must be so constituted as to ascertain the Offspring; otherwise we take away from the *Males* one of the strongest Motives to *publick Good*, viz. *natural Affection*; and discourage *Industry*, as has been shewn above.

THE

THE *Labour* of each Man cannot furnish him with all Necessaries, tho it may furnish him with a needlets Plenty of one sort : Hence the *Right of Commerce*, and alienating our Goods ; and also the *Rights* from *Contracts* and *Promises*, either to the *Goods* acquir'd by others, or to their *Labours*.

THE great Advantages which accrue to Mankind from unprejudic'd *Arbitrators*, impower'd to decide the *Controversys* which ordinarily arise, thro the partiality of *Self-love*, among Neighbours ; as also from prudent Directors, who should not only instruct the Multitude in the best Methods of promoting the *publick Good*, and of defending themselves against mutual or foreign *Injurys* ; but also be arm'd with Force sufficient to make their Decrees or Orders effectual at home, and the Society formidable abroad : these Advantages, I say, sufficiently shew the *Right Men* have to constitute *Civil Government*, and to subject their *alienable Rights* to the Disposal of their Governours, under such *Limitations* as their Prudence suggests. And as far as the People have subjected their *Rights*, so far their Governours have an *external Right* at least, to dispose of them, as their Prudence shall direct, for attaining the Ends of their Institution ; and no further.

IX. THESE

## Sect. 7.

Corollarys  
for compa-  
ring the  
degrees of  
Virtue and  
Vice in Ac-  
tions.

IX. THESE Instances may shew how our *moral Sense*, by a little Reflection upon the tendencys of Actions, may adjust the *Rights of Mankind*. Let us now apply the general Canon laid down above\*, for comparing the Degrees of *Virtue* and *Vice* in Actions, in a few Corollarys besides that one already deduc'd ‡.

From A-  
bility.

I. THE Disappointment, in whole or in part, of any Attempt, *Good* or *Evil*, if it be occasion'd only by external Force, or any unforeseen Accident, does not vary the *moral Good*, or *Evil*; for as in *good* Attempts, the *Moment of Good*, or [M] is diminish'd, or vanishes in such a case, so does the *Ability*, or [A] likewise: The *Quotient* then may still be the same. This holds equally in *evil* Attempts. So that Actions are not to be judg'd *good* or *evil* by the Events, any further than they might have been foreseen by the *Agent* in *evil* Attempts; or were actually intended, if they were *good*, in *good* Actions; for then only they argue either *Love* or *Hatred* in the *Agent*.

Interest.

2. SECULAR Rewards annex'd to *Virtue*, and actually influencing the *Agent* fur-

\* See Sect. iii. Art. 11, 12.

‡ See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 3.



ther than his *Benevolence* would, diminish Sect. 7.  
 the *moral Good* as far as they were neces-  
 sary to move the *Agent* to the Action, or  
 to make him do more *Good* than otherwise  
 he would have done ; for by increasing the  
*Interest*, or [I] *positive*, to be subtracted,  
 they diminish the *Benevolence*. But *addi-*  
*tional Interests* which were not necessary  
 to have mov'd the *Agent*, such as the *Re-*  
*wards* of a good *Being* for Actions which  
 he would have undertaken without a *Re-*  
*ward*, do not diminish the *Virtue*. In this  
 however no Mortal is capable of judging  
 another. Nor do the Prospects of *grateful*  
*Returns* for Benefits which we would have  
 conferr'd gratuitously, diminish the *Gene-*  
*rosity*. This Corollary may be apply'd to  
 the *Rewards* of a *future State*, if any Per-  
 son conceives them distinct from the Plea-  
 sures of *Virtue* itself: If they be not con-  
 ceiv'd as something distinct from those  
 Pleasures, then the very Desire of them  
 is a strong Evidence of a *virtuous Dispo-*  
*sition*.

3. EXTERNAL *Advantage* exciting us  
 to Actions of *evil* Tendency to others, if  
 without this Prospect of *Advantage* we  
 would not have undertaken them, diminishes  
 the *Evil* of the Action ; such as the Pros-  
 pects of *great Rewards*, of avoiding *Tor-*  
*tures*, or even the *uneasy Sollicitations* of  
 violent *selfish Passions*. This is com-  
 U monly



Sect. 7. monly call'd the *greatness of Temptation*.

~~~~~ The reason of this is the same with that in the former Case, since  $H = \frac{\mu - I}{A}$ . We may here also remember again, that we are more uneasy upon the presence of *Pain*, than upon the absence of *Good*; and hence *Torture* is a more extenuating Circumstance than *Bribes*, engaging us to *Evil*, because [1] is greater.

Detriment. 4. THE surmounting the uneasy Sollicitations of the *selfish Passions*, increases the *Virtue* of a *benevolent Action*, and much more worldly Losses, Toil, &c. for now the *Interest* becomes *negative*; the Subtraction of which increales the *Quantity*.

5. A MALICIOUS Action is made the more odious by all its foreseen *Disadvantages* to the *Agent*, for the same reason: particularly,

*Knowledge
of Laws,
how it af-
fects Ac-
tions.*

6. THE Knowledge of a *Law* prohibiting an *evil Action*, increases the *Evil* by increasing the *negative Interest* to be subtracted; for then the *ill-natur'd Inclination* must be so strong as to surmount all the Motives of *Self-love*, to avoid the Penaltys, and all the Motives of *Gratitude* toward the *Law-giver*. This is commonly call'd *sinning against Conscience*.

7. OFFICES of no *Toil* or *Expence*, have little *Virtue* generally, because the *Ability* is very great, and there is no *contrary Interest* surmounted.

8. BUT the refusing of them may be very *vitious*, as it argues an absence of *good Affection*, and often produces a great enough *Moment of natural Evil*. And,

9. IN general, the fulfilling the *perfect Rights* of others has little *Virtue* in it; for thereby no *Moment of Good* is produc'd more than there was before; and the *Interest* engaging to the Action is very great, even the avoiding all the Evils of *War* in a *State of Nature*. *Degree of Right.*

10. BUT the *violating perfect*, or even *external Rights*, is always *exceedingly evil*, either in the immediate, or more remote Consequences of the Action; and the *selfish* Motives surmounted by this *vitious* Inclination, are the same with those in the former Case.

11. THE truest Matter of Praise are those Actions or Offices which others claim from us by an *imperfect Right*; and generally, the stronger their *Right* is, there is the less *Virtue* in fulfilling it, but the greater *Vice* in violating it.


Sect. 7.

Strength
of Ties.

LEMMA. The stronger Ties of *Benevolence*, in *equal Abilitys*, must produce a greater *Moment of Good*, in *equally good Characters*, than the weaker Ties. Thus, *natural Affection*, *Gratitude*, *Friendship*, have greater Effects than *general Benevolence*. Hence,


12. IN *equal Moments of Good* produc'd by two *Agents*, when one acts from *general Benevolence*, and the other from a *nearer Tie*; there is greater *Virtue* in the *Agent*, who produces *equal Good* from the weaker Attachment, and less *Virtue*, where there is the stronger Attachment, which yet produces no more.

13. BUT the Omission of the *good Offices* of the stronger Ties, or Actions *contrary* to them, have greater *Vice* in them, than the like Omissions or Actions *contrary* to the weaker Ties; since our *Selfishness* or *Malice* must appear the greater, by the strength of the contrary Attachment which it surmounts. Thus, in co-operating with *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or *Friendship*, we evidence less *Virtue* in any given *Moment of Good* produc'd, than in equally important Actions of *general Benevolence*: But *Ingratitude* to a *Benefactor*, *Negligence* of the *Interests* of a *Friend*, or *Relation*; or Returns of *evil Offices*, are vastly more odious,

odious, than equal Negligence, or evil Sect. 7.
Offices toward Strangers. 

14. WHEN we cannot at once follow two different Inclinations of *Benevolence*, we are to prefer gratifying the stronger Inclination; according to the wise Order of NATURE, who has constituted these Attachments. Thus, we are rather to be *Grateful* than *Liberal*, rather serve a *Friend*, or *Kinsman*, than a *Stranger* of only *equal Virtue*, when we cannot do both.

15. OR, more generally, since there can be no *Right*, *Claim*, or *Obligation* to *Impossibilitys*; when two *Actions* to be done by any Agent, would both tend to the good of Mankind, but they cannot be perform'd both at once; that which occasions most *Good* is to be done, if the Omission of the other occasions no pre-pollent *Evil*. If the omission of either, will occasion some *new natural Evil*, that is to be omitted, whose Omission will occasion the least *Evil*. Thus, if two Persons of unequal Dignity be in Danger, we are to relieve the more *valuable*, when we cannot relieve both. *Ingratitude*, as it evidences a worse Temper than neglect of *Beneficence*; so it raises worse Sentiments in the Benefactor, and greater Diffidence, and Suspicion of his Fellow.

Sect. 7.  Fellow-Creatures, than an Omission of an Act of Beneficence: we ought therefore to be *Grateful*, rather than *Beneficent*, when we cannot (in any particular Case) evidence both Dispositions. If omitting of one Action will occasion *new positive Evil*, or continuance in a State of *Pain*, whereas the Omission of another would only prevent some *new positive Good*; since a State of *Pain* is a greater Evil, than the absence of Good, we are to follow *Compassion*, rather than *Kindness*; and relieve the *Distressed*, rather than increase the Pleasures of the *Easy*; when we cannot do both at once, and other Circumstances of the Objects are equal. In such Cases, we should not suppose *contrary Obligations*, or *Dutys*; the more important Office is our *present Duty*, and the Omission of the less important inconsistent Office at present, is no *moral Evil*.

The Original of Government.

X. FROM Art. vii. it follows, "That
 " all human Power, or Authority, must
 " consist in a Right transferr'd to any
 " Person or Council, to dispose of the ali-
 " enable Rights of others; and that con-
 " sequently, there can be no Government
 " so absolute, as to have even an *external*
 " Right to do or command every thing."
 For wherever any Invasion is made upon
unalienable Rights, there must arise either
 a perfect, or external Right to Resistance.

The

The only Restraints of a moral Kind upon Subjects in such cases, are, when they foresee that, thro' their want of Force, they shall probably by Resistance occasion greater Evils to the Publick, than those they attempt to remove; or when they find that *Governours*, in the main very useful to the Publick, have by some unadvised Passion, done an Injury too small to overballance the Advantages of their Administration, or the Evils which Resistance would in all likelihood occasion; especially when the Injury is of a private Nature, and not likely to be made a Precedent to the ruin of others. *Unalienable Rights* are essential Limitations in all Governments.

BUT by *absolute Government*, either in Prince, or Council, or in both jointly, we understand a Right to dispose of the natural Force, and Goods of a whole People, as far as they are naturally alienable, according to the Prudence of the Prince, Council, or of both jointly, for the publick Good of the State, or whole People; without any Reservation as to the Quantity of the Goods, manner of Levying, or the proportion of the Labours of the Subject, which they shall demand. But in all States this tacit Trust is presuppos'd, "that the Power conferr'd shall be employ'd according to the best Judgment of the Rulers for the publick Good." So that

*Absolute
Govern-
ment.*

Sect. 7. whenever the Governours openly profess a Design of destroying the State, or act in such a manner as will necessarily do it; the *essential Trust*, suppos'd in all conveyance of *Civil Power*, is violated, and the *Grant* thereby made void.

Limited
Govern-
ment.

A PRINCE, or Council, or both jointly, may be variously Limited; *either when the Consent of the one may be necessary to the validity of the Acts of the other; or when, in the very Constitution of this supreme Power, certain Affairs are expressly exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Prince, or Council, or both jointly:* as when several independent States uniting, form a general Council, from whose Cognizance they expressly reserve certain Privileges, in the very Formation of this Council; or when in the very Constitution of any State, a certain Method of *Election* of the Person of the Prince, or of the Members of the supreme Council is determin'd, and the *Intention* of their Assembling declar'd. In all such cases, it is not in the Power of such Prince, Council, or both jointly, to alter the very *Form of Government*, or to take away that Right which the People have to be govern'd in such a manner, by a Prince, or Council thus elected, without the universal Consent of the very People who have subjected themselves to this Form of Govern-

Government. So that there may be a Sect. 7.
 very *regular State*, where there is no
 universal absolute Power, lodg'd either in
 one Person, or Council, or in any other
 Assembly beside that of the whole People
 associated into that State. To say, that upon
 a Change attempted in the very *Form of the*
Government, by the *supreme Power*, the
 People have no Remedy according to the
 Constitution itself, will not prove that the
supreme Power has such a *Right*; unless
 we confound all Ideas of *Right* with those
 of *external Force*. The only Remedy in-
 deed in that Case, is an universal Insurrec-
 tion against such *perfidious Trustees*.

DESPOTICK Power, is that which Per-
 sons injur'd may acquire over those Cri-
 minals, whose Lives, consistently with the
 publick Safety, they may prolong, that by
 their Labours they may repair the Da-
 mages they have done; or over those who
 stand oblig'd to a greater Value, than all
 their Goods and Labours can possibly a-
 mount to. This Power itself, is limited to
 the Goods and Labours only of the Crimi-
 nals or Debtors; and includes no Right
 to Tortures, Prostitution, or any Rights
 of the Governed which are *naturally Un-*
alienable; or to any thing which is not of
 some Moment toward Repair of Damage,
 Payment of Debt, or Security against fu-
 ture Offences. The Characteristick of de-
 spotick

The Nature
 of despotick
 Power.

Sect. 7. *Spotick Power*, is this, “ that it is solely
 “ intended for the good of the Gover-
 “ nours, without any *tacit Trust* of con-
 “ sulting the good of the *Governed*.” De-
 spotick Government, in this Sense, is direct-
 ly inconsistent with the Notion of Civil
 Government.

FROM the Idea of *Right*, as above ex-
 plain’d, we must necessarily conclude, “ that
 “ there can be no *Right*, or *Limitation of*
 “ *Right*, inconsistent with, or opposite to
 “ the greatest publick Good.” And there-
 fore in Cases of *extreme Necessity*, when
 the State cannot otherwise be preserv’d from
 Ruin, it must certainly be *Just* and *Good*
 in limited Governours, or in any other
 Persons who can do it, to use the Force of
 the State for its own preservation, beyond
 the Limits fix’d by the *Constitution*, in
 some *transitory Acts*, which are not to be
 made *Precedents*. And on the other hand,
 when an *equal Necessity* to avoid Ruin re-
 quires it, the Subjects may justly resume
 the Powers ordinarily lodg’d in their Go-
 vernours, or may counteract them. This
 Privilege of *flagrant Necessity*, we all al-
 low in defence of the most perfect *private*
Rights: And if *publick Rights* are of
 more extensive Importance, so are also *pub-
 lick Necessitys*. These Necessitys must be
 very grievous and flagrant, otherwise they
 can never over-ballance the *Evils* of vio-
 lating

lating a tolerable Constitution, by *an arbitrary act of Power*, on the one hand; or by an Insurrection, or Civil War, on the other. No Person, or State can be happy, where they do not think their *important Rights* are secur'd from the *Cruelty, Avarice, Ambition, or Caprice* of their Governours. Nor can any *Magistracy* be safe, or effectual for the ends of its Institution, where there are frequent Terrors of *Insurrections*. Whatever *temporary Acts* therefore may be allow'd in extraordinary Cases; whatever may be lawful in the *transitory Act* of a bold Legislator, who without previous Consent should rescue a slavish Nation, and place their Affairs so in the Hands of a *Person, or Council, elected, or limited* by themselves, that they should soon have Confidence in their own Safety, and in the Wisdom of the Administration; yet, as to the fixed State which should ordinarily obtain in all Communitys, since no *Assumer* of Government, can so demonstrate his superior Wisdom or Goodness to the satisfaction and security of the Governed, as is necessary to their Happiness; this must follow,

“ That except when Men, for their *own Interest*, or out of *publick Love*, have by

“ *Consent* subjected their Actions, or their

“ Goods within certain Limits to the Disposal of others; no Mortal can have

“ a *Right* from his *superior Wisdom*, or

“ Good-

Sect. 7.

Sect. 7. " *Goodness*, or any other *Quality*, to give
 " Laws to others without their *Consent*,
 " *express* or *tacit* ; or to dispose of the
 " *Fruits* of their Labours, or of any o-
 " ther *Right* whatsoever." And therefore
superior Wisdom, or *Goodness*, gives no
Right to Men to govern others.

*Divine Go-
 vernment
 founded on
 Wisdom
 and Good-
 ness.*

BUT then with relation to the DEITY, suppos'd *omniscient* and *benevolent*, and secure from *Indigence*, the ordinary Cause of Injurys toward others ; it must be *amiable* in such a *Being*, to assume the Government of *weak, inconstant Creatures*, often misled by *Selfishness* ; and to give them Laws. To these Laws every Mortal should submit from *publick Love*, as being contriv'd for the *Good* of the *Whole*, and for the *greatest private Good* consistent with it ; and every one may be sure, that he shall be better directed how to attain these Ends by the *Divine Laws*, than by his own greatest *Prudence* and *Circumspection*. Hence we imagine, " That a *good* and *wise* GOD
 " must have a *perfect Right* to govern the
 " *Universe* ; and that all Mortals are ob-
 " lig'd to *universal Obedience*."

*Divine
 Justice
 what.*

THE *Justice* of the DEITY is only a Conception of his *universal impartial Benevolence*, as it shall influence him, if he gives any Laws, to attemper them to the *universal Good*, and inforce them with the

most effectual Sanctions of Rewards and Sect. 7.
Punishments.

XI. SOME imagine that the *Property* Creation
the *Creator* has in all his Works, must be not the
the *true* Foundation of his *Right* to go- Ground of
vern. Among Men indeed, we find it ne- God's Do-
cessary for the *publick* Good, that none minion.
should arbitrarily dispose of the Goods ac-
quir'd by the Labour of another, which
we call his *Property*; and hence we ima-
gine that *Creation* is the *only* Foundation
of GOD's *Dominion*. But if the Reason *
of establishing the *Rights* of *Property* does
not hold against a *perfectly* wise and be-
nevolent Being, I see no Reason why *Pro-*
perty should be necessary to his *Dominion*.
Now the Reason does not hold: For an
infinitely wise and good Being, could never
employ his assumed Authority to counter-
act the *universal* Good. The tie of *Grati-*
tude is stronger indeed than bare *Benevo-*
lence; and therefore supposing two *equally*
wise and good Beings, the one our *Creator*,
and the other not, we should think our
selves more oblig'd to obey our *Creator*.
But supposing our *Creator* *malicious*, and a
good Being condescending to rescue us, or
govern us better, with sufficient Power to
accomplish his kind Intentions; his *Right*
to govern would be perfectly good. But

* See Art. 10. Par. 6. of this Section.

~ Sect. 7. this is rather matter of curious Speculation than Use; since both Titles of *Benevolence* and *Property* concur in the *one only true DEITY*, as far as we can know, join'd with *infinite Wisdom and Power*.

Our Moral
Sense the
Effect of
the Divine
Goodness.

XII. IF it be here enquir'd, " Could not
" the DEITY have given us a *different* or
" *contrary determination* of *Mind*, viz.
" to *approve* Actions upon another Foun-
" dation than *Benevolence*?" It is certain,
there is nothing in this surpassing the natu-
ral Power of the DEITY. But as in the first
Treatise *, we resolv'd the Constitution of
our present *Sense of Beauty* into the *divine*
Goodness, so with much more obvious Rea-
son may we ascribe the present Constitu-
tion of our *moral Sense* to his *Goodness*.
For if the DEITY be really *benevolent*, or
delights in the Happiness of others, he
could not *rationaly* act otherwise, or give
us a *moral Sense* upon another Foundation,
without counteracting his own *benevolent*
Intentions. For, even upon the Supposition
of a *contrary Sense*, every *rational Being*
must still have been solicitous in some de-
gree about his own external Happiness: Re-
flection on the Circumstances of Mankind
in this World would have suggested, that
universal Benevolence and a *social Temper*,
or a *certain Course* of external Actions,

* Sect. viii. Art. 2. Prop. 5.

would

would most effectually promote the *exter- Sect. 7.*
nal Good of every one, according to the Reasonings of CUMBERLAND and PUF-
 FENDORF; while at the same time this *per-*
verted Sense of *Morality* would have made
 us uneasy in such a Course, and inclin'd us
 to the quite contrary, *viz. Barbarity, Cru-*
elty, and Fraud; and *universal War*, ac-
 cording to Mr. HOBBS, would really have
 been our *natural State*; so that in every
 Action we must have been distracted by two
 contrary Principles, and perpetually mise-
 rable, and dissatisfy'd when we follow'd the
 Directions of either.

XIII. It has often been taken for granted in *these Papers*, "That the DEITY is *mo-*
 rally good;" tho the Reasoning is not at
 all built upon this Supposition. If we en-
 quire into the Reason of the great Agree-
 ment of Mankind in this Opinion, we shall
 perhaps find no demonstrative Arguments *a*
priori, from the Idea of an *Independent*
Being, to prove his *Goodness*. But there
 is abundant Probability, deduc'd from the
 whole *Frame* of *Nature*, which seems, as
 far as we know, plainly contriv'd for the
Good of the *Whole*; and the casual Evils
 seem the necessary Concomitants of some
 Mechanism design'd for vastly prepollent
Good. Nay, this very *moral Sense*, im-
 planted in *rational Agents*, to delight in,
 and admire whatever Actions flow from a

Whence
 this uni-
 versal Opi-
 nion of the
 Divine
 Goodness.

Sect. 7. Study of the *Good* of *others*, is one of the strongest Evidences of *Goodness* in the AUTHOR of *Nature*.

BUT these Reflections are no way so universal as the Opinion, nor are they often inculcated by any one. What then more probably leads *Mankind* into that Opinion, is this. The obvious *Frame* of the *World* gives us Ideas of *boundless Wisdom* and *Power* in its AUTHOR. Such a *Being* we cannot conceive *indigent*, and must conclude *happy*, and in the *best State* possible, since he can still gratify himself. The *best State* of *rational Agents*, and their *greatest* and most *worthy Happiness*, we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in *universal efficacious Benevolence*: and hence we conclude the DEITY *benevolent* in the most *universal impartial manner*. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves the Name of *Perfection* but *Benevolence*; and those *Capacitys* or *Abilitys* which are necessary to make it *effectual*; such as *Wisdom*, and *Power*: at least we can have no other valuable Conception of it.



FINIS.

